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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the effects of corporate culture and 
investor psychology on corporate decisions and financial markets. The first essay focuses on the 
role of corporate culture in acquisitions, whereas the last two essays investigate deviations from 
market efficiency. 
The first essay uses textual analysis of firms’ annual reports to develop an estimate of the 
differences in corporate cultures of the combining firms, and finds that greater cultural differences 
between the firms lead to higher synergistic gains, but only when the acquirer has a stronger culture 
than its target. The synergy gains concentrate among deals where the acquirer’s values are not 
antagonistic to the target’s. Further analysis of profitability and productivity (measured as earnings 
per employee) around the acquisition transaction corroborates these findings. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that differences in corporate culture are an important driver of announcement returns in 
mergers and acquisitions. 
The second essay investigates whether stock misvaluation drives industry-level merger waves 
by examining intra-wave patterns in acquirers’ valuation levels in a sample of acquisitions during 
1981-2010. The essay contrasts two types of merger waves: “stock” waves defined on pure stock 
acquisitions, and “cash” waves formed on pure cash offers. Consistent with the misvaluation 
hypothesis, the essay finds that the occurrence of stock merger waves is tightly associated with 
industry stock valuation, and bidder stock valuation is negatively associated with long-run 
abnormal returns, especially so during waves of stock mergers. In contrast, there is little evidence 
of such patterns using the cash wave definition.  
The third essay investigates the effects of sunshine, wind, rain, snow, and temperature on daily 
index returns of 49 countries from 1973 to 2012. The paper finds pervasive weather effects that 
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vary across temperature regions (cold, hot, and mild) and months. A hedge strategy that exploits 
the return predictability of daily weather generates up to 25% (11.8%) annualized out-of-sample 
gross (net) profits during 1993-2012. The systematic patterns of weather effects together with the 
relationship between their strength and timing and individuals’ seasonal propensity to spend time 
outdoors, suggest a plausible mechanism through which weather-induced mood influences index 
returns.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few decades and with increasing frequency, researchers have highlighted 
empirical phenomena that are in direct violations of the fundamental premises of traditional 
finance models (see Barberis and Thaler, 2003, and Baker, Ruback and Wurgler, 2004, for a survey 
of the literature). For example, violations to efficient market hypothesis have been documented 
and there are now numerous articles that present evidence consistent with the irrational investors 
assumption (see Baker, Ruback and Wurgler, 2004 for a brief review). Although the behavioral 
finance literature is abundant, there are still many instances where either the empirical evidence is 
divided, or no empirical link has been established. In this dissertation, I consider three of such 
situations. 
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay investigates the role of corporate 
culture in mergers and acquisitions. Anthropologists have long defined culture as the full range of 
learned human behavior patterns (Tylor, 1871). To the extent that corporations are manned by 
human beings and that corporate culture reflects, in great part, the culture of the corporation’s 
members, this essay examines the financial implications of the intersection of learned corporate 
(human) behavior and corporate policy, in this case, mergers and acquisitions.  
Indeed, the first essay of the dissertation, Cultural Differences, Synergies and Mergers and 
Acquisitions, examines how differences in the acquirer’s and its target’s corporate cultures relate 
to the combined post-announcement abnormal stock performance. Surveys of executives report 
that cultural differences are relevant to acquisition success. For example, approximately half of the 
executives in Graham et al.’s (2016) sample would not acquire a “culturally misaligned” target, 
although no precise definition of cultural alignment is offered. However, theory predicts both 
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negative (for instance, Tajfel’s, 1982; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998) and positive (e.g. Watson et 
al., 1993) relations between cultural differences and mergers outcomes. Whether differences in 
corporate cultures are positively or negatively related to synergistic gains in mergers is ultimately 
an empirical issue. 
I use textual analysis of the acquirers’ and targets’ annual reports (10-K forms) to develop an 
estimate of the differences in corporate cultures between the merging entities. I draw on Cameron 
et al.’s (2006) Competing Values Framework to describe corporate culture in terms of four values, 
namely, creativity, competition, collaboration and control. Cultural distance (CD) is the Euclidean 
distance, across the four cultural values, between an acquirer and its target. The measure is well 
calibrated: Chapter 2 provides the results of various tests that validate the measure as a proxy for 
the intensity of the analyzed values in the sample firms. Textual analysis-based measures of 
cultural values allow for a larger sample than is typical in earlier studies (see for example, Hartnell, 
Ou and Kinicki, 2011), while also permitting a more precise estimation of cultural values, relative 
to proxies such as being listed on Fortune’s Best Companies to Work For ranking.  
Using a sample of hypothetical acquirer-target pairs, where targets are matched to real 
targets by industry, market capitalization and market-to-book ratios of equity, the essay documents 
a negative relation between the probability that a firm will be targeted by an acquirer and the 
cultural distance between said acquirer and the potential target.  
Given these selection issues, and consistent with theoretical predictions, announced 
acquisitions between culturally different firms must either create value, if cultural distance is 
related to expected synergies, or destroy value, if cultural distance relates to frictions not accounted 
for by the management team. Using the acquirer’s and target’s combined cumulative abnormal 
announcement returns measured over three days centered on the announcement day as a proxy for 
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synergistic gains, I find a positive relation between CD and combined announcement returns, even 
after controlling for deal, bidder and target characteristics, state-level differences in the economic, 
geographic and social environments, and the selection effects documented above. The CD effect 
is economically significant: a one-standard deviation increase in the cultural distance translates 
into an increase of approximately 1% in combined three-day abnormal returns, which amounts to 
about one third of the combined abnormal returns. 
However, I find a discontinuity in the CD effect. Conceptually, if corporate culture is a 
valuable intangible asset, strong-culture firms should be more profitable and productive than weak-
culture firms, and differences in corporate cultures should benefit an acquirer only if the acquirer 
has the cultural strength to assimilate the target. Chapter 2 thus defines a measure of cultural 
strength. It then provides empirical evidence that culturally stronger firms are more profitable and 
efficient than culturally-weak firms and, in line with the prediction, finds that the positive relation 
between cultural distance and combined abnormal announcement returns arises only in the 
subsample of acquirers that are culturally stronger than their targets.  
The announcement returns tests suggest that differences in corporate cultures correlate, at least 
partially, to expected operating synergies. Regressions of post-merger industry-adjusted operating 
performance on pre-merger industry-adjusted operating performance provide evidence consistent 
with the prediction. Post-merger increases in industry-adjusted operating performance are larger 
for acquirers culturally stronger than their target.  
In short, Chapter 2 shows that human values and behavior, and corporate cultural values by 
extension, have a financial impact on the firm. The other essays of this dissertation examine other 
instances where investors behavior interacts with corporations and financial markets. 
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Chapter 3, Does Stock Misvaluation Drive Merger Waves?1, considers possible explanations 
for the occurrence of observed merger waves, defined as periods of industry-specific increased 
merger activity. More specifically, we contrast two hypotheses: the neoclassical theory (also 
known as the Q hypothesis) which posits that merger activity is driven by synergy and efficiency 
factors and by extension, that merger waves are caused by economic and regulatory shocks, and 
the misvaluation hypothesis, which predicts that stock misvaluation affects merger intensity. 
Under the misvaluation hypothesis, merger waves are triggered by sufficiently large deviations of 
stock prices from fundamental values.  
In contrast to previous studies of merger waves, we define two sets of industry-specific merger 
waves: stock waves are defined on the subsample of acquisitions paid by pure stock, and cash 
waves are defined using the subsample of pure cash acquisitions. These merger waves indicate 
periods of increased industry-specific merger activity, where merger activity is measured using 
either pure stock deals or pure cash deals. Of course, deals of all considerations are announced 
during these periods of intense merger activity; contrasting their patterns in valuations and post-
announcement returns provides an adequate setting for our tests.  
Namely, we distinguish the misvaluation hypothesis from the Q hypothesis using two 
approaches. First, we test whether there is a positive association between bidder valuation levels 
and the occurrence of merger waves, and whether the strength of this association is the same 
irrespective of the wave definition (stock versus cash wave). According to the Q hypothesis, 
because the level of stock valuation reflects firms’ fundamentals and merger waves are triggered 
by economic factors such as deregulations, the strength of the relation between valuation levels 
and merger activity should be the same, independently of the deal consideration. In contrast, 
                                                          
1 The second and third essays are co-authored with Ming Dong.  
5 
 
according to the misvaluation hypothesis, that relation should be especially strong for deals paid 
entirely by stock. Second, we examine bidder long-run stock performance around merger waves. 
If merger waves result from firms acting in response to economic shocks, acquisitions announced 
during waves should create bidder shareholder value. However, overvaluation-driven merger 
waves should be associated with poor post-announcement abnormal stock performance of the 
acquirers. 
We use a broad sample of U.S. domestic mergers and acquisitions announced between 1981 
and 2010. To define our misvaluation proxy, we apply the residual income model of Ohlson 
(1995), sometimes called “intrinsic value” (V), and use the ratio of this value to market price (VP). 
We find that bidder valuation peaks exactly during in-wave periods, relative to pre-, post- and non-
wave periods; this valuation spread is much larger around stock waves than around cash waves. 
Logit tests of the likelihood of merger wave occurrence confirm our results. These findings support 
the misvaluation hypothesis because the effects of industry equity valuation on industry-specific 
merger intensity are contingent on the definition of merger waves (stock versus cash waves).  
We also examine the post-bid long-run returns of the acquirers to further distinguish the 
misvaluation hypothesis from the Q hypothesis. Long-run performance is measured by the buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), where benchmark portfolios are matched on size and market-
to-book ratios. Under the Q hypothesis, in-wave bidders should benefit the most in the post-
announcement period, because their high valuation indicates high growth prospects. However, we 
find that in-wave acquirers have the lowest 5-year BHARs, when using the stock waves definition. 
Furthermore, in multivariate regressions of BHARs on bidder valuation and merger phase indicator 
variables, we find that in- and post-wave bidders perform significantly worse than pre-wave and 
non-wave bidders, and this effect is stronger for bidders with high valuation. However, we observe 
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no clear patterns of bidder long-run abnormal stock performance around cash merger waves. These 
results lend further support to the misvaluation hypothesis. Therefore, even though Chapter 3 does 
not explore why misvaluation arises, it presents evidence consistent with the persisting existence 
of firm and industry-level misvaluation and its consequences on acquisitions decisions.  
The third essay of this dissertation, Chapter 4: Does the Weather Influence Global Stock 
Returns?, examines another violation to the efficient market hypothesis, as well as a departure 
from the assumption that investors are purely rational. In this case, the essay explores the relation 
between investors psychology and mood and stock returns. Because there is no ambiguity in 
causality between the weather and stock returns, and because daily weather conditions are 
exogenous and transitory events, considering the influence of weather on stock returns provides a 
clean setting to test whether investors’ mood relates to stock returns.  
There are strong reasons to believe that the psychological effects of weather on mood, 
optimism or risk-taking vary with regional and seasonal conditions. Indeed, the psychology 
literature reports that the valence of mood is sensitive to temperature. In addition, some weather 
phenomena (e.g. snow) are climate-contingent. Therefore, we analyze a wide range of weather 
variables, allowing for the possibility that the weather effects vary by climate and season. 
More specifically, we investigate the effects of five weather variables—sunshine, wind speed, 
rain, snow depth on the ground, and temperature—on nominal daily index returns of 49 countries 
from 1973 to 2012. We use daily weather variables observed in the cities where our sample 
countries’ national exchanges are located as proxies for the most relevant conditions for each 
country, and conduct both ordinary least squares regressions (of daily returns) and logit regressions 
(of the probability of a positive return) on the weather variables. Contrary to the previous literature, 
we sort the countries into three groups based on the average annual temperature, shift the timing 
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of countries in the Southern Hemisphere by six months to align the seasons, and conduct month-
by-month tests for each temperature region. 
The regression results indicate statistical significance of all five weather variables. To confirm 
that our results are not driven by a spurious relation between weather and returns, we test the 
profitability of a trading strategy based purely on the predictability of the daily weather. Our out-
of-sample tests indicate that the hedge portfolios generate annualized gross returns as high as 25% 
during 1993-2012. Our second approach to ensure that the weather-returns relation is not spurious 
is to evaluate whether the patterns of monthly weather effects found in both the OLS and logit tests 
can be interpreted in a systematic way that is consistent with finance and psychology theories. We 
find that in general, “comfortable weather”, which is climate and season specific, is positively 
associated with returns. In addition, using estimates of time spent outdoors, we find that these 
weather effects are stronger when people spend more time outdoors or when outdoor time is more 
valuable. Taken together, our results show that the weather effects are real and support the 
hypothesis that comfortable weather conditions promote investor optimism and lead to high stock 
returns, especially during seasons of increased outdoor activity. 
In short, this dissertation examines three instances where finance intersects with culture, 
human behavior and psychology. The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 
introduces the essay Cultural Differences, Synergies and Mergers and Acquisitions. The essay 
Does Stock Misvaluation Drive Merger Waves? is presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 consists 
of the essay Does the Weather Influence Global Stock Returns? Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and 
offers future research avenues.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Cultural Differences, Synergies and Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
“When you merge cultures well, value is created.” 
 
George Bradt, “The Root Cause of Every Merger's 
Success or Failure: Culture”, Forbes, August 29, 2015. 
2.1 Introduction 
In a recent article, Graham et al. (2016) report that 78% of the executives they survey 
believe that corporate culture is one of the principal factors affecting firm value. Consistent with 
this view, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2015) find that a culture of trust is associated with 
stronger firm performance. The value-relevance of corporate culture has motivated the creation of 
a new literature that examines the effects of culture on corporate policies such as CEO turnover 
(Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014), financial reporting risk (Davidson, Dey and Smith, 2015), financial 
stability (McNulty and Akhigbe, 2015), or firm-level investment policy (Pan, Siegel and Wang, 
2015).  
I extend this literature by exploring the corporate culture effects in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). A priori, it is not clear whether cultural differences impact mergers and 
acquisitions. On the one hand, there is the notion that managers are generally unaware of corporate 
culture issues in M&As (AON Hewitt, 2011), and it is hard to argue that acquirers select targets 
on the basis of their cultural similarity. On the other hand, Graham et al. (2016) report that 
approximately half of the executives they survey would not acquire a target that is culturally 
misaligned, although no further definition of cultural misalignment is offered. Furthermore, any 
test of corporate culture effects is subject to noise in the measurement of corporate culture itself.  
Additionally, theory does not have a clear prediction on how cultural differences between 
the acquirer and target affect both the probability of target selection and synergistic gains from the 
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merger transaction. Indeed, on the one hand, the cultural adversity proposition suggests that a 
merger of culturally diverse firms produce frictions which could lead to stress, tension and other 
“soft” negative externalities. Under Tajfel’s (1982) and Williams and O’Reilly’s (1998) theories, 
team members demonstrate favoritism towards culturally similar, inner-team members, in 
opposition to the treatment for outer-group people. This inter-group bias may hinder the sharing 
of information during post-acquisition integration (for example, Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 
1996). In that scenario, the unobservable integration costs increase with the acquirer-target cultural 
distance, which could lead, if anticipated at the announcement, to lower announcement returns. 
On the other hand, the information processing theory (e.g., Watson et al., 1993) proposes 
that in culturally diverse teams, team members benefit from a broader range of perspectives, which 
leads to enhanced problem-solving, creativity, innovation and adaptability. Under that theory, 
cultural differences are associated with expected operating synergies. The information processing 
theory thus predicts that a greater cultural distance is associated to higher announcement returns.  
Therefore, whether the combining firms’ cultural differences are positively or negatively 
related to wealth effects is ultimately an empirical issue that I examine in this paper. In contrast 
with previous studies (for instance, Bargeron, Lehn and Smith (2015), Bereskin et al. (2016) and 
Pan, Siegel and Wang (2015)), I use textual analysis of the acquirers’ and targets’ annual reports 
(10-K forms) to develop an estimate of the differences in corporate cultures between the merging 
entities. I draw on Cameron et al.’s (2006) Competing Values Framework to describe corporate 
culture in terms of four values, namely, creativity, competition, collaboration and control. Cultural 
distance (CD) is thus the Euclidean distance across the four cultural values between an acquirer 
and its target.  
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I first examine whether the cultural attributes measures are well calibrated. I use OLS 
regressions to verify whether the four cultural attributes predict, in turn, R&D expenses, number 
of employees, profitability and asset turnover. I find that each cultural attribute significantly 
predicts the observable financial output that is theoretically associated with the attribute, and the 
economic significance of the correct attribute is the highest. To further support the evidence of 
non-random distribution of cultural attributes, I do not find such associations in placebo tests 
where I use a sample of randomly generated cultural attributes. Consistent with the definition of 
corporate culture, the paper also provides evidence of within-industry variation in cultural 
attributes.  
Using a sample of hypothetical acquirer-target pairs, where targets are matched to real 
targets by industry, market capitalization and market-to-book ratios of equity, I then test whether 
differences in corporate cultures between an acquirer and a potential target affect the probability 
that the potential target will be acquired. Consistent with the survey evidence reported by Graham 
et al. (2016), I find that potential acquisitions between firms with very different corporate cultures 
tend to fail the “cultural feasibility” test, and are either not considered or abort before the 
announcement. However, for the acquisitions between culturally different firms that are 
announced, the cultural distance is unrelated to the probability of acquisition completion.  
Given the selection issues documented, announced acquisitions between culturally 
different firms must either create value, if cultural distance is related to expected synergies, or 
destroy value, if cultural distance relates to frictions and managers do not diagnose cultural issues 
accurately before proceeding to the acquisition. I thus examine the post-announcement wealth 
effects associated with cultural differences. If cultural effects are anticipated or strongly associated 
with observable characteristics of the firms, their effects should be realized in full upon the 
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acquisition announcement, or earlier. Otherwise, if cultural effects occur (or are revealed) during 
the integration phase of the merger, they could impact long-term performance.  
I find that differences in corporate cultures positively impact the combined acquirer’s and 
target’s short-term announcement returns, a common proxy for synergies in the acquisitions 
literature. The effect is economically significant: a one-standard deviation increase in cultural 
distance translates into an increase of about 0.8% in combined three-day abnormal returns, which 
amounts to approximately 15-20% of the combined abnormal returns. The cultural distance effects 
remain after controlling for deal and firm characteristics, state-level differences in economic and 
cultural environments, product market synergies, quality of the acquirer’s corporate governance 
or market-wide policy uncertainty. The positive cultural distance effects remain in longer event 
windows. For example, high-distance acquirers earn higher six-month CAR than low-distance 
acquirers. I also find that the cultural effects remain in the longer term (24 and 36 months post-
announcement), but endogeneity concerns cast doubts over the causal link between cultural effects 
and long-run post-acquisition abnormal returns.  
To ensure that the reported results are not affected by the selection bias documented above, 
I use the sample of hypothetical acquirer-target pairs and estimate a two-stage model. The first 
stage is a probit regression of the probability that a randomly selected pair of firms is a real pair 
in merger announcements; the second stage is the OLS regression of combined abnormal 
announcement returns on the cultural distance variable and controls. I find that the cultural 
distance effects remain even after accounting for the selection bias.  
Drawing from the disciplinary takeovers literature, I condition the tests on the acquirer 
having a stronger culture than its target. Intuitively, if corporate culture is a valuable intangible 
asset, strong-culture firms should be more profitable and productive than weak-culture firms, and 
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differences in corporate cultures should benefit an acquirer only if the acquirer has the cultural 
strength to assimilate the target. This thesis is in line with Sørensen (2002), who finds a positive 
relation between the strength of corporate culture, defined as the intensity with which beliefs are 
held within the firm, and corporate performance. In other words, if strong-culture firms are more 
productive, the acquisition of a target by a strong-culture acquirer leads to a transfer of control of 
the target’s assets from the target management to the (more productive and more profitable) 
strong-culture acquirer management. All else being equal, the transfer of the target’s assets to a 
more productive, culturally strong firm should lead to value creation.  
I rank sample firms along their highest (normalized) cultural attributes and define strong-
culture (weak-culture) firms as the sample firms where the highest of the firm’s normalized 
cultural attributes is higher than the full sample median. I find evidence that strong-culture firms 
have higher market share, sales per employee, operating profit per employee and cash flows per 
employee than weak-culture firms. I also show that the cultural distance effects concentrate in the 
subsample of strong-culture acquirers, that is, acquirers with stronger corporate culture than their 
targets’.  
However, the relation between cultural differences and post-acquisition performance is not 
linear. Drawing on one prediction of Cameron et al.’s (2006) Competing Values Framework, I 
examine whether certain values are incompatible. Cameron et al.’s (2006) framework indeed states 
that certain pairs of values (e.g. creativity and control) compete against each other, resulting in 
higher frictions and, ultimately, cultural incompatibility. Consistent with the framework’s 
prediction, the results show that the positive relation between cultural distance and announcement 
returns is strongest for some levels of compatibility between the acquirer’s and target’s core 
values. 
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The main results of the paper are robust to alternative measures of firm’s culture (for 
example, Hofstede’s, 1980, O’Reilly et al.’s, 1991 and Fiordelisi and Ricci’s, 2014) and different 
methodologies of textual analysis. I compare the main findings with those that results from a 
limited KLD Socrates employee treatment dataset and a dataset of culture variables estimated from 
text analysis of job reviews web-scrapped from a career intelligence website. However, the 
alternative two datasets are too limited in size to reach meaningful conclusions.  
By documenting a positive relation between combined announcement returns and cultural 
differences, the announcement returns tests suggest that differences in corporate cultures correlate, 
at least partially, to expected operating synergies. To confirm this interpretation, I explore the 
changes in acquirers’ post-merger, industry-adjusted operating performance. Changes in post-
merger operating performance should be more positive for strong-culture acquirers, consistent 
with the results that strong-culture acquirers are more productive and profitable firms on average. 
Regressions of post-merger industry-adjusted operating performance on pre-merger industry-
adjusted operating performance provide evidence in line with the interpretation that cultural 
differences account for a portion of expected synergies. Namely, improvements in operating 
performance around the merger, measured by operating profit margin or net profit margin, are 
sharpest for strong-culture acquirers. Similarly, strong-culture acquirers’ asset turnover and return 
on assets decrease less around the merger, relative to weak-culture acquirers. 
This paper’s contributions are twofold. First, the paper confirms that differences in corporate 
cultures relate to both the probability of acquisition and wealth effects in mergers and acquisitions. 
By showing that greater differences in corporate cultures are associated with higher combined 
announcement returns and post-merger increases in industry-adjusted operating performance, the 
paper also suggests that differences in corporate cultures correlate with expected operating 
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synergies. Second, the paper confirms the relevance of corporate culture on corporate policies --
in this case, mergers, a finding attributable to the granularity of the CD measure (at the firm-level, 
and available dynamically).  
This paper is closely related to the literature that examines the impact of cultural distance 
on mergers and acquisitions. While Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi (2015) and Chakrabarti, Gupta-
Mukherjee and Jayaraman (2009) consider national cultures, other papers focus on corporate 
cultures instead. For instance, Bargeron, Lehn and Smith (2015) find that firms included in the 
Best Companies to Work For (BCW) list make smaller acquisitions and earn slightly larger 
announcement returns relative to comparable non-BCW firms, while Bereskin et al. (2016), using 
KLD data that encompass seven categories (community, corporate governance, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, human rights and products), report a positive relation between 
cultural similarity and announcement returns.2 Alexandridis et al. (2015) use a similar measure of 
corporate culture for a small sample of FTSE firms and find that cultural distance is negatively 
related to abnormal announcement returns and deal completion probability . 
Relatedly, Pan, Wang and Siegel (2015a and 2015b) trace back the cultural heritage of CEOs 
and executives to compute a firm-level Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) and find that high-
UAI firms undertake less acquisitions than low-UAI firms. While Pan, Wang and Siegel’s (2015a) 
focus is on understanding the origin of within-firm commonality in attitudes toward risk, the focus 
of this paper is on examining the effects of combining the merging firms’ workforces, taking the 
pre-announcement corporate cultures and skillsets as given.  
                                                          
2 While cultural values may affect a firm’s choices in any of these seven categories, Bereskin et al.’s (2016) definition 
of corporate culture is significantly broader in scope than mine. Additionally, for any individual variable, KLD does 
not report how strongly a firm emphasizes this dimension, relative to other variables/dimensions. For these two 
reasons, their results differ from mine.  
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This paper also contributes to the emerging literature on the relationship between corporate 
culture and corporate policies. This literature has documented a link between a firm’s corporate 
culture and its propensity to commit accounting fraud (Davidson, Dey and Smith, 2015), its 
governance (Popadak, 2014), its CEO tenure (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014), its corporate 
performance (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2015), and its risk-taking behavior (Stulz, 2016). 
Edmans (2011) and Edmans, Li, and Zhang (2014) also link work satisfaction to stock returns.  
Finally, this paper also adds to the literature that examines the source of acquisition-related 
synergies. For example, Hoberg and Philips (2010) show that product market synergies are a driver 
of acquisition activity, while Bena and Li (2014) report that the combination of innovation 
capabilities is another source of acquisition-related synergies. These conclusions are consistent 
with those of Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2009), who find that operating synergies 
are relatively more important than financial synergies. Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy’s 
(2009) proxy of expected synergies has great predictive power; unfortunately, its calculation 
requires firms to be followed by Value Line and is thus limited to large firms. In contrast, cultural 
distance can be estimated for any pair of public firms; the paper shows that differences in corporate 
cultures correlate with operating synergies.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the sample and 
methodological issues. Section 2.3 tests whether cultural distance relates to the probability of two 
firms merging. Section 2.4 examines the cultural distance effects on announcement returns while 
Section 2.5 explores the post-merger operating performance. Section 2.6 discusses further tests 
and Section 2.7 concludes.  
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2.1 Method and sample 
2.2.1 Cultural distance 
I follow the existing literature and define culture as a set of assumptions, beliefs and values, 
from which norms and roles are derived (among others, O’Reilly, 1991; Schein, 2009; Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2015). Crémer (1993) and Hermalin (2001) differentiate corporate 
cultures from national cultures by pointing that cross-sectional variations in corporate cultures 
prevail even at the domestic level and underlining the firm-specific nature of these beliefs and 
values; commonality in beliefs and values exists however among subsets of firms. Both Crémer 
(1993) and Hermalin (2001) conclude that corporate culture can be a valuable, intangible asset. 
To estimate the cultural distance between an acquirer and its target, I use textual analysis of 
the bidders’ and targets’ 10-K forms to extract scores that mirror the relative importance of specific 
values to the firm. The cultural distance is the Euclidean distance between the acquirers’ and 
targets’ scores across all values.  
More specifically, I follow Loughran and McDonald (2011) and retrieve 10-K and 10-K405 
forms from EDGAR for bidder and target firms involved in a domestic acquisition between 1994 
and 2014.3 I parse the 10-K forms and remove html tags, and stop words.4 The main results of this 
paper derive from the textual analysis of the full, parsed 10-K forms, although similar results 
obtain if I restrict the analysis to the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section.5 For 
                                                          
3 Firms whose executives did not disclose their insider trading information within the prescribed period are required 
to file form 10-K405 instead of form 10-K. I assume that any market reaction to the non-disclosure is priced 
immediately and therefore unlikely to affect significantly my results.  
4 I exclude negation words (no, not, neither, none, nobody, nowhere, nor, never) from stop words in order to make 
the identification of negative loadings on the culture variables possible; frequency counts of cultural variables that 
subtract 1 for each cultural word in the vicinity of a negation word are qualitatively similar to simple counts. In fact, 
Tottie (1991) finds that negation accounts for 1.28% of words in written English. Therefore, even if the negation-
adjusted algorithm does not capture all negated attributes, the low frequency of negation makes this non-detection 
nonconsequential. Results using negation-adjusted variables are therefore not reported. 
5 Results are also robust to imposing the restriction that 10-K forms have at least 2,000 or 3,000 words (Loughran and 
McDonald, 2014; Li, 2010).  
17 
 
each acquisition, I consider only the bidders’ and targets’ 10-K forms that are filed before the 
announcement.6 Appendix A1 provides more details about the parsing of 10-K forms.   
Deciding which values to measure is admittedly an ad hoc decision. Following Bouwman 
(2013), Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) and an established literature from the management field7, I use 
the values of the Competing Values Framework (CVF; Cameron et al., 2006). The CVF describes 
a firm’s corporate culture along two axes: stability versus flexibility and external focus versus 
internal focus, and the quadrants defined by the intersection of the axes correspond to four value-
driver-specific corporate cultures. The four-dimensional operationalization of the CVF 
comprehends four values (create, compete, control and collaborate); Figure 2.1 presents a 
graphical representation of the CVF.  
The arbitrariness of the selection of a given cultural framework is mitigated in great part by 
the extent to which cultural frameworks overlap. For example, Cameron et al.’s (2006) CVF 
parallels the super-groupings from Schwartz’s (1992) Value Inventory. Schwartz indeed classifies 
values along two axes, namely conservatism versus openness to change (similar to the individual 
flexibility versus stability control in the CVF) and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence 
(comparable to the internal versus external focus in the CVF). The CVF values therefore partially 
reflect those of Schwartz’s (1992) inventory, even though the CVF describes corporate culture 
whereas Schwartz’s framework was developed as a characterization of individuals’ values (as 
opposed to an organization). 
                                                          
6 To minimize the effects that extraordinary or unusual events (such as prior large investments, market crashes, etc.) 
discussed in the 10-K forms could have on the culture measures, I consider all 10-K forms filed prior to the 
announcement date, but after 1994. Such assumption is in line with the management literature, which defines 
corporate culture as the cumulative organizational knowledge that develops through time (for example, Cameron et 
al., 2006; Schein, 2010).  
7 For example, Hartnell, Ou and Kinicki (2011) perform a meta-analysis on 84 empirical studies that use the CVF; 
their initial search for CVF-based papers returned 4,637 articles, book chapters, dissertations and conference 
proceedings for consideration. 
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As a further robustness test, I also use the values proposed by O’Reilly et al. (1991), namely, 
adaptability, attention to detail, collaboration, customer orientation, integrity, results-orientation 
and transparency. Although Hofstede’s (1980) framework is now associated with national values, 
it was originally designed as a study of cross-country variations in within-firm (IBM) corporate 
cultures. As an additional robustness test, I thus estimate the importance of Hofstede’s values –
power distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, for the firms in the sample.  
For each value of each framework, I develop a lexical field of words related to this value, 
following Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014, for the CVF-based values), O’Reilly et al. (1991) and 
Hofstede (1980). I expand the fields using WordNet thesaurus. Appendix A2 presents the 
complete lexical fields developed for each value.8 I follow Tetlock (2007) and compute the 
frequency of the lexical fields’ words in the parsed 10-Ks. I aggregate the frequencies over each 
value and divide by the total number of words in the parsed 10-K forms.9 For each cultural 
dimension, Table 2.1 reports the top twenty words, by average frequency. Words that overlap with 
the financial lexicon and are expected in a 10-K form are indicated in bold figures.10  
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics of the cultural scores; Panel A provides statistics for 
the acquirers, whereas Panel B shows statistics for the targets. I find for example that 3.3% of the 
words in bidders’ 10-K forms relates to the value create, whereas 6.8%, 9.5% and 5.7% relate to, 
respectively, the values compete, control and collaborate.11  
                                                          
8 Appendix A2 presents the complete lexical fields; words are stemmed to facilitate the matching with the 10-K forms. 
Most results are robust to an operationalization of the CVF that uses Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) bags of words or a 
two-dimensional operationalization of the CVF that includes only two values, flexibility and external focus. 
9 I use the frequency counts for simplicity. However, the main results of the paper remain if I use weighted frequencies, 
following Loughran and McDonald’s (2001) term-weighting methodology. Section 2.6.1 has more details.  
10 The main results of this paper remain if I filter out the frequencies of financial words from the cultural scores. 
(results untabulated).   
11 The raw scores are higher than those reported by Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014), which is due in part to the extended 
lexical fields that I use. However, the ordering of the individual dimensions with respect to their frequency is 
respected: compete and control are the dimensions on which firms score the highest, on average, while create is the 
dimension on which firms score the lowest.  
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The distributions of the cultural scores are comparable with those reported by Fiordelisi 
and Ricci (2014), even if the mean cultural scores I find are slightly higher than Fiordelisi and 
Ricci’s. Notably, the maximum scores are very similar. For example, approximately 30% of 10-
K words relate to control; Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) report that 33.3% of the words in their 
sample 10-K forms relate to control. These frequencies are significantly higher than the positive 
and negative sentiment statistics reported by Loughran and McDonald (2011). This discrepancy 
arises principally because Loughran and McDonald (2011) do not remove stop words, whereas I 
follow Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) and eliminate the stop words listed in Appendix A1.  
I assess that the value loadings are well calibrated by confirming that each estimated value 
correlates strongly with an observable output that, according to Cameron et al.’s (2006) 
framework, should in theory be a manifestation of the measured value. I thus estimate the 
following OLS regressions: Outputit+1 = α + Createit + Collaborationit + Competeit + Controlit, 
where cultural scores and outputs are measured for each firm-year it. Table 2.3 presents the results. 
The dependent variable is an observable output measured in year t+1 and is, in turn, the R&D 
expenses scaled by total assets (Column 1), the number of employees (in thousands) scaled by 
total assets (Column 2), the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) scaled by sales (Column 3) 
or asset turnover, measured as EBIT scaled by total assets (Column 4). The economic significance 
of each cultural value is presented [in brackets] and is estimated as the change in the dependent 
variable associated with a one-standard deviation change in cultural distance, while maintaining 
the other independent variables at their sample means.  
I do not include any control variables in the regressions beyond the four cultural scores 
because cultural factors are unlikely to be the primary determinants of R&D expenses, number of 
employees, EBIT or asset turnover. Furthermore, the objective of these calibration tests is not to 
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accurately predict future economic outputs using cultural scores, but rather to confirm that the 
text-based cultural scores load on the appropriate factors.  
Table 2.3 reports that, in accordance with Cameron et al.’s (2006) theory, Create is the 
cultural value with the strongest association with R&D expenses (Column1; economic impact: 
0.0589, in contrast with 0.0165 for Compete and 0.0102 for Control). Similarly, Column 2 shows 
that Collaboration has the strongest association with the number of employees, scaled by total 
assets (0.1947, versus 0.166 for Control). In Column 3, Compete is the only cultural value 
positively and significantly associated with the operating margin, consistent with its description 
in Cameron et al.’s (2006) framework. Finally, Control, which is associated with efficiency, has 
the strongest association with asset turnover (Column 4, economic impact: 0.1761, versus 0.1468 
for Collaboration). These associations are all statistically significant at standard levels. Table 2.3’s 
findings thus support the interpretation that the text-based estimates of the firm-level cultural 
values provide relevant information about the strength of firm-level cultural values.  
To ensure that my multivariate results are not driven by the fundamental factors (R&D 
expenses, number of employees, ROA and profitability) that correlate with cultural values, I add 
the fundamental factors as control variables in the multivariate regressions of announcement 
returns (results untabulated) and find that results remain similar. Therefore, cultural attributes are 
not proxies for economic fundamentals, even though they correlate with their associated 
observable outputs. 
As an additional, ad hoc test, I rank the firms by their respective cultural scores; Appendix 
A3 shows the top and bottom three firms for each cultural values. I delete repeated firms (multiple 
10-Ks filled in different years by a single firm) because cultural scores are not transient from year 
to year. Consistent with the create definition and the intuition, the top three firms in terms of 
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creativity are in the (life) sciences industry, whereas the bottom three are in the financial industry. 
Similarly, the highest-ranked firms in terms of control are in industries where an emphasis on 
efficiency and cost-cutting are important; the lowest-ranked firms are instead in life sciences and 
technology industries, where the focus is on creating margins. Same-industry firms can rank 
differently, depending on their business model: for instance, there is a bank in both the highest- 
and lowest-ranked firms in terms of competitiveness (competitiveness being here a focus on 
increasing market shares). Taken together, these rankings provide anecdotal evidence that further 
supports the text-based measures.12,13  
As the raw frequencies underscore (Tables 2.1 and 2.2), the 10-K forms call for a specific 
language that overlaps with the control lexical field more than with the other values. To attenuate 
this distortion, I demean the raw scores by subtracting the industry mean score using Fama-French 
12-industry classification; the demeaned measures therefore indicate whether a firm emphasizes 
a given dimension more or less than its peers. Finally, I combine the demeaned scores along 
various values into a single variable, cultural distance (CD), that captures the differences in 
emphasis that an acquirer and its target put on specific values. Specifically, following, among 
others, Kogut and Singh (1988), I compute the Euclidean distance between an acquirer’s and its 
target’s scores on all values of a given culture framework.14 For example, using the four-
dimensional CVF, I compute the cultural distance (CD) between acquirer a and target t as:15 
                                                          
12 For each cultural attribute, I also compute the average value by state, and map the results. Although some states 
rank consistently among the top (bottom) states in terms of cultural strength, there is large variability in the distribution 
of cultural scores (results untabulated).  
13 I also perform placebo tests to show that firms’ cultural scores are not assigned randomly. Appendices A3, A4, and 
A5 have more details.  
14 The main results of the paper hold if CD is instead calculated as the simple difference between the acquirer’s and 
the target’s scores: CD = (Createa + Compa + Controla + Colla) - (Createt + Compt + Controlt + Collt). Section 2.6.1 
has more details.  
15 The main results of the paper remain qualitatively similar if CD is computed using the Mahalanobis distance 
between the vectors of the acquirer’s and target’s cultural attributes, instead of the Euclidean distance (results 
untabulated).  
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CDCVF=[(Createa-Createt)
2+(Compa-Compt)
2+(Controla-Controlt)
2+(Colla-Collt)
2]0.5 
Similarly, I compute a cultural distance variable based on Hofstede’s framework (CDH) and 
another based on Cameron et al.’s (2006) CVF framework, but estimated using the bags of words 
published in Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014, CDFR). Panel C of Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics 
for CDCVF, notably, that cultural differences are not uniformly distributed. Mean CD (1.699) is 
considerably larger than the median CD (1.34), and the standard deviation is also relatively large 
(1.386).16  
 
2.2.2 Merger sample and other variables 
I extract the acquisitions sample from Thompson’s Securities Data Company’s (SDC) 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. Owing to the need to perform textual analysis, I collect data 
on domestic acquisitions by public U.S. acquirers, from 1994 to 2014 inclusively. I exclude stock 
repurchases and restrict the sample to acquisitions of public targets. I limit the sample to domestic 
acquisitions, in order to disentangle the effects of corporate and national cultures. Consistent with 
the previous literature, I also limit the sample to acquisitions worth at least $50 millions and at 
least one percent of the acquirer’s market capitalization, measured four weeks prior to the 
announcement. The mode of payment, deal value, announcement and completion dates, 
completion status, and deal attitude come from SDC. Stock daily returns come from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and accounting variables are retrieved from Compustat. 
I control for possible product market synergies by using Hoberg and Phillips’ (2010) product 
similarity measure and an indicator variable (DIV_DEAL) that equals 1 if the acquirer’s two-digit 
SIC code is the same as the target’s, and zero otherwise. I also control for the acquirer’s equity 
                                                          
16 With the exception of the robustness tests, all the tests of this paper are performed using CDCVF. For ease of reading, 
I thus omit the subscript, unless necessary.  
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Market-to-Book ratio, calculated using month-end values for the month that immediately precedes 
the announcement. Observations with negative Market-to-Book ratios are omitted.  
State-pair variables control for the potential of a state to attract cross-state investment, 
relative to the home state, and possible associated synergies. I thus control for the geographical 
proximity (logarithm of the straight-line distance, in miles, between the capital cities of the states 
where the acquirer and the target are headquartered), differences in the acquirer’s and the target’s 
states’ corporate tax rates, differences in Gallup-Healthways’ well-being indices, differences in 
state political allegiance and because Kumar et al. (2011) show that religious beliefs relate to 
gambling propensity, state-level religious affiliations17. Appendix A7 describes the sample 
construction.  
Panel C of Table 2.2 shows that the mean acquisition is large, with a value close to $1.7 
billion representing on average 42.5% of the acquirers’ pre-announcement market capitalization. 
However, REL_SIZE is heavily skewed; the median deal represents 23.3% of the acquirer’s pre-
merger market capitalization. This bias toward large acquisitions follows from restricting the 
sample to public firms and is necessary for studying the impact of potential synergies arising from 
combining different skillsets: the effects of integrating the target must indeed be large enough to 
possibly impact returns. To some extent, the sample is similar to that of Devos, Kadapakkam and 
Krishnamurthy (2009).  
2.3 Cultural distance and target selection 
Graham et al. (2016) report that approximately half of the executives they survey are 
reluctant to acquire a firm whose corporate culture is very different. In this section, I thus examine 
                                                          
17 Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1980-2010. Collected by the Association of Statisticians 
of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) and distributed by the Association of Religion Data Archives 
(www.theARDA.com). 
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empirically whether the differences in corporate cultures affect the probability of two firms 
merging (or one being acquired by the other).  
To perform this test, I create a sample of hypothetical acquirer-target pairs by matching, for 
each acquirer in the sample, a hypothetical target that is in the same industry (using Fama-French 
48-industry classification) as the real target and has a market capitalization, measured four weeks 
before the announcement, that is between 75% and 125% of the real target’s. If there are more 
than five matches, I select the five closest to the real target in terms of their Market-to-Book ratio 
of equity.18 Using the sample of real and hypothetical acquirer-target pairs, I estimate the 
following logistic model: 
Pr(Acq-Target is real = 1) = 
1
1+𝑒
−(𝛼+𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡)
, where CDijt is the cultural distance 
measure for the real or hypothetical acquisition of target j by acquirer i in year t. Xijt is a vector of 
control variables, all defined in the Appendix A8. Industry -defined using Fama-French’s 12-
industry classification, year and acquirer’s state dummy variables are also included in the model. 
Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. 
Table 2.4 presents the results. Consistent with the Graham et al.’s (2016) survey evidence, 
I find that a greater distance in corporate culture between two firms is associated with a reduced 
probability of these firms merging (CD coefficient in Column 1 = -17.03, p < 0.001). The cultural 
distance effect is economically significant: a one-standard deviation increase in the cultural 
distance, while holding other variables at their sample mean, decreases the probability of the two 
firms merging by 31.8% (Column 1). The effect remains if control variables for acquirer, target 
and deal characteristics (Column 2), state-level differences (Column 3) and product market 
                                                          
18 I obtain qualitatively similar results if I restrict the hypothetical sample to the best two or ten matches, or if I include 
all potential target firms that meet the industry and market capitalization criteria (results untabulated).  
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synergies (Column 4) are included. Although the economic magnitude decreases, the cultural 
differences effect remains economically important (approximately 10% when all control variables 
are included). To assess that the cultural distance effect is robust to the choice of the hypothetical 
sample, I reestimate the model using a sample of hypothetical acquirer-target pairs where the 
hypothetical target’s market capitalization is between 50% and 150% of the real target’s, and 
where the top ten matches (in terms of closeness to the real target’s Market-to-Book ratio of 
equity) are retained. Column 5 presents the results and shows that results are qualitatively similar 
to those of Columns 1-4. For instance, the economic impact of cultural distance is approximately 
8.2%, comparable in magnitude to the economic impact reported in Column 4; the lesser 
magnitude is consistent with the increased heterogeneity in the potential targets that arises by 
relaxing selection criteria.  
In short, the results are consistent with the interpretation that ex ante, executives are able to 
accurately estimate their own culture as well as the target’s and that they consciously ignore 
culturally different firms as potential targets. Acquisitions between drastically different firms are 
therefore either not considered, or the negotiations abort before the merger announcement. In spite 
of this bias, acquisitions between culturally different firms occur on a periodical basis. In the next 
section, I examine whether these acquisitions are associated with value creation or destruction.  
 
2.4.1 Cultural differences, cultural distance and post-announcement returns 
The previous section showed that even though acquisitions between culturally different 
firms are less likely to happen, such acquisitions occur periodically. I now consider whether 
cultural differences are related to inferior or superior post-announcement returns for the acquirers. 
Using an event study setting mitigates the concerns that the cultural distance measure is co-
determined with the dependent variable. In addition, considering combined announcement returns 
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as a measure of expected synergies as perceived by the market allows to expand the sample, since 
bidders disclose an estimate of expected synergies in less than 20% of the deals (Dutordoir, 
Rosenboom and Vasconcelos, 2014).  
For these tests, I follow Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) and limit the sample to 
acquisitions transactions worth at least $50 million and that represent at least 1% of the acquirer’s 
pre-announcement market capitalization, measured four weeks before the announcement. 
Announcement returns are calculated using the market model, for the three-day and seven-day 
windows centered around the event day.19 Combined acquirer and target announcement returns 
are the average of the acquirer’s and target’s abnormal announcement returns, weighted by their 
respective market capitalization four weeks before the announcement.  
I first compare the announcement returns and deal characteristics for high- and low-CD 
acquisitions. High-CD (Low-CD) acquisitions are the acquisitions with CDCVF above (below) the 
full-sample CDCVF median. Table 2.5 presents the results of t-tests for differences in means 
between the two subsamples. Panel A reports that High-CD acquisitions generate higher three- 
and seven-days acquirer and combined announcement returns. The average acquirer CAR is 
negative, but less so for high-CD acquirers (difference for three-day acquirer CAR: 0.0149;  
p < 0.001). In contrast, the average target CAR is positive, making the combined CAR positive, 
significantly more so for high-CD acquirers (difference in three-day combined CAR: 0.0094, p = 
0.0151).  
Panel B shows that the deals announced by high-CD acquirers are undistinguishable from 
those announced by low-CD acquirers in terms of relative size, acquirers’ market-to-book ratio of 
equity, percentage of diversifying deals, percentage of completed deals, days until the effective 
                                                          
19 I obtain qualitatively similar results when abnormal returns are calculated as the return in excess of the market 
return, using CRSP value-weighted index as the market proxy.  
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date, percentage of shares held at the announcement and form of the merger (that is, merger versus 
acquisition of assets). The larger announcement returns of high-CD acquirers cannot be attributed 
to any of these variables.20 However, high-CD acquirers have larger market capitalization, and 
they announce fewer pure-stock deals than low-CD acquirers. In addition, there is a higher 
proportion of unsolicited deals among high-CD deals, relative to low-CD deals (difference: 5.5%; 
p < 0.001). These variables are known determinants of announcement returns; multivariate tests 
thus include them as control variables.21  
Table 2.6 shows the results of multivariate OLS regressions of the following model:  
CARit = β1(CDijt) + β2(Xijt) + εit, where CARit are the combined acquirer and target 
announcement returns. and CDijt is the cultural distance measure for the acquisition of target j by 
acquirer i in year t. Xijt is a vector of control variables, all defined in the Appendix A8. Industry -
defined using Fama-French’s 12-industry classification, and acquirer’s state indicator variables 
are also included in the model. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. Column 1 shows 
that the cultural distance, CDCVF, is positively related to three-day CAR (coefficient = 0.072;  
p = 0.013). The cultural distance effect remains if control variables for state-level differences are 
included (Column 2), if the model is estimated with acquirer state fixed effects or industry fixed 
effects only (Columns 3 and 4, respectively), or if more deal-level control variables are included 
                                                          
20 In untabulated tests, I estimate logit regressions of the form Completedit = β1(CDijt) + β2(Xijt) + εit, where the 
dependent variable is equal to one if the acquisition announced by acquirer i at time t was completed (as recorded by 
SDC), and zero otherwise. CDijt is the cultural distance measure for the acquisition of target j by acquirer i in year t 
and Xijt is a vector of control variables. I find that CD is not significantly related to the deal completion probability. 
Thus, results of Table 2.6 cannot be attributed to investors pricing in the completion probability of the announced 
deal. 
21 I also find that high-CD acquirers pay higher fees (in proportion of the deal value) to their financial advisors than 
low-CD acquirers (difference: 0.114%; p =0.065; results untabulated). However, fees paid are reported unfrequently, 
which limits the power of tests and reduces sample size. I therefore do not include fees paid in the multivariate tests. 
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(Column 5). In untabulated tests, I find that cultural distance is also significantly related to seven-
day combined CAR.22  
The economic significance is presented in brackets and calculated as the change in the 
dependent variable that results from a one-standard deviation change in the cultural distance 
distribution while holding all the other variables at their sample mean. To better capture the 
proportions of the cultural effects, the economic significance is scaled by the sample mean three-
day combined abnormal returns. The cultural distance effect is economically significant: a one-
standard deviation change in CD translates into a 0.7 and 1.0 percent increase in three-day 
combined announcement returns, which in turn accounts for 13% (Column 5) to 23% (Column 4) 
of the total three-day abnormal return.  
In untabulated regressions, I confirm that the above results are robust to excluding large-
loss acquisitions, where large-loss deals are those with losses of at least $1 billion in market 
capitalization (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005). Results also hold if acquisitions 
representing less than 5% of the acquirer’s pre-announcement market capitalization are 
excluded.23 By conducting multiple acquisitions in a short time-frame, repeat acquirers could be 
more experienced than first-time acquirers, which could translate into a higher CD effect. I 
confirm that the results hold for the subsample of first-time, or sporadic, acquirers, defined as 
acquirers not involved in acquisitions during the five years surrounding the merger announcement. 
Eliminating acquisitions announced during the merger wave of the late 1990s (1998-2000) or 
                                                          
22 In untabulated tests, I confirm that the CD effect remains qualitatively similar if combined CAR(-2,+2) are used as 
the dependent variable. In addition, a plot of CAR(-124,124) for high-CD and low-CD acquirers reveals that high-
CD and low-CD acquirers’ CAR are undistinguishable before the announcement, but following the announcement, 
high-CD acquirers’ CAR slowly trend upwards, while low-CD acquirers’ CAR trend downwards (graph available 
upon request).  
23 Results are marginally insignificant if no minimal size constraint is imposed. However, relaxing the size constraint 
results in the inclusion of many acquisitions that are too small to significantly affect the acquirer, thus adding noise 
to the results.  
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during the financial crisis (2007-2008) improves the results; the results presented are therefore not 
driven by acquisitions taking place during special market-wide circumstances. In addition, results 
remain qualitatively similar, though slightly less significant, if I eliminate acquisitions by financial 
firms. 
I also find that cultural scores do not predict firm-level future returns (results untabulated). 
Consistent with the findings of Cohen, Malloy and Nguyen (2016) and the stability of corporate 
culture through time, I find that the cultural information that can be inferred from the 10-k forms 
is already incorporated into prices. In turn, my results highlight that the information about 
structural changes in corporate cultures such as those that arise from an acquisition create is rapidly 
reflected into prices.  
At first glance, the positive CD effects seem contradictory with both the strong opinion 
executives voiced in Graham et al.’s (2016) survey and the results of the previous section. In fact, 
the previous section highlighted that potential acquisitions where the cultural distance is beyond 
an unobserved critical level are less likely to be considered or announced. To account for this 
selection bias, Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2.6 estimate a two-stage Heckman model. The first stage 
estimates a probit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one if the acquirer-target 
pair is a real acquirer-target pair, and zero otherwise. The second stage estimates an OLS 
regression similar to the one estimated in Column 2, with the Inverse Mills Ratio of the first stage 
included as an additional independent variable.  
I use the sample of hypothetical acquirer-target pairs for the first stage estimation, where 
potential targets are firms for which the cultural attributes can be estimated at the announcement 
date, are in the same industry as the real target (using Fama-French 48-industry classification) and 
have pre-announcement market capitalization within 50% to 150% of the real target’s pre-
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announcement market capitalization. In addition to state characteristics and potential targets’ 
attributes, I use targets’ cumulative returns over the six-month period immediately before the 
announcement month as an additional independent variable because a firm’s recent stock 
performance might alter its attractiveness to acquirers (Palepu, 1986). Column 6 of Table 2.6 
shows that, consistent with the findings of Graham et al. (2016) and the results of the previous 
section, the cultural distance between two firms is negatively related to the probability that these 
two firms will merge together (or acquire each other).24 After accounting for this selection bias, 
CD is positively related to combined three-day announcement returns (Column 7), confirming 
previous results; the magnitude of the CD effect in Column 7 is also directly comparable to that 
of Column 2.   
In short, the results support the cultural benefits hypothesis, which is consistent with the 
interpretation that cultural differences relate to expected synergies. To confirm or infirm this 
possibility, I examine the potential sources of this cultural distance effect in the following sections.  
 
2.4 Announcement returns 
2.4.2 Possible sources of the cultural distance effect 
Differences in corporate cultures may be correlated with differences in the firms’ product 
mixes. Table 2.6’s regressions control for whether the acquisition is horizontal (that is, same two-
digit SIC code) or not. However, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) show that such control variable does 
not properly account for product market synergies. I thus estimate the baseline OLS regression, 
but add Hoberg and Phillips’ (2010) product market synergies (Score_HP) as an additional 
                                                          
24 The average (median) CD for the sample of potential matches is 2.1 (1.65), versus 1.69 (1.34) for the sample of 
announced acquisitions. 
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independent variable.32 Column 1 of Table 2.7 shows that the cultural distance effect becomes 
marginally insignificant (coefficient = 0.0632; p = 0.050), although the loss in significance could 
be due partially to the decrease in sample size.  
Alternatively, differences in corporate cultures could be related to differences in 
governance. Indeed, Popadak’s (2014) results provide evidence of a link between corporate culture 
and corporate governance. In Columns 2 to 4 of Table 2.7, I add, in turn, different independent 
variables that proxy for the quality of the acquirer’s corporate governance: number of directors 
(Column 2), acquirer’s entrenchment index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009; Column 3) and 
acquirer’s governance index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2001; Column 4). In all cases, the 
cultural distance effect remains; corporate governance therefore does not appear to drive the 
cultural distance effect.33  
Finally, differences in corporate cultures could appear larger during periods of market-
wide uncertainty. To control for this possibility, I develop a high uncertainty indicator variable 
based on the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016), which is a 
monthly composite index that considers the newspaper coverage of policy-related economic 
uncertainty, a list of temporary federal tax code provisions and elements from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia's Survey of Professional Forecasters.34 More specifically, the 
High_uncertainty indicator variable equals one if month t’s index value is greater than the previous 
24-months average value of the index, and zero otherwise. Column 5 of Table 2.7 presents the 
                                                          
32 Including Hoberg and Phillips’ (2010) product market similarity score reduces the sample size, as their publicly 
available data require firms with pairwise similarities above a given threshold. Data is retrieved from the Hoberg and 
Phillips library (http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/idata/readme_tnic3.txt). 
33 In untabulated regressions, I control for the difference between the acquirer’s and the target’s respective G scores 
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2001). The CD coefficient becomes marginally insignificant, but the drastic reduction 
in sample size decreases the power of tests. Similarly, including the differences in the number of directors or 
entrenchment index translates into a sharp reduction in sample size, and makes statistical inference meaningless. 
34 I retrieve data from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html.  
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results, and shows that the cultural distance effect remains. In untabulated regressions, I confirm 
that the cultural distance effect also remains if the raw, continuous uncertainty index is used as an 
independent variable.  
In brief, the cultural distance effect documented above cannot be explained by either of the 
product market synergy, corporate governance or policy uncertainty channels, as differences in 
corporate cultures remain significantly and positively associated with combined announcement 
returns. In the next section, I examine which firms benefit from these cultural differences.  
 
2.4.3 Which firms gain from the cultural distance effect? 
The results so far assume that the effects of cultural differences are homogeneous across 
firms. However, it is reasonable to believe that some acquirers are better prepared to integrate a 
culturally different target. Additionally, there could be some nonlinearities in the cultural distance 
effects. In this section, I consider these possibilities.  
I first examine which acquirers benefit from the acquisition of a culturally different target. 
The field-based evidence highlights both the reluctance of executives to acquire firms whose 
corporate culture is perceived as very different and the importance of the cultural integration 
strategy (Graham et al., 2016; AON Hewitt, 2011). Drawing from the disciplinary takeover 
literature and from Sørensen (2002) who finds a positive relation between corporate culture 
strength and operating performance, acquirers whose corporate culture is “stronger” than their 
target’s are presumably in a comparatively better position to integrate their target and capitalize 
on the cultural differences. For example, extending Wang and Xie’s (2009) argument to corporate 
cultures, if strong-culture firms are more productive and profitable than weak-culture firms, the 
transfer of control of a weak-culture target to a strong-culture acquirer should create value, as the 
comparatively more productive firm will now control a larger asset base. In contrast, for weak-
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culture acquirers, the acquirer-target cultural differences could be irreconcilable, as for example 
no dominant culture exists, or the dominant culture is not aligned with the acquirer’s corporate 
structures in place.  
To investigate this possibility, I first need to define strong- and weak-culture firms. I use 
the maximum of a firm’s four normalized cultural attributes to define cultural strength. More 
precisely, I rank sample firms along their highest (normalized) cultural attributes and define 
strong-culture (weak-culture) firms as the sample firms where the highest of the firm’s normalized 
cultural attributes is higher than the full sample median.35,36 A strong-culture firm should be more 
productive than a weak-culture firm. I ensure that this definition is reasonable by comparing the 
productivity of strong- and weak-culture firms. Table 2.8 presents the results: Columns 2 and 3 
report average productivity metrics for strong- and weak-culture firms, respectively, while 
Column 4 presents the results of t-tests for differences in means between strong- and weak-culture 
firms.  
On average, firms with above-median maximum cultural score have higher market share 
than firms with below-median maximum cultural scores (p < 0.001 for all differences). However, 
strong-culture firms are not more profitable than weak-culture firms (difference in ROA and EBIT 
margins: 0.0091 and 0.0478; p = 0.166 and 0.515, respectively) and even though they have higher 
cash flows (scaled by assets), the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.149). Also, 
consistent with the definition of corporate culture being an intangible asset that, if used correctly, 
improves productivity, Table 2.8 shows that strong-culture firms generate higher sales, EBIT and 
                                                          
35 This definition implies that strong-culture firms place more emphasis on cultural values (one, or many) than their 
peers. It does not imply that a given culture is better than another, however. Whether a culture is better depends on 
the cultural strength, but also the congruence between the culture, the firm and its environment.  
36 The results remain if I instead define culture strength as the principal component of the four individual cultural 
values, or if I define culturally strong firms as those where the sum of their normalized cultural attributes is higher 
than the sample median (or higher than the sum of the normalized cultural attributes of their target).  
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cash flows per employee than weak-culture firms (p < 0.001 for all differences, with the exception 
of the difference for cash flows per employees, which has p = 0.005). Building and maintaining 
such intangible is not free, however: strong-culture firms also record higher Sales, General and 
Administrative expenses per employee than weak-culture firms. Overall, it seems that the strong-
culture definition identifies correctly the firms with highest productivity per employee. 
The question that remains, then, is whether strong-culture firms are better prepared to 
integrate a culturally distant target. To answer this question, I slightly modify the strong-culture 
definition: in the remainder of the paper, strong-culture (weak-culture) acquirers are those whose 
highest normalized cultural attribute (that is, the maximum of create, compete, control and 
collaborate) is higher (lower) than their target’s highest, normalized cultural attribute. 37,38 I then 
repeat the tests of Table 2.6, but splitting the sample into the acquisitions where the acquirer is a 
strong-culture acquirer and those where the acquirer is a weak-culture one.  
Table 2.9 presents the results of the OLS regressions of three-day combined announcement 
returns on the cultural distance and control variables, conditioning on the acquirer being a strong- 
or weak-culture one.39 As in Table 2.6, acquirer state and industry dummies are included, and 
standard errors are clustered by industry and year. Columns 1 to 4 show the results for the 
subsample of strong-culture acquirers; in that subsample, cultural distance is positive and 
significant, even after controlling for deal, acquirer, target, state and product market 
characteristics. The cultural distance effect remains economically significant: a one-standard 
                                                          
37 Collaboration is the most important cultural attribute for approximately 20% of the acquirers, while Compete, 
Control and Create are the most important cultural attributes for 35%, 37% and 7% of the acquirers, respectively. 
Targets have similar distribution of highest attributes.  
38 It is likely that some so-defined strong-culture acquirers have a maximum cultural score that falls below the full 
sample median maximum cultural score, but these misclassifications are not frequent and only add noise to the tests.  
39 Results remain qualitatively similar if I estimate a pooled model with a strong-culture indicator variable and an 
interaction term for the interaction of CD and strong-culture. However, conditioning the results allows to better 
contrast the different patterns. 
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deviation increase in cultural distance, while maintaining the other independent variables at their 
sample mean, translates into an increase in combined abnormal announcement returns of 
approximately 0.8 percent, which amounts to about 35% of the average three-day combined 
abnormal returns (for bids by strong-culture acquirers only). In contrast, in the subsample of weak-
culture acquirers (that is, acquirers whose total cultural score is less than their target’s; Columns 
5 to 8), the cultural distance effect is insignificant. 
In untabulated tests, I confirm that strong-culture acquirers do not pursue diversifying 
acquisitions more often than weak-culture acquirers, nor do they formulate more pure-stock offers 
than the weak-culture acquirers. Therefore, differences in offer characteristics cannot explain why 
the cultural distance effect concentrates in the subsample of strong-culture acquirers. I also 
replicate the results, increasing the minimum relative size of the target to exclude, in turn, deals 
that represent less than 5%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% of the acquirer’s pre-announcement market 
capitalization. In all cases, the general pattern remains and the CD effect is strongest in the 
subsample of strong-culture acquirers. However, and possibly due to the reduction in tests power 
associated with progressively smaller sample sizes, the CD effect at times becomes marginally 
significant.  
I also confirm that the CD effect is not driven by differences in operating profitability, 
efficiency (proxied by asset turnover), R&D expenses, number of employees (results untabulated). 
Furthermore, in line with Baruch and Lev (1996), I use the ratio of advertising expenses to sales 
as a proxy for brand value. I set missing advertising expenses to zero to maintain sample size and 
I show that the corporate culture effects that I document do not completely overlap with 
differences in brand values. The CD coefficient for example is 0.4397 (p = 0.0289) for the 
subsample of culturally strong acquirers, while it is insignificant for the subsample of culturally 
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weak acquirers. Similarly, I repeat the tests controlling for toeholds, merger form (merger versus 
acquisition of assets), unsolicited deals and whether the merger is a merger of equals. Results are 
qualitatively similar to those tabulated. 
The results support the claim that pre-existing cultural strength is required for the acquirers 
to successfully integrate a culturally distant target. Counting with a stronger intangible asset gives 
strong-culture acquirers the latitude to merge with riskier targets, where risk comes from cultural 
differences. An examination of the changes in the acquirer’s corporate culture around the merger 
provides additional evidence. In line with Bargeron, Lehn and Smith (2015), I find that the 
acquirers in the strong culture subsample experience a weakening of their culture in the two years 
following the acquisition, consistent with a loss of identity coming from the integration of a 
different (and typically, weaker culture) target. The acquirers in the weak culture subsample also 
experience a degradation in their culture following the acquisition, although of lesser magnitude 
than the strong-culture acquirers. For example, estimating pre-acquisition cultural scores as the 
weighted average of the acquirers' and its target's highest normalized cultural score, weighted by 
the acquirer's and target's pre-announcement market capitalizations, I find that the average 
decrease for strong-culture acquirers is 2.61 units in the two years following the acquisition, a 
larger change than in the subsample of weak-culture acquirers (decrease: 2.27 units; p-value of 
the difference in means: 0.036).40,41 
Thus, strong-culture acquirers benefit from merging with culturally different firms, as 
evidenced by the positive cultural distance effect. However, it is not clear whether the cultural 
                                                          
40 However, I find that for large acquisitions (where the target’s market capitalization is at least 5% of the acquirer’s 
pre-announcement market capitalization), the post-merger decrease in cultural score is smaller for acquirers whose 
culture is stronger than their target’s.  
41 On average, cultural scores recover three years after the merger announcement. 
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benefits are homogeneous along the cultural distance, or whether there are some nonlinearities in 
the relation. I turn to this next.  
A possible nonlinearity comes from incompatible corporate values. In fact, I exploit one 
prediction of Cameron et al. (2006), namely, that acquirer-target pairs where the entities’ core 
values are opposite are likely to be competing against each other. Bouwman (2013) hypothesizes 
that such mergers are likely to underperform mergers between non-opposite entities. To explore 
this avenue, I split the sample into strong- and weak-culture acquirers, as before, and re-estimate 
the OLS regressions, with two additional independent variables, Opposite and the interaction of 
Opposite and CD. Opposite is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if, for each acquirer-
target pair, one of the following is true: 1) the acquirer’s dominant trait is create and the target’s 
dominant trait is control; 2) the acquirer’s dominant trait is control and the target’s dominant trait 
is create; 3) the acquirer’s dominant trait is compete and the target’s dominant trait is 
collaboration; or 4) the acquirer’s dominant trait is collaboration and the target’s dominant trait is 
compete. Otherwise, that is, if the acquirer’s dominant trait is not diagonally opposing the target’s 
dominant trait, Opposite is equal to zero.  
Columns 4 and 8 of Table 2.9 present the results. First, Column 4 shows that the CD effect 
becomes marginally insignificant for strong-culture acquirers (coefficient = 0.1173; p = 0.064); 
Columns 8 confirms that the CD effect is insignificant for weak-culture acquirers. Turning to the 
Opposite variable and the interaction term, the insignificant Opposite coefficients in both Columns 
4 and 8 report that acquisitions between firms with opposite core values do not outperform the 
other acquisitions. Therefore, the results support the interpretation that cultural differences benefit 
merging firms, but only to a certain point; merging firms with competing core values do not benefit 
from cultural differences. Power of these tests is however limited by the small number of Opposite 
38 
 
deals, in particular in the subsample of strong-culture acquirers (72 deals, but only 40 for which 
full accounting information is available). Tests for difference in means reveal that Opposite deals 
are slightly more prevalent in the subsample of weak-culture acquirers (15.7% of weak deals 
versus 12.4% of strong deals; p = 0.095). In other words, the results of Table 2.9 point to two 
sources of the aggregate cultural distance effect: benefits are more important the greater the 
cultural differences, but only if the acquirer is culturally stronger than its target, and there is some 
commonality or compatibility in core values.  
A possible explanation for the cultural differences effect is that acquirers merging with a 
culturally distant target complete a more thorough due diligence, including possibly cultural due 
diligence, and are therefore better prepared to transform differences into value. I briefly consider 
this explanation. Practitioners insist on the importance of due diligence, including cultural due 
diligence, for the success of a merger (AON Hewitt, 2011). To proxy for the cultural due diligence, 
I estimate the intensity of acquirer-target in-person meetings during the merger negotiation phase. 
I retrieve the section “Background of the Merger” from forms DEFM14A, DEFM14C, PREM14A 
and PREM14C that were filed within three months of the acquisition announcement.42 The 
meeting intensity measure is the frequency of words that relate to person-to-person interactions.  
Untabulated results show that approximately 34% of the acquirers-target pairs with above-
median cultural distance meet more frequently during the pre-merger negotiations than the 
acquirer-target pairs with below-median cultural distance (p-value of the t-tests for difference in 
means = 0.006). Acquirers whose core values are not at odds with their target’s (non-opposite 
acquisitions) also meet more frequently during the negotiations phase (difference in means: 
                                                          
42 For many acquirer-target pairs, forms DEFM14A, DEFM14C, PREM14A and PREM14C were not filed within 
three months of the acquisitions or were not available (for example, if the proposed merger did not require a vote). 
For this part of the analysis, there is thus a considerable decrease in sample size.  
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0.1239; p = 0.019). Thus, although I perform no formal tests of causality, preliminary evidence 
suggests that pre-merger interaction between the acquirer and its future target could help acquirers 
transform cultural differences into synergies. 
2.4.3.1 Long-run returns 
Because information regarding the cultural (in)compatibility of merging firms could be 
revealed during the integration process, I examine the effect of cultural distance on the acquirers’ 
long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are the 
differences between acquirers’ buy-and-hold 24- or 36-month returns and the compound return of 
an equally-weighted portfolio matched on size and book-to-market. The 24- and 36-month horizon 
reflects a trade-off: the horizon needs to be sufficiently long to capture the post-integration “new 
normal”, yet selecting a too long horizon decreases the likelihood that the observed performance 
is related to the merger.  
I estimate OLS regressions of the form BHARit = β1(CDijt) + β2(Xijt) + εit, where BHARit 
are the acquirer i’s 24- or 36-month BHAR starting on month t+1, CDijt is the cultural distance 
between acquirer i and target j for the deal announced at time t, and Xijt is a vector of deal, acquirer, 
Appendix A9 presents the results.  
Similar to short-term returns, long-run returns are positively related to cultural distance. 
Without conditioning on the cultural strength of the acquirer, CD is positively related to both 24-
months and 36-months BHAR (coefficients: 1.664 and 3.556, respectively; p = 0.004 and 0.001). 
Using the same measure of cultural strength as above, I find that the effect is driven by acquirers 
that are stronger culturally than their target. Indeed, Columns 2 and 5 repeat the tests for the 
subsample of culturally strong acquirers and find that CD is positively related to acquirers’ 24-
month and 36-month BHARs (coefficients: 2.076 and 4.076, respectively; p < 0.001 in both cases). 
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However, in the subsample of culturally weak acquirers, cultural distance does not relate to 24-
month BHAR. An exception to the finding that only strong-culture acquirers benefit from cultural 
distance arises with the 36-month BHAR (Column 6, CD coefficient: 3.265; p = 0.020). However, 
the interpretation of these results is subject to the possibility of unobserved factors increasing over 
longer-term horizons. Still, because the effect is smaller in magnitude than for the strong-culture 
acquirers, the evidence thus generally supports the cultural benefits interpretation that relates 
cultural distance positively to merger performance, but only if the acquirer is culturally stronger 
than its target.  
Ultimately, if cultural differences benefit acquirers, as the results suggest, strong-culture 
acquirers merging with culturally distant targets should see their operating performance improve 
in the years following the acquisition. I turn to this in the next section.  
 
2.5 Operating performance 
To examine whether strong-culture acquirers benefit from the acquisition of culturally 
distant targets, I compare the acquirers’ pre- and post-merger operating performance. More 
specifically, in the spirit of Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) and Fu, Lin and Officer (2013), I 
regress the industry-adjusted median operating performance from years +1 to +2 (relative to the 
year of the acquisition) on the industry-adjusted median operating performance from years -2 to  
-1, again relative to the acquisition year. The intercept thus represents the change in operating 
performance that can be attributed to the merger.43  
                                                          
43 The results remain if the mean (instead of median) pre- and post-merger operating performances are contrasted, or 
if the pre- or post-merger windows are increased to 36 months, or decreased to 12 months. The results are also robust 
to the addition of the logarithm of the acquirer’s pre-announcement market capitalization, acquirer’s pre-
announcement market-to-book ratio of equity and acquirer’s pre-announcement leverage ratio as independent 
variables (results untabulated).  
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The pre-merger operating performance is the weighted average of the acquirer’s and target’s 
operating performance, where the weights are their respective market capitalization four weeks 
before the merger announcement. If the acquirer and target are from different industries (using 
Fama-French 48 industries classification), the industry benchmark is also adjusted, using the pre-
acquisition acquirer and target market capitalizations as weights. The industry benchmark is the 
average operating performance of the ten, same-industry, closest firms to the acquirer in terms of 
market capitalization and market-to-book ratio of equity.44 Different operating performance 
metrics are used: return on assets, operating profits (scaled by sales), net income (scaled by sales), 
asset turnover (ratio of EBIT to total assets) and the ratio of net income per employee. All 
accounting ratios are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles (but results remain qualitatively the 
same, and are in fact more contrasted, if ratios are instead winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles).  
In line with the evidence reported above, I first split the sample into strong- and weak-culture 
acquirers, where strong-culture (weak-culture) acquirers are those whose total cultural score is 
above (below) their target’s. Consistent with the interpretation that (strong) corporate culture is a 
valuable intangible asset, Table 2.8 reported that strong-culture firms are more profitable and 
productive than weak-culture firms. In the context of mergers, the post-merger improvements in 
operating performance should thus be sharper for strong-culture acquirers.  
Panels A and B of Table 2.10 report that this is indeed the case: While the ROA of strong-
culture acquirers does not significantly change in the two years following the merger, that of weak-
culture acquirers decreases significantly (coefficient = -0.012; p = 0.067). Both the operating and 
net profit margins increase in the post-merger period for both the strong- and weak-culture 
                                                          
44 Results are qualitatively similar if I restrict the number of comparable firms to five, or if I do not impose size limits. 
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acquirers, although the increase is larger for strong-culture acquirers (considering for example the 
net profit margin, 0.253 for strong-culture acquirers versus 0.035 for weak-culture acquirers, both 
significant at 1%). Consistent with the decrease in ROA, the asset turnover decreases in the post-
merger period for both the strong- and weak-culture acquirers, most likely driven by the increased 
asset base. However, the decrease is sharpest for weak-culture acquirers (-0.024 versus -0.018 for 
strong-culture acquirers). In short, Panels A and B of Table 2.10 provide evidence that acquirers 
with a stronger corporate culture perform better in the two years following the merger 
announcement than the acquirers with weaker culture.  
Table 2.9, Columns 4 and 8, reports a nonlinearity in the cultural distance effect. Indeed, it 
shows that the cultural distance effect decreases when the acquirer’s and target’s core values are 
opposite (or competing, in the CVF nomenclature). Consistent with those tests, I examine whether 
strong-culture acquirers that merge with a target whose core values are not opposite to the 
acquirers’ register better post-announcement operating performance than those strong-culture 
acquirers merging with a competing target. Statistical inferences are however limited by the 
reduced number of opposite acquisitions performed by strong-culture acquirers (only 31 
observations for which industry-adjusted operating performance between years t-2 and t+2 is not 
missing). Nonetheless, I find that strong-culture acquirers that merge with a non-competing target 
report higher post-merger improvements in operating and net profit margins (respectively, 0.357 
and 0.375, both significant at 1%, versus 0.025 (p = 0.133) and 0.061  
(p < 0.001) for the opposite subsample), relative to strong-culture acquirers merging with a 
competing target (results untabulated).  
In short, the operating performance regressions provide evidence that further support the 
findings of the previous section. Notably, I find that culturally stronger acquirers improve their 
43 
 
industry-adjusted operating performance in the two years following the acquisition, relative to 
their pre-acquisition industry-adjusted performance. I also find that differences in the acquirer’s 
and target’s corporate cultures matter. Consistent with the previous section’s results that report a 
positive cultural distance effect, I find here that strong-culture acquirers, that is, acquirers with the 
cultural strength to integrate a culturally distant target, indeed benefit more from the acquisition 
of a culturally distant target. In fact, strong-culture acquirers report larger improvements in post-
announcement operating performance, provided that there is some level of compatibility in core 
values.  
 
2.6 Further tests 
2.6.1 Alternative culture measures 
As noted above, the decision to use the cultural values from Cameron et al.’s (2006) 
Competing Values Framework is justified by the framework’s prominence in the managerial 
sciences and by its natural prediction regarding acquisitions between firms whose core values are 
opposed. To assess the robustness of the previous results to the use of alternative cultural 
frameworks, Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.11 estimate OLS regressions of three-day combined 
announcement returns on CD and control variables, with alternative cultural distance measures: 
In Column 1, CD is estimated using Cameron et al.’s (2006) framework, but lexical fields are from 
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014). Column 2 uses CDH as the cultural distance proxy, where the cultural 
attributes are from Hofstede’s (1980) framework, whereas Column 3 uses CDO’Reilly, where the 
cultural attributes are from O’Reilly et al.’s (1991) framework.45 Columns 1 to 3’s results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.6; the CD effect is therefore not contingent on 
the specific cultural values of a framework.  
                                                          
45 Appendix A2 reports the lexical fields associated with each of these frameworks. 
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In Column 4, I express the cultural attributes as proportions of the total cultural stock 
before calculating CD: (Createa/Tota + Controla/Tota + Collaborationa/Tota + Competea/Tota) - 
(Createt/Tott + Controlt/Tott + Collaborationt/Tott + Competet/Tott), where Tota (Tott) is the sum 
of the acquirer’s (target’s) cultural attributes. Column 4 reports the results; consistent with the 
previous results, the CD effect is positive. In Column 5, I modify the textual analysis methodology 
used to compute the cultural scores. Loughran and McDonald (2011) show that weighting terms 
by their relative frequency in the full document affects their measure of text-based sentiment. I 
thus use Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) term-weighting methodology (instead of the simple 
frequency counts) when computing the individual cultural scores. Cultural distance is otherwise 
computed as described in Section 2.2.1. Column 5 shows that the CD effect remains even when 
using the term-weighting methodology.  
A question of interest is whether the direction of the cultural distance is important. To 
examine this issue, I depart from the literature and measure CD as (Createa + Controla + 
Collaborationa + Competea) - (Createt + Controlt + Collaborationt + Competet). Column 6 
estimates the OLS regression of three-day combined announcement returns on CD and control 
variables for the subsample of positive CD, whereas Column 7 does the same for the subsample 
of observations with negative CD. Consistent with the results of Section 2.4.3, the CD effect is 
positive, but only for the subsample where the acquirer has a stronger culture than the target. These 
results are in line with the synergy interpretation: greater cultural distance are associated with 
greater announcement returns, but only when the acquirer has the better culture and, therefore, the 
necessary intangible assets to successfully integrate the target.  
Another possibility is that the cultural scores capture the degree of transparency of the 
firm, instead of the cultural dimensions of the firm. To control for this possibility, I develop a 
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lexical field associated with transparency.46 I then calculate cultural scores as before, but I remove 
words that also associate with transparency; the cultural distance, net of transparency words, is 
calculated as detailed in Section 2.2.1. I confirm that results remain qualitatively similar using the 
cultural distance, net of transparency words (results untabulated). For example, the CD 
coefficients in regressions similar to those reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6 are 0.0938  
(p = 0.0011) and 0.0748 (p < 0.001), respectively. Therefore, the cultural scores do not appear to 
capture the disclosure environment of the firm.   
Finally, I repeat the tests using each one of the four cultural values individually (results 
untabulated). I find that differences in acquirer-target’s competitiveness drive the cultural distance 
effects, as differences in competitiveness are positively related to combined abnormal three-day 
announcement returns, both for the full sample (coefficient = 0.0065; p < 0.001) and the subsample 
of strong-culture acquirers (coefficient = 0.0119; p = 0.028). Differences in other cultural 
attributes are positively signed, but their magnitude and statistical significance are secondary to 
differences in competitiveness. These results are consistent with the argument that the cultural 
distance effects originate in more productive, strong-cultured acquirers taking control of 
comparatively weak-cultured targets; synergies come from the strong-culture acquirers controlling 
an increased asset base.   
 
                                                          
46 The transparency lexical field includes the following words: accessible, advertised, announced, apparent,  available, 
broadcast, clear, comprehendible, comprehensible, decipherable, declared, discernable, discernible, disclosed, 
distinct, divulged, evident, explicit, exposed, graspable, intelligible, knowable, legible, limpid, lucid, luminous, 
manifest, nonambiguous, noticeable, observable, obvious, open, palpable, plain, posted, prevalent, proclaimed, 
promulgated, public, publicized, readable, reported, reputed, revealed, see-through, self-evident, self-explanatory, 
sharing, straightforward, translucent, transparent, unambiguous, uncomplicated, understandable, undisguised, 
unequivalent, unfolded, unlocked, unmistakable, unsealed, visible, well-defined. 
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2.6.2 Alternative sources of written text 
To confirm that the cultural scores are not driven by noise from the scripted parts of the 
10-K forms, I compute cultural scores for each one of Cameron et al.’s (2006) four dimensions 
using only the Management’s Discussion and Analysis sections of the 10-K forms. Computation 
of cultural scores and cultural distance are otherwise exactly as described in Section 2.2. 
Untabulated results confirm that using the whole 10-K forms to extract cultural scores does not 
distort the cultural distance effects. Magnitude and significance of the cultural distance 
coefficients are directly comparable to their equivalent in Table 2.6.  
As a further robustness test, I repeat the tests using corporate culture scores estimated from 
earnings conference calls. Because the Q&A section of earnings conference calls is not scripted, 
unlike firms’ annual reports, the culture scores inferred from the conference calls are possibly 
more representative of a firm’s corporate culture. I retrieve the transcripts of earnings conference 
calls from Fair Disclosure Wire and estimate culture scores as described in Section 2.1, using the 
full transcripts (scripted and Q&A portions together). Because the earliest calls in the Fair 
Disclosure Wire database are from 2004, the final sample has fewer observations than the full 
sample used in the main tests. However, in spite of the small sample, I find that the correlation 
among individual cultural scores is positive and significant for all four attributes. The correlation 
between 10k-based Create and conference call-based Create is 0.368, while the correlation 
coefficients are 0.182, 0.259 and 0.329 for the Compete, Control and Collaboration attributes, 
respectively (p < 0.001 for all four correlations). Also, I find that multivariate results are in line 
with those of Table 8. For example, replicating the restricted models of Columns 1 and 5, I find 
that the CD coefficient is 0.0836 (p = 0.0336) for the strong-culture acquirers and 0.0943  
(p = 0.4224; results untabulated) for the acquirers whose culture is weaker than their targets’. 
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Therefore, the text of the conference calls, including their non-scripted portion, seems to 
accurately reflect firms’ corporate culture.  
The use of forms 10-K to infer a firm’s corporate culture rests on the assumption of within-
firm homogeneity in corporate culture. However, if multiple cultures coexist within a firm, the 
corporate culture inferred from forms 10-K may reflect the management’s culture (or view 
thereof) better than the rank-and-file employees’ culture. Similar to Popadak (2014), I retrieve job 
reviews written by current and former employees from a career intelligence website. I compute 
the cultural scores exactly as described in Section 2.2, but using the free-form portion of the job 
review only. Because the career intelligence website has limited coverage (the earliest reviews 
were published in 2011), the sample size reduces dramatically to 63 observations for which 
combined CAR and CD are non-missing.  
In untabulated tests, I find that there is no statistical difference between the three- or seven-
day combined announcement returns of the high-CD and low-CD acquisitions. This can be due to 
within-firm cultural heterogeneity, but most likely, the lack of significance is due to the small 
sample size. Considering reviews published after the announcement date greatly increases the 
sample size, but assumes that corporate events as significant as large acquisitions are unlikely to 
change a firm’s culture (an assumption invalidated by Popadak, 2014), and raises endogeneity 
concerns. As the number of published reviews will grow through time, the review-based estimates 
of culture should be more precise and numerous; examination of the relation between employees’ 
opinions and merger effects is a topic for future research. 
 
2.6.3 Employee treatment versus corporate culture 
Possibly, there is a natural overlap between corporate culture and employee treatment. 
Employees in firms with better employee relations may feel differently towards their employer 
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and their position, which could in turn affect the firm’s culture. To investigate this issue further, I 
follow Bae, Kang and Wang (2011) and retrieve data from KLD Socrates (now part of MSCI).47 
I compute, for each firm-year, an employee treatment score by summing the scores over five 
categories of employee relations: union relations, cash profit-sharing, employee involvement in 
stock options plans, strength of the retirement benefits and health and safety strength. The total 
Employee Treatment index ranges between zero and five. The acquirer-target treatment distance 
is the absolute value of the difference in Employee Treatment indices.48  
Due to the small sample size, I again limit the analysis to a comparison of combined 
announcement returns between high- and low-CD acquisitions, where high- and low-CD 
acquisitions are, respectively, the acquisitions with above-median (below-median) employee 
treatment distance. In untabulated results, I find that high-treatment distance acquisitions generate 
lower combined announcement returns than acquisitions where both the acquirer’s and target’ 
employees are treated comparably (difference: -0.018; p = 0.055). The contrasting effects of the 
Employee Treatment distance could be due to limitations of my KLD dataset or differences in 
methodologies (for instance, KLD’s score on any individual dimension records only the existence, 
and not the magnitude, of the employee relation dimension). Alternatively, treatment distance is 
possibly not a substitute for cultural differences, and both variables capture different intangibles.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Using a sample of domestic acquisitions of public firms announced between 1994 and 
2014, I examine whether cultural distance between an acquire and its target is related to the 
                                                          
47 A partially-complete employee relations dataset is retrieved owing to subscriptions rights. 
48 I also compute the treatment distance as the Euclidean distance over the five employee treatment categories. The 
untabulated results are similar to those described, but slightly weaker.   
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combined announcement returns. To estimate the cultural distance of an acquisition, I use textual 
analysis of the firms’ 10-K forms to extract scores that reflect the relative importance of specific 
values (e.g. collaboration, competitiveness, etc.) for each firm. The cultural distance, CD, is the 
Euclidean distance between the acquirer’s and the target’s pre-announcement cultural value 
scores.  
Consistent with the survey evidence of Graham et al. (2016) and using a sample of 
hypothetical acquirer-target pairs where the targets are matched on industry, market capitalization 
and market-to-book ratios of equity, I first document that differences in corporate cultures between 
two firms negatively relate to the probability of the target firm being selected as a target. On 
average, and assuming that executives accurately diagnose corporate cultures, mergers between 
culturally distant firms will either never be seriously considered, or the negotiations abort before 
the announcement. The announced mergers and acquisitions thus need to clear an unobserved 
“cultural feasibility” threshold.  
In the sample of announced acquisitions, I find that greater differences between the 
acquirer’s and the target’s cultures are positively associated with the combined acquirers’ and 
targets’ three-day abnormal stock returns. The cultural distance effect remains after controlling 
for product market synergies, corporate governance quality of the acquirers, market-wide policy 
uncertainty and the selection bias documented above. After providing evidence that a strong 
corporate culture is a valuable intangible, I show that the cultural distance effect concentrates in 
the subsample of strong-culture acquirers. Intuitively, only acquirers with a clear cultural identity 
are prepared to integrate a target with vastly different norms and values.  
Consistent with the interpretation that the positive association between cultural distance 
and announcement returns should translate into operating synergies, I find that strong-culture 
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acquirers merging with a culturally distant targets register larger post-merger improvements in 
operating performance (operating and net profit margins) than strong-culture acquirers merging 
with culturally similar targets.  
In short, the paper contributes to the literature by showing that corporate culture matters. 
More specifically, the paper documents that corporate culture is a valuable intangible asset that 
affects the probability of being acquired. Conditioning on the acquirer having a stronger corporate 
culture than its target, the paper finds that differences in corporate cultures are positively related 
to combined announcement returns and post-merger improvements in operating performance. 
Therefore, thanks to the granularity of the CD measure (at the firm-level, and available 
dynamically), the paper confirms the relevance of corporate culture for mergers and more broadly, 
for corporate policies, thus contributing to the burgeoning field of culture and finance.  
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Figure 2.1. Competing Values Framework 
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Source: Cameron et al. (2006), Figure 3.1. 
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Table 2.1. Frequency of Individual Cultural Words 
Create Compete Collaboration Control 
Word % Word % Word % Word % 
Style 0.228 Agreement 0.396 Share 0.413 Operations 0.396 
New 0.210 End 0.348 Service 0.374 Require 0.281 
Change 0.165 Market 0.241 Relation 0.232 Manage 0.248 
Develop 0.122 Result 0.221 Inform 0.168 Value 0.242 
Future 0.107 Invest 0.165 Receive 0.151 Productive 0.231 
Risk 0.083 Revenues 0.144 Certitude 0.150 Usage 0.184 
Design 0.072 Benefit 0.114 Partnership 0.134 Control 0.167 
Make 0.063 Performance 0.110 Standard 0.117 Additional 0.161 
Adjust 0.060 Customer 0.107 Chief 0.089 Employee 0.142 
Original 0.059 Accord 0.096 Association 0.073 Grant 0.099 
Establish 0.052 Earn 0.091 Document 0.072 Conditional 0.097 
Begin 0.052 Present 0.083 Participation 0.072 Accord 0.096 
Initiation 0.039 Charge 0.068 Affiliation 0.058 Reason 0.087 
Institute 0.032 Acquire 0.065 Federation 0.066 Facilitator 0.086 
Generate 0.031 Position 0.058 Connection 0.056 Expectation 0.070 
Venture 0.027 Direct 0.052 Method 0.041 Procedure 0.062 
Produce 0.022 Gain 0.051 Work 0.038 Address 0.058 
Commence 0.021 Profit 0.043 Supportive 0.033 Approval 0.056 
Install 0.019 Return 0.035 Combination 0.031 Process 0.052 
Experiment 0.019 Signal 0.032 Involvement 0.031 Direct 0.052 
This table reports, for each cultural dimension, the top twenty words in terms of average frequency, 
where frequency is calculated as the occurrences of a word in an individual 10-K form, divided by the 
total number of words in the parsed 10-K form.  
Bolded words indicate words that overlap with the financial lexicon. 
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Acquirers characteristics 
 Mean  
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Min  
(%) 
Max  
(%) 
Std. Dev. N 
CREATE 3.347 2.718 0.237 12.435 2.361 1209 
COMPETE 6.784 5.820 0.337 20.091 4.436 1209 
CONTROL 9.509 8.085 0.869 30.264 6.213 1209 
COLLABORATION 5.665 4.773 0.436 18.630 3.689 1209 
       Panel B. Target characteristics 
 Mean  
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Min 
 (%) 
Max  
(%) 
Std. Dev. N 
CREATE 2.997 2.381 0.054 12.739 2.285 1209 
COMPETE 6.039 4.866 0.164 20.842 4.409 1209 
CONTROL 8.545 7.008 0.206 30.751 6.207 1209 
COLLABORATION 5.003 3.988 0.095 19.946 3.593 1209 
       Panel C. Deal characteristics 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. N 
CD 0.176 0.119 0.167 1209 
     CAR (-1,1), acquirer -0.018 -0.012 0.071 1201 
CAR (-3,3), acquirer -0.025 -0.018 0.098 1201 
Combined CAR (-1,1) 0.021 0.011 0.066 1172 
Combined CAR (-3,3) 0.030 0.023 0.089 1167 
     DEAL_VALUE 1.695 0.391 4.810 1209 
REL_SIZE 0.425 0.233 0.557 1012 
MB, acquirer 4.087 2.677 3.620 1012 
PURE_STOCK 0.356 0.000 0.479 1209 
     SCORE_HP 0.085 0.070 0.069 944 
GEO_DISTANCE 4.575 6.081 3.142 1209 
DIFF_WB 1.560 1.792 1.254 1209 
DIFF_TAX 0.788 0.688 0.751 1183 
SAME_POLITIC 0.728 1.000 0.445 1209 
SAME_REL 0.712 1.000 0.453 1209 
This table provides descriptive statistics. Panel A reports cultural scores for acquirers and acquirers’ 
characteristics, and Panel B reports cultural scores for targets. Panel C provides statistics at the deal level, 
including cultural variables, post-acquisition returns, deal characteristics and distance variables. Variables 
descriptions are in Appendix 2.  
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Table 2.3. Calibration of Cultural Attributes 
 Dependent variable 
 R&D/AT 
(1) 
Employees/AT 
(2) 
EBIT/Sale 
(3) 
Turnover 
(4) 
CREATE 0.1911 -0.3532 -0.0055 -0.0132 
 (<0.001) (0.0163) (0.9967) (0.9137) 
 [0.0589] [-0.1088] [-0.0017] [-0.0040] 
COLLABORATION 0.002 0.4686 0.0266 0.3448 
 (0.8305) (0.0005) (0.9825) (0.0011) 
 [0.0008] [0.1947] [0.0110] [0.1468] 
COMPETE 0.0451 0.0236 2.4980 0.2079 
 (<0.001) (0.8704) (0.0551) (0.0703) 
 [0.0165] [0.0086] [0.9138] [0.0786] 
CONTROL 0.0174 0.2843 -2.8019 0.2973 
 (0.0181) (0.0069) (0.0031) (0.0003) 
 [0.0102] [0.1660] [-1.6364] [0.1761] 
Intercept -0.1318 -0.2378 1.4574 -0.2066 
 (<0.001) (0.0678) (0.2127) (0.0427) 
     
R-Square 0.1919 0.0248 0.0029 0.0422 
N 2171 2047 2165 2171 
This Table reports the results of the OLS estimation of the following model:  
Outputit+1 = α + Createit + Collaborationit + Competeit + Controlit, where cultural scores and outputs 
are measured for each firm-year it.  
Each column uses a different output variable. In Column 1, the dependent variable is the R&D expenses 
scaled by total assets. Column 2’s dependent variable is the number of employees (in thousands), scaled 
by total assets. Column 3 uses the Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), scaled by total sales, and 
in Column 4, the dependent variable is the asset turnover, measured as EBIT scaled by total assets.  
 
The number of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) 
and economic significance [in brackets] are also reported. Economic significance is calculated as the 
change in the dependent variable that is associated with a one-standard deviation change in the 
independent variables, while maintaining the other independent variables at their sample mean. 
Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values and economic significance indicate the cultural value with 
the highest economic significance in each model. 
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Table 2.4. Cultural Distance and the Probability of Merging 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CD -17.033 -16.6598 -16.6204 -16.0973 -11.2738 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 [0.3183] [0.4101] [0.1316] [0.0988] [0.0818] 
REL_SIZE . -0.2304 -0.3589 -0.4117 -0.4051 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
MKT_CAP . 0.0426 0.0657 0.0342 -0.0078 
  (0.0223) (0.0426) (0.5046) (0.8046) 
DIV . 0.3399 0.1756 0.2037 0.1665 
  (0.1731) (0.5182) (0.4418) (0.5101) 
MB . -0.0231 -0.0369 -0.0338 -0.0205 
  (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
MB_TARGET . -0.0009 0.0014 -0.002 0.0085 
  (0.9530) (0.9503) (0.9405) (0.6757) 
LOG_WB . . -0.1505 -0.1524 -0.1006 
   (0.0090) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
DIFF_TAX . . -0.1166 -0.1261 0.0096 
   (0.0500) (0.1078) (0.8364) 
SAME_POLITIC . . 0.0831 0.1517 0.1852 
   (0.3552) (0.0051) (0.0000) 
SAME_RELIGIOUS . . 0.0629 0.0737 0.101 
   (0.5897) (0.5672) (0.4118) 
GEO_DISTANCE . . -0.2037 -0.2141 -0.2144 
   (0.0032) (0.0185) (0.0137) 
SCORE_HP . . . -0.8449 -0.469 
    (0.0054) (0.0703) 
INTERCEPT 1.8429 1.5142 2.7004 2.9117 1.8535 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Pseudo R-Sq. (0.3693) (0.3618) (0.4001) (0.3969) (0.2145) 
N 5257 5106 4985 3816 6877 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
State Dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
This table reports the results of the logistic regressions where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the acquirer-target pair 
announced a merger, and zero otherwise (that is, if the acquirer-target pair is drawn from the sample of hypothetical mergers). 
Hypothetical acquirer-target pairs are formed by matching acquirers with potential targets, where the potential targets are in 
the same Fama-French 48-industry as the real targets and have a pre-announcement market capitalization between 75% and 
125% of the real target’s pre-announcement market capitalization (between 50% and 150% of real target’s pre-announcement 
market capitalization for Column 5 matches). If there are more than 5 matches, potential targets are sorted by how close their 
pre-announcement market-book ratio of equity is to the real target’s pre-announcement market-book ratio, and the 5 closest 
matches are retained. Column 5 retains the top 10 matches. 
Independent variables are defined in Appendix A8. The number of observations and pseudo R-squared of each regression 
are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered by both industry and year. 
Economic significance [in brackets] is calculated as the change in the dependent variable that results from a one-standard 
deviation change in cultural distance, while maintaining the other independent variables at their sample means. Year and 
acquirers’ industry and state indicator variables are included in the regressions. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-
values indicate statistical significance at the 5% level or higher. 
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Table 2.5. Announcement Returns and Characteristics of High-CD and Low-CD Acquisitions 
Panel A. Announcement Returns    
 Full Sample High CD Low CD High CD - Low CD 
ACQUIRER CAR (-1,1) -0.0184 -0.0109 -0.0259 0.0149 
    (0.0002) 
ACQUIRER CAR (-3,3) -0.0248 -0.019 -0.0306 0.0115 
    (0.0409) 
COMBINED CAR (-1,1) 0.0212 0.0259 0.0165 0.0094 
    (0.0151) 
COMBINED CAR (-3,3) 0.0296 0.0332 0.026 0.0072 
    (0.1632) 
Panel B. Deal and Acquirer Characteristics    
 Full Sample High CD Low CD High CD - Low CD 
REL_SIZE 0.4251 0.392 0.4587 -0.0667 
    (0.0566) 
MKTCAP 10.8376 14.2244 7.4452 6.7792 
    (0.0001) 
MB 4.0923 3.9012 4.2865 -0.3853 
    (0.0921) 
MB_TARGET 2.7392 2.76 2.7181 0.0419 
    (0.7745) 
PURE_STOCK 0.3557 0.2562 0.4553 -0.1991 
    (0.0000) 
PURE_CASH 0.2746 0.3669 0.1821 0.1848 
    (0.0000) 
DIV_DEAL 0.2878 0.2843 0.2914 -0.0071 
    (0.7856) 
FRIENDLY 0.9363 0.9174 0.9553 -0.0379 
    (0.0069) 
COMPLETED 0.8743 0.8562 0.8924 -0.0362 
    (0.0578) 
DAYS_TO_COMPLETE 133.4759 128.6815 138.0835 -9.402 
    (0.0668) 
TOEHOLD 0.8649 0.8871 0.8429 0.0443 
    (0.9103) 
UNSOLICITED 0.0775 0.1082 0.0468 0.0614 
    (0.0001) 
MERGER FORM 0.9596 0.9612 0.958 0.0032 
    (0.7730) 
This table reports descriptive statistics. Panel A presents statistics about the acquirer and combined acquirer 
and target abnormal announcement returns, whereas Panel B reports statistics about deal and acquirer 
characteristics. All variables are defined in the Appendix A8. 
Statistics are presented for the full sample, and for the High-CD and Low-CD acquisitions. High-CD (Low-
CD) acquisitions are those with CD above (below) the full-sample median CD value. The last column presents 
the results of t-tests for the differences in means between the High-CD and Low-CD subsamples. P-values are 
presented in parentheses. Boldfaced coefficients indicate statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
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Table 2.6. Combined Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Dependent variable CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) 1real merger 
pair 
CAR(-
1,1) 
      First 
Stage 
Second 
Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CD 0.0716 0.0718 0.0569 0.0868 0.0487 -0.5940 0.0380 
 (0.0130) (0.0000) (0.0118) (0.0001) (0.0190) (0.000) (0.008) 
 [0.1905] [0.1912] [0.1514] [0.2310] [0.1297]   
REL_SIZE 0.0089 0.0079 0.0094 0.0091 0.0101 0.0116 0.0090 
 (0.2424) (0.3188) (0.2209) (0.2272) (0.1733) (0.742) (0.007) 
MKT_CAP -0.0057 -0.006 -0.0055 -0.0067 -0.0054 0.0767 -0.0101 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PURE_STOCK -0.0074 -0.0012 -0.0063 -0.0015 -0.0046  -0.0113 
 (0.3484) (0.8668) (0.4085) (0.8475) (0.5412)  (0.044) 
PURE_CASH 0.0104 0.0115 0.0103 0.0099 0.011  0.0101 
 (0.0737) (0.0270) (0.0471) (0.0842) (0.0214)  (0.013) 
DIV_DEAL 0.0027 -0.0015 0.0014 0.0004 0.0015 0.2501 0.0009 
 (0.6972) (0.8336) (0.8416) (0.9485) (0.8188) (0.054) (0.950) 
FRIENDLY 0.007 0.0099 0.0088 0.0086 0.0186  0.0078 
 (0.4523) (0.3175) (0.3796) (0.3884) (0.1069)  (0.234) 
MB 0.0001 0 0 0 0 -0.0118 -0.0002 
 (0.7763) (0.9907) (0.9678) (0.9864) (0.9941) (0.000) (0.762) 
MB_TARGET 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0122 0.0012 
 (0.3115) (0.4356) (0.2992) (0.5047) (0.3508) (0.025) (0.006) 
DIFF_WB  0.0026 0.0035 0.0019 0.0033 -0.0533 0.0045 
  (0.3515) (0.2035) (0.4750) (0.2420) (0.000) (0.164) 
DIFF_TAX  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0286 -0.0024 
  (0.9865) (0.9848) (0.7767) (0.9369) (0.111) (0.579) 
SAME_POLITIC  0.0048 0.0041 0.0075 0.0045 0.0713 -0.0029 
  (0.3455) (0.4217) (0.0517) (0.3630) (0.087) (0.656) 
SAME_REL  0.0105 0.0098 0.0068 0.0101 0.0131 0.0048 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0422) (0.0000) (0.812) (0.528) 
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Table 2.6 (Continued). Combined Announcement Abnormal Returns 
GEO_DISTANCE  0.0008 0.0007 0.0014 0.0004  0.0008 
  (0.6453) (0.6832) (0.3677) (0.8214)  (0.6453) 
TOEHOLD     0.0002   
     (0.4117)   
MERGER FORM     0.0352   
     (0.0011)   
UNSOLICITED     0.0189   
     (0.0033)   
MERGER OF EQUALS     -0.0326   
     (0.0556)   
PAST_RETURNS        
        
IMR        
        
INTERCEPT 0.0372 0.0152 0.0129 0.032 -0.0316 0.0372 0.0152 
 (0.0140) (0.2895) (0.1635) (0.0511) (0.0008) (0.0140) (0.2895) 
R-square (0.0838) (0.1154) (0.0891) (0.0798) (0.1038) (0.0838) (0.1154) 
N 1224 1166 1166 1166 1155 1224 1166 
State Dummies Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
This table presents the OLS estimation of the model:  Post-Bid Abnormal Returnit = β1(CDijt) + β2(Xijt) + εit  
In Columns 1 through 5, the dependent variable is the combined cumulative three-day abnormal returns (CAR[-1,1]). Columns 6 and 7 present the results 
of the two-stage Heckman estimation: Column 6 presents the results of the first-stage probit regression, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable 
that equals one if an acquirer-target pair is a pair of firms that announced an acquisition, and zero otherwise. Column 7 presents the results of the second-
stage OLS regression, where the dependent variable is the three-day combined abnormal announcement returns.  
Xijt is a vector of acquirer and target deal control variables and includes: relative size of the acquisition, acquirers’ pre-announcement market capitalization, 
pure stock offer indicator, pure cash offer indicator, diversifying deal indicator, friendly deal indicator, acquirer’s pre-announcement market-to-book ratio 
of equity, target’s pre-announcement equity market-to-book ratio, state-level differences in well-being index, state-level differences in marginal corporate 
tax rate, state-level difference in state GDP, differences in the state-wide proportion of Catholics, state-level , indicator variable, logarithm of the distance 
in miles between state capitals. All variables are defined in Appendix A8.  
 
The number of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered by 
both industry and year, except in the two-stage model where errors are clustered by industry only. Economic significance [in brackets] is calculated as the 
change in the dependent variable that results from a one-standard deviation change in cultural distance, while maintaining the other independent variables 
at their sample means. Acquirers’ industry and state indicator variables are included in the regressions. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values 
indicate statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
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Table 2.7. Possible Sources of the CD Effect. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CD 0.0632 0.0551 0.0734 0.0694 0.0696 
 (0.0501) (0.0061) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 [0.1681] [0.1466] [0.1954] [0.1848] [0.1853] 
SCORE_HP -0.0084     
 (0.8009)     
N_DIRECTORS_AC
Q 
 0.0024    
  (0.0021)    
E_INDEX_ACQ   0.0022   
   (0.3969)   
G_INDEX    -0.0005  
    (0.1432)  
HIGH_UNCERTAI
NTY 
    -0.0045 
     (0.0394) 
REL_SIZE 0.0018 0.0073 0.0081 0.0078 0.008 
 (0.8539) (0.3703) (0.3152) (0.3242) (0.3136) 
MKT_CAP -0.0057 -0.0083 -0.0062 -0.0059 -0.0061 
 (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
PURE_STOCK -0.002 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 (0.7790) (0.8098) (0.8522) (0.8959) (0.8966) 
PURE_CASH 0.0097 0.0113 0.0116 0.0115 0.0119 
 (0.1140) (0.0342) (0.0295) (0.0257) (0.0222) 
DIV_DEAL -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0016 
 (0.7536) (0.9454) (0.8332) (0.8359) (0.8215) 
FRIENDLY -0.0147 0.0099 0.0095 0.0099 0.0098 
 (0.2699) (0.3138) (0.3335) (0.3110) (0.3201) 
MB -0.0003 0.0001 0 0 0 
 (0.6455) (0.9002) (0.9929) (0.9824) (0.9950) 
MB_TARGET 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.3321) (0.3709) (0.4400) (0.4679) (0.4339) 
DIFF_WB 0.0056 0.0031 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 
 (0.0366) (0.2671) (0.3534) (0.3400) (0.3509) 
DIFF_TAX -0.0025 -0.0003 0.0002 0 -0.0001 
 (0.7622) (0.9705) (0.9715) (0.9955) (0.9856) 
SAME_POLITIC 0.0129 0.0056 0.0052 0.0048 0.0049 
 (0.0323) (0.2468) (0.3591) (0.3447) (0.3363) 
SAME_REL 0.0075 0.0107 0.0106 0.0106 0.0107 
 (0.0036) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GEO_DISTANCE 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.6928) (0.6726) (0.6766) (0.6511) (0.6366) 
INTERCEPT 0.0362 0.0106 0.0166 0.0164 0.0171 
 (0.0299) (0.5262) (0.2462) (0.2185) (0.2584) 
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Table 2.7 (Continued). Possible Sources of the CD Effect. 
R-square (0.1436) (0.1242) (0.1162) (0.1158) (0.1163) 
N 855 1166 1166 1166 1166 
Industry Dummies? Y Y Y Y Y 
State Dummies? Y Y Y Y Y 
This table presents the OLS estimation of the model:  Post-Bid Abnormal Returnit = β1(CDijt) + β2(Xijt) + εit  
The dependent variable is the combined cumulative three-day abnormal returns (CAR[-1,1]). Xijt is a vector 
of acquirer and target deal control variables and includes: relative size of the acquisition, acquirers’ pre-
announcement market capitalization, pure stock offer indicator, pure cash offer indicator, diversifying deal 
indicator, friendly deal indicator, acquirer’s pre-announcement market-to-book ratio of equity, target’s pre-
announcement equity market-to-book ratio, state-level differences in well-being index, state-level differences 
in marginal corporate tax rate, state-level difference in state GDP, differences in the state-wide proportion of 
Catholics, state-level , indicator variable, logarithm of the distance in miles between state capitals. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A8.  
Each column adds, in turn, another explanatory variable: Column 1 uses Hoberg-Philips (2010) product 
market similarity measure; Column 2 uses the acquirers’ number of directors; Column 3 includes Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index for the acquirers; and Column 4 adds Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick index (2003) for the acquirers.  
 
The number of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are 
calculated using standard errors clustered by both industry and year. Economic significance [in brackets] is 
calculated as the change in the dependent variable that results from a one-standard deviation change in cultural 
distance, while maintaining the other independent variables at their sample means. Acquirers’ industry and 
state indicator variables are included in the regressions. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values 
indicate statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
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Table 2.8. Operating Performance of Firms with Stronger Culture. 
 
 Full Sample Strong Culture Weak Culture Strong Culture - Weak Culture 
ROA 0.0292 0.0337 0.0246 0.0091 (0.1660) 
Cash Flow / Total Assets 0.0373 0.0438 0.0309 0.0129 (0.1487) 
      
Sales per employee 366.97 407.87 325.99 81.87 (0.0000) 
EBIT per employee 36.69 49.29 24.08 25.21 (0.0006) 
Cash Flow per employee 41.20 50.25 32.12 18.12 (0.0054) 
SGA per employee 69.71 77.20 62.21 14.99 (0.0000) 
      
EBIT margin -0.0408 -0.019 -0.0627 0.0438 (0.5508) 
Employees / Total Assets 0.0034 0.0031 0.0037 -0.0006 (0.0012) 
Market share 0.0015 0.0016 0.0014 0.0002 (0.0072) 
      
Culture 3.3771 5.9422 0.8072 5.1351 (0.0000) 
N 3227 1615 1612 .  
This table reports descriptive statistics about the operating performance for the full sample firms (Column 1).  
ROA is the return on assets, calculated as EBIT/Total assets. Cash Flows are the sum of EBIT and Depreciation. SGA are the Sales, 
General and Administrative expenses. EBIT margin is the ratio of EBIT/Sales. Market share is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s 
yearly sales, divided by the industry’s total sales for that same period. Fama-French 48-industry classification is used.  
 
Columns 2 and 3 present operating performance measures for the high-culture and low-culture subsamples, where high (low) culture 
firms are those where max(create, compete, control, collaborate) is above (below) the full-sample’s median. All cultural attributes are 
normalized before computing the maximum value. The last column presents the results of t-tests for the differences in means between the 
High-Culture and Low-Culture subsamples. P-values are presented in parentheses. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values indicate 
statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
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Table 2.9. Combined Announcement Returns, for Strong- and Weak-Culture Acquirers 
 Strong Culture Weak Culture 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CD 0.1221 0.1278 0.1542 0.1173 0.0211 -0.0075 -0.0762 -0.0187 
 (0.0010) (0.0065) (0.0000) (0.0637) (0.6062) (0.7686) (0.0690) (0.2964) 
 [0.3437] [0.3599] [0.4341] [0.3302] [0.0532] [0.0188] [0.1924] [0.0472] 
REL_SIZE 0.0068 0.0066 -0.0021 0.0064 0.0127 0.0146 0.0108 0.0146 
 (0.4939) (0.5051) (0.8403) (0.5111) (0.1329) (0.1165) (0.4062) (0.1187) 
MKT_CAP -0.0084 -0.0086 -0.009 -0.0089 -0.0027 -0.0023 -0.002 -0.0023 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0304) (0.0232) (0.3663) (0.0373) 
PURE_STOCK 0.0068 0.0072 0.007 0.0073 -0.0211 -0.0195 -0.0147 -0.0195 
 (0.5584) (0.5705) (0.5277) (0.5544) (0.0147) (0.0386) (0.0531) (0.0400) 
PURE_CASH 0.0181 0.016 0.0215 0.0157 0.0077 0.0089 0.0083 0.0087 
 (0.0387) (0.1216) (0.0621) (0.1169) (0.0016) (0.0075) (0.2924) (0.0103) 
DIV_DEAL -0.0008 -0.001 0.002 -0.0014 0.0068 0.0044 0.003 0.0044 
 (0.9193) (0.9064) (0.7146) (0.8674) (0.3770) (0.5650) (0.7467) (0.5678) 
FRIENDLY -0.0193 -0.0125 -0.015 -0.0117 0.0347 0.0338 -0.0049 0.0339 
 (0.0857) (0.2122) (0.3102) (0.2415) (0.0207) (0.0436) (0.7178) (0.0412) 
MB 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (0.1274) (0.1920) (0.3273) (0.1762) (0.9591) (0.8212) (0.6739) (0.8327) 
MB_TARGET 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 
 (0.2589) (0.2600) (0.0047) (0.2334) (0.8550) (0.7404) (0.3959) (0.7425) 
DIFF_WB  0.0039 0.0116 0.0041  0.0039 0.0062 0.004 
  (0.2197) (0.0070) (0.1994)  (0.3370) (0.2964) (0.3142) 
DIFF_TAX  0.0012 -0.0027 0.0007  0.0008 -0.0019 0.0011 
  (0.8548) (0.7263) (0.9109)  (0.9144) (0.8211) (0.8804) 
SAME_POLITIC  0.0016 0.0108 0.0012  0.0022 0.0038 0.0022 
  (0.8311) (0.2004) (0.8694)  (0.7870) (0.6252) (0.7948) 
SAME_REL  0.0014 -0.0061 0.0009  0.017 0.0205 0.0173 
  (0.8904) (0.4996) (0.9235)  (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0025) 
GEO_DISTANCE  -0.0005 -0.002 -0.0004  0.0008 0.0014 0.0007 
  (0.1996) (0.1772) (0.3985)  (0.7288) (0.5859) (0.7643) 
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Table 2.9 (Cont.). Combined Announcement Returns, for Strong- and Weak-Culture Acquirers 
SCORE_HP   -0.0047    -0.0491  
   (0.8712)    (0.5787)  
OPPOSITE    0.0049    -0.0024 
    (0.5637)    (0.8418) 
OPPOSITE * CD    0.0553    0.0525 
    (0.7007)    (0.5470) 
INTERCEPT 0.0751 0.0525 0.0511 0.0529 -0.0075 -0.0279 0.011 -0.0277 
 (0.0054) (0.0570) (0.0368) (0.0672) (0.6762) (0.2313) (0.6699) (0.2558) 
         
R-square (0.1499) (0.1497) (0.1906) (0.1521) (0.1061) (0.1154) (0.1569) (0.1157) 
N 620 598 452 598 599 564 403 564 
State Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
This table presents the OLS estimation of the model:  Post-Bid Abnormal Returnit = β1(CDijt) + β2(Xijt) + εit  
The dependent variable is the combined cumulative three-day abnormal returns (CAR[-1,1]). Xijt is a vector of acquirer and target deal control variables 
and includes: relative size of the acquisition, acquirers’ pre-announcement market capitalization, pure stock offer indicator, pure cash offer indicator, 
diversifying deal indicator, friendly deal indicator, acquirer’s pre-announcement market-to-book ratio of equity, target’s pre-announcement equity 
market-to-book ratio, state-level differences in well-being index, state-level differences in marginal corporate tax rate, state-level difference in state GDP, 
differences in the state-wide proportion of Catholics, state-level , indicator variable, logarithm of the distance in miles between state capitals. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A8.  
 
Columns 1 to 4 present the results for the strong-culture subsample, whereas Columns 5 to 8 present the results for the weak-culture subsamples. Strong 
(weak) culture acquirers are those where the max(create, compete, control, collaborate) is larger (smaller) than the their target’s max(create, compete, 
control, collaborate). All cultural attributes are normalized before computing the maximum value. 
 
The number of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered 
by both industry and year. Economic significance [in brackets] is calculated as the change in the dependent variable that results from a one-standard 
deviation change in cultural distance, while maintaining the other independent variables at their sample means. Acquirers’ industry and state indicator 
variables are included in the regressions. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values indicate statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
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Table 2.10. Post-Announcement Operating Performance 
Panel A: Strong-Culture Acquirers  Panel B: Weak-Culture Acquirers 
 ROA Op. Profits Net Income Turnover 
 
 ROA Op. Profits Net Income Turnover 
Intercept -0.0007 0.2528 0.2822 -0.0181  -0.0123 0.0351 0.0178 -0.024 
 (0.8734) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0056)  (0.0669) (0.0000) (0.0392) (0.0000) 
Past performance 0.6311 0.8624 0.7968 0.7976  0.6288 0.9064 0.8916 0.884 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
          
R-Square (0.4508) (0.7828) (0.7508) (0.7197)  (0.4374) (0.7347) (0.7263) (0.7655) 
N 526 526 526 526  414 414 414 414 
           
This table presents the OLS estimation of the post-announcement operating performance on past performance. As in Healy, Palepu and Ruback 
(1992), the post-announcement operating performance is the firm-level industry-adjusted median operating performance from years +0 to +2 (relative 
to the year of the acquisition). The pre-merger operating performance is the industry-adjusted weighted average of the acquirer’s and target’s 
operating performance, and if the acquirer and target are from different industries (using Fama-French 48 industries), the industry benchmark is 
adjusted, using the pre-acquisition acquirer and target market capitalization as weights. Industry-adjusted operating performance is firm i’s operating 
performance, minus the average operating performance of the ten closest same-industry firms by Market-Book ratios of equity, where matched firms 
have capitalization between 50% and 150% of firm i’s.  
 
Panel A presents the results for the subsample of strong-culture acquirers whereas Panel B reports the results for the subsample of weak-culture 
acquirers. Strong (weak) culture acquirers are those where the max(create, compete, control, collaborate) is larger (smaller) than the their target’s 
max(create, compete, control, collaborate). All cultural attributes are normalized before computing the maximum value. ROA is the ratio of EBIT 
to total assets, Operating Profits is the ratio of EBIT to sales and Net Income is the ratio of Net Income to sales. Turnover is the ratio of sales to total 
assets. NI/Emp is the ratio of net income to the number of employees.  
 
The number of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors 
clustered by both industry and year. Year dummies are included in the regressions. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values indicate statistical 
significance at the 5% level or higher. 
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Table 2.11. Robustness Tests: Alternative Measures of CD 
Culture CDFR CDH CDO’Reilly CDCVF, vect 
CDCVF, 
term-weighted 
CDCVF > 
0 
CDCVF < 0 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CD 0.008 0.007 0.6002 0.0748 0.0008 0.1072 0.0034 
 
(0.0017) (0.0156) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0334) (0.7622) 
 
[0.2738] [0.1713] [0.2069] [0.1942] [0.3345] [0.4722] [0.0157] 
REL_SIZE 0.0075 0.0079 0.0077 0.008 0.008 -0.0027 0.0134 
  (0.3492) (0.3179) (0.3301) (0.3178) (0.3121) (0.7304) (0.0926) 
MKT_CAP -0.0062 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.006 -0.0064 -0.0082 -0.0034 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0024) 
PURE_STOCK 0 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0096 -0.0027 
  (0.9998) (0.8369) (0.8230) (0.8689) (0.9640) (0.3980) (0.7436) 
PURE_CASH 0.0125 0.0118 0.0114 0.0115 0.0107 0.0083 0.0145 
  (0.0168) (0.0189) (0.0286) (0.0261) (0.0403) (0.4029) (0.0074) 
DIV_DEAL -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0051 -0.0016 
  (0.7774) (0.8278) (0.8237) (0.8269) (0.8253) (0.5633) (0.8580) 
FRIENDLY 0.0105 0.0102 0.0103 0.0099 0.0097 0.0075 0.011 
  (0.2768) (0.2913) (0.2854) (0.3158) (0.3172) (0.6988) (0.5327) 
MB 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.9879) (0.9966) (0.9792) (0.9987) (0.9709) (0.9137) (0.8321) 
MB_TARGET 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
  (0.3510) (0.4365) (0.4345) (0.4494) (0.3851) (0.3289) (0.6142) 
DIFF_WB 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024 0.0026 0.0027 0.0011 0.0033 
  (0.3364) (0.3478) (0.3623) (0.3402) (0.3203) (0.7973) (0.3553) 
DIFF_TAX -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0105 -0.0058 
  (0.9728) (0.9598) (0.9692) (0.9805) (0.9911) (0.2733) (0.4801) 
SAME_POLITIC 0.0048 0.005 0.005 0.0047 0.0048 0.0119 -0.0023 
  (0.3521) (0.3395) (0.3279) (0.3582) (0.3293) (0.2487) (0.6174) 
SAME_REL 0.0103 0.0104 0.0106 0.0105 0.0104 0.0031 0.0175 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7591) (0.0035) 
GEO_DISTANCE 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0001 0.0006 
  (0.6285) (0.6234) (0.5872) (0.6466) (0.6631) (0.9350) (0.7888) 
INTERCEPT 0.0128 0.0143 0.0135 0.0152 0.0122 0.0508 -0.0046 
  (0.4092) (0.3228) (0.3622) (0.2869) (0.4084) (0.2330) (0.8327) 
                
R-square (0.1183) (0.1150) (0.1160) (0.1155) (0.1199) (0.1730) (0.1646) 
N 1166 1166 1166 1166 1166 516 647 
State Dummies Y Y Y   Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y     Y Y 
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Table 2.11 (Continued). Robustness Tests: Alternative Measures of CD 
This table presents the OLS estimation of the model:  Post-Bid Abnormal Returnit = β1(CDijt) + β2(Xijt) + εit  
The dependent variable is the combined cumulative three-day abnormal returns (CAR[-1,1]), where the 
weights are the acquirer’s and target’s market capitalization four weeks before the announcement.  
Xijt is a vector of acquirer and target deal control variables and includes: relative size of the acquisition, 
acquirers’ pre-announcement market capitalization, pure stock offer indicator, pure cash offer indicator, 
diversifying deal indicator, friendly deal indicator, acquirer’s pre-announcement market-to-book ratio of 
equity, target’s pre-announcement equity market-to-book ratio, state-level differences in well-being index, 
state-level differences in marginal corporate tax rate, state-level difference in state GDP, differences in the 
state-wide proportion of Catholics, state-level , indicator variable, logarithm of the distance in miles between 
state capitals and Hoberg-Philips’ (2010) product market synergies. All variables are defined in Appendix A8. 
 
In Columns 1, 2 and 3, the cultural distance (CD) variable is estimated on the basis of, respectively, Fiordelisi 
and Ricci’s (2014), Hofstede’s (1984) or O’Reilly et al.’s (1991) frameworks. In Column 4, CD is also 
calculated as (Createa + Controla + Collaborationa + Competea) - (Createt + Controlt + Collaborationt + 
Competet), but each attribute is normalized by the sum of all four attributes (e.g. Createa /(Createa + Controla 
+ Collaborationa + Competea)). In Column 5, CD is calculated using the term-weighting methodology 
outlined in Loughran and McDonald (2011), where the individual cultural scores are derived from the 
weighted frequencies of each individual word. 
 
In Columns 6 and 7, CD is calculated as (Createa + Controla + Collaborationa + Competea) - (Createt + 
Controlt + Collaborationt + Competet), where the subscripts refer to the acquirer and target, respectively. All 
attributes are measured before the announcement. Column 6 reports the results for the subsample of positive 
CD, whereas Column 7 reports the results for the subsample of negative CD.  
 
The number of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are 
calculated using standard errors clustered by both industry and year. Economic significance [in brackets] is 
calculated as the change in the dependent variable that results from a one-standard deviation change in cultural 
distance, while maintaining the other independent variables at their sample means. Acquirers’ industry and 
state indicator variables are included in the regressions. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values 
indicate statistical significance at the 5% level or higher. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Does Stock Misvaluation Drive Merger Waves?49 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The notion that merger and acquisition activity clusters by time and industry is well-known in 
the literature (e.g., Nelson (1959), Gort (1969), and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)), but the debate 
on the causes of merger waves is far from settled. According to the neoclassical theory (also known 
as the Q hypothesis), merger activity is driven by synergy and efficiency factors, and merger waves 
are caused by economic and regulatory shocks (e.g., Brainard and Tobin (1968), Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)). In contrast, the misvaluation hypothesis 
posits that stock misvaluation affects merger intensity; merger waves are triggered by sharp 
deviations of stock prices from fundamental values (Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004)). Despite strong evidence that stock misvaluation affects takeovers at the 
individual deal level (e.g., Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), Cai and Vijh (2007), 
Savor and Lu (2009), Gu and Lev (2011), and Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013)), empirical evidence 
remains intensely divided about whether stock market misvaluation drives the aggregate or 
industry-level merger activity.50  
This polarization of the evidence is puzzling, especially considering that the majority of the 
above-mentioned papers study similar samples of acquisitions. We argue there are two reasons for 
                                                          
49 The current version is co-authored with Ming Dong.  
50 Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) and Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012) document that consistent 
with theories of market-driven merger waves, mergers are more likely when firms have higher valuation multiples. 
On the other hand, some studies find evidence supporting other drivers of merger waves. For instance, Bouwman, 
Fuller, and Nain (2009) argue that merger intensity is driven by herding, whereas Duchin and Schmidt (2013) argue 
that agency factors cause merger waves. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Andrade and 
Stafford (2004), Harford (2005), Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2005), and Ahern and Harford (2014) also find evidence 
supporting the neoclassical theories. 
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this phenomenon. First, when identifying merger waves, prior literature does not distinguish 
valuation-sensitive takeovers from other deals. Since pure stock offers are more likely to be 
influenced by stock (mis)valuation compared to cash deals, mixing all types of transactions in the 
analysis decreases the power of detecting valuation effects.51 Second, prior literature typically does 
not examine both the valuation multiples (such as value-to-price and market-to-book ratio) and 
long-run stock performance around merger waves. Because valuation multiples may contain 
information about both growth prospects and misvaluation, inferences are ambiguous if either 
equity valuation or long-run stock performance is not examined.52   
In this paper, we aim to remedy these issues. Specifically, we distinguish the misvaluation 
hypothesis from the Q hypothesis using two approaches. First, we test whether the bidder valuation 
levels correlate with the occurrence of merger waves and whether the effects of stock valuation on 
industry-level merger waves depend on the wave definition. According to the Q hypothesis, the 
level of stock valuation reflects firms’ economic fundamentals. Economic triggers of merger 
waves, such as technological shocks and industry-level deregulations, should affect merger activity 
irrespective of the transactions’ method of payment. By contrast, under the misvaluation 
hypothesis, we expect stronger misvaluation effects for deals paid entirely by stock. When both 
firms’ shares are traded, bidder and target stock valuations have an impact on takeovers—
overvalued bidders acquire relatively undervalued targets with stock (Shleifer and Vishny’s 
                                                          
51 One exception is Rau and Stouraitis (2011) who differentiate cash from stock merger waves. However, they draw 
inferences from comparing patterns across different kinds of corporate event waves and do not examine bidder equity 
valuation and stock performance across wave phases.  
52 Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) show that merger activity is strongly correlated with stock 
valuation levels and conclude that market overvaluation leads to merger waves. However, since they do not examine 
long-run acquirer stock performance, this is challenged by later studies. For instance, Duchin and Schmidt (2013) find 
that acquirers during merger waves have poor long-run stock performance and conclude agency issues, rather than 
misvaluation, drive merger waves; however, they do not examine the valuation patterns around waves. Maksimovic, 
Philips and Yang (2013) document high productivity gains of on-the-wave, high valuation acquirers, but they do not 
examine the long-run stock performance of these acquirers.  
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(2003)).53 Also, when the target is private, the bidder can use overvalued stock to pay for the 
transaction; the limited bargaining power of the low-liquidity private target may offer the acquirer 
increased incentive to take advantage of its overvalued stock.54  
Our second approach is to examine bidder long-run stock performance around merger waves. 
If merger waves result from firms acting in response to economic shocks, acquisitions announced 
during waves should create, or at least not destroy, bidder shareholder value. In contrast, 
overvaluation-driven merger waves should be associated with poor post-bid abnormal stock 
performance of the acquirers.55 
Using a broad sample of U.S. mergers and acquisitions announced between 1981 and 2010, 
we define two sets of merger waves: stock waves are defined on the subsample of acquisitions paid 
by pure stock (we find 52 industry-specific stock waves), and cash waves are defined using the 
subsample of pure cash acquisitions (we identify 82 industry-specific cash waves).56 Isolating 
valuation-sensitive deals from other acquisitions increases the power of our tests to detect the 
valuation effect on merger waves, even if there is little valuation effect on the aggregate merger 
sample.  
                                                          
53 Regardless of bidder valuation, bidders can profit by acquiring undervalued targets with cash. However, the 
economic impact of cash deals is likely to be limited because firms are reluctant to make large transactions in cash, 
and managerial compensation related incentives for mergers are weaker in cash deals when target shares are 
undervalued (e.g., Cai and Vijh (2007)). Consistent with the prediction that stock bidders are overvalued, prior 
literature finds that stock bidders have lower announcement returns than cash bidders in transactions between public 
firms (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Brown and Ryngaert, 1991; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz, 2004; Dong et al., 2006). 
54 Several papers find positive announcement abnormal returns in a sample of bidders when they acquire private 
targets, especially when the form of payment is stock (Chang (1998), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), and Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006)).  Officer (2007) provides evidence that 
unlisted targets are often sold at discounts. These results suggest that bidders of private firms tend to get better deals 
especially when the method of payment is stock.  
55 We also consider the possibility that value-relevant information is fully reflected in the short-run announcement-
period bidder returns, but we find such short-run stock reactions are dwarfed by long-run abnormal returns.  
56 The stock and cash merger waves identify periods of increased merger activity of stock and cash deals, respectively. 
Once these periods of intense merger activity are identified, we contrast valuation patterns of all types of deals, sorted 
by target public status and means of payment, around these periods.  
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We apply the residual income model of Ohlson (1995), sometimes called “intrinsic value” 
(V), and use the ratio of this value to market price (VP) as our baseline misvaluation proxy. Since 
intrinsic value reflects growth opportunities, normalizing market price by intrinsic value filters out 
the firm growth effects to provide a purified measure of misvaluation. To provide further 
assurance, we also measure equity valuation by the book-to-price ratio (BP), and the industry 
component of the decomposed market-to-book ratio advocated by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005). Our conclusions are robust to using these measures.57  
We examine the pattern of bidder stock valuation across the phases of stock and cash merger 
waves. We define pre-, in-, post- and non-wave periods and we find that bidder valuation peaks 
exactly during in-wave periods. In addition, in-wave acquirers have higher valuation ratios than 
non-wave acquirers, and this valuation spread is much larger around stock waves than around cash 
waves. The contrast between cash and stock waves is even starker when we conduct logit tests of 
the likelihood of a merger wave occurring in an industry. We find that the occurrence of merger 
waves is strongly and positively correlated with industry equity valuation only for stock waves. 
These findings support the misvaluation hypothesis, because according to the Q hypothesis, the 
effect of industry equity valuation on industry-specific merger intensity should be the same 
regardless of the type of merger waves.  
In our second approach to differentiating the misvaluation hypothesis from the Q hypothesis, 
we examine the post-announcement long-run returns of the acquirers to complement evidence on 
valuation level. We measure long-run performance by the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
                                                          
57 Our focus on the contrast of equity misvaluation effects between stock and cash waves makes our inference less 
sensitive to the misvaluation measure used, compared to other studies on merger waves. Even though a particular 
valuation proxy may contain noise, as long as such noise does not vary systematically across the types of merger 
waves or across the wave phases, our conclusion is less dependent on the misvaluation proxy. The examination of 
long-run bidder stock performance further alleviates the reliance on valuation measures.  
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of the acquiring firm, using size-and-MB matched portfolios as the benchmark. Under the Q 
hypothesis, in-wave bidders—whose growth prospects are among the highest—should benefit the 
most from synergistic gains. However, we find that for stock waves, in-wave acquirers have the 
lowest 5-year BHARs. Furthermore, the post-bid long-run performance is negatively correlated 
with the pre-bid valuation ratio. For instance, bidders of private targets and pure-stock bidders, 
who have the highest valuation during stock waves, have the lowest mean 5-year BHARs  
(-98% with p < 0.001 for both groups of bidders). The multivariate regressions of BHARs on 
bidder valuation and merger phase indicator variables confirm these results: In- and post-wave 
bidders perform significantly worse than pre-wave bidders and bidders in non-wave years, and this 
effect is magnified for bidders with high valuation. Remarkably, the negative effect of bidder 
overvaluation on post-bid long-run stock performance is significant only in stock deals, or during 
the in-wave and post-wave periods—periods of heightened merger activity. We observe no clear 
patterns of bidder long-run abnormal stock performance and cash merger intensity. These results 
lend further support to the misvaluation hypothesis.  
The Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model predicts that stock market driven mergers should 
benefit bidder shareholders in the long run, despite the fact that these bidders tend to be overvalued 
at the time of the bid. However, we find no positive BHAR for the pooled sample of in-wave 
acquirers, which suggests that even though merger intensity is triggered by stock market 
overvaluation, bidder shareholders do not actually benefit from the takeover, even during stock 
merger waves. This finding suggests that overvaluation-induced agency costs adversely influence 
the long-term value of bidder shareholders (e.g., Jensen (2004, 2005), Polk and Sapienza (2009), 
Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013), and Duchin and Schmidt (2013)).  
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This paper is related to Dong et al. (2006) because it also examines the drivers of merger 
activity by differentiating the Q hypothesis from the misvaluation hypothesis. However, unlike 
Dong et al. (2006), which focuses on the deal-level drivers of takeover activity, this paper considers 
aggregate, industry-level patterns in merger activity. A priori, it is not clear whether firm-specific 
stock misvaluation is strong enough or prevalent enough to drive industry-level merger activity. 
Our paper provides empirical evidence that answers this question.  
Our paper is also closely related to recent work on the causes of merger waves. Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) and Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012) document that, consistent 
with the misvaluation hypothesis, merger intensity is positively correlated with stock valuation 
multiples. However, several other recent studies dispute the role of misvaluation in affecting 
merger waves. We discuss below how our testing strategies shed new light to the debate over the 
drivers of merger waves.  
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) document that takeovers occurring during booming 
markets are fundamentally different from those announced during depressed markets. Like us, they 
find that bidders during booming markets have lower post-bid long-run stock performance, but 
they also find that earlier bidders outperform later bidders during booming markets, therefore 
arguing that their evidence is consistent with managerial herding. In contrast, by isolating 
valuation-sensitive stock acquisitions from valuation-insensitive cash deals, our tests reveal that 
bidder overvaluation peaks exactly during stock waves, and that in-wave merger announcements 
are followed by lower long-run performance, supporting the misvaluation hypothesis.  
Duchin and Schmidt (2013) define merger waves on all acquisitions and find that in-wave 
acquirers have poor long-run stock performance, but they argue that agency-related factors, rather 
than stock overvaluation, trigger merger waves. We provide contrasting evidence by showing that 
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during stock waves, extreme acquirer valuation precedes the dismal long-run returns, a pattern 
consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis. Our results suggest that stock misvaluation triggers 
merger waves, but our findings are also compatible with Duchin and Schmidt’s in that agency 
costs associated with overvaluation possibly prevent bidder shareholders from benefiting from in-
wave transactions.  
Finally, Maksimovic, Philips and Yang (2013) study the properties of merger waves using 
acquisition samples in the manufacturing sector differentiated by the public status of the acquirers. 
They find that public merger waves are more affected by market valuation. However, they also 
find that productivity gains are greater when the acquirer’s stock is highly valued, and they posit 
that in-wave acquisitions lead to positive efficiency outcomes. In contrast, by showing that 
acquirers have inferior post-announcement stock performance during stock waves, we provide 
evidence that valuation-driven merger waves do not benefit acquirer shareholders. Still, 
Maksimovic, Philips and Yang’s findings can be reconciled with ours, because investors can 
overvalue acquirers’ business prospects during merger waves, leading to a sharp post-bid 
correction of their stock prices.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the sample. Section 
3.3 discusses our hypotheses and methodology. Section 3.4 contrasts how industry-level stock 
valuation affects stock and cash merger waves. Section 3.5 analyzes the long-run stock 
performance for bids announced during different phases of merger waves. Section 3.6 discusses 
robustness tests. Section 3.7 concludes.  
 
3.2. Sample and Merger Wave Identification 
We extract the acquisitions sample from Thompson’s Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. We keep bids made by U.S. acquirers for U.S. targets, 
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independent of both the acquirer’s and target’s public status, between 1981 and 2010,58 and with 
a value of at least $10 million. Stock daily returns come from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) and accounting variables are retrieved from Compustat. We exclude firms with total 
assets or book value of equity worth less than $1 million at the time of the acquisition. Table 3.1 
reports the number of bids per year, the yearly break-down per bid type, as well as the industry-
level mean VP and Book-to-Price (BP) ratios, where the industries are defined following Fama-
French’s 48-industries classification.  
Because Table 3.1 reports the average valuation levels across industries, VP (BP) appears to 
be relatively stable in the time-series. For instance, the pre-dotcom bubble mean industry-level 
mean VP in 1999 is 0.972, relative to a mean industry-level mean VP of 0.988 in 2009, during the 
financial crisis. An (untabulated) examination of mean industry-level VP ratios by industry reveals 
that mean industry-level VP ratios increased by at least 25% between 1999 and 2009 in the 
following industries: food, soda, beer, tobacco, drugs, automobiles, mining, oil, utilities, personal 
services, computers, electronic equipment, and others. In contrast, the mean industry-level VP 
ratios of the textile, construction, construction materials, steel works, aircraft and financial 
industries decreased by at least 25%.59 Furthermore, in unreported tests, we verify that VP 
significantly and positively predicts cross-sectional stock returns in our sample period. These 
results confirm the validity of VP as a misvaluation proxy for our tests. 
We adapt the methodology used in Harford (2005) and Duchin and Schmidt (2013) in order 
to identify merger waves. Specifically, we identify merger waves by comparing the per-decade 
and per-industry highest concentration of bids in any period of 24 consecutive months with the 
                                                          
58 We end our takeover sample in 2010 because we require five year of stock return data to calculate long-run returns. 
The return data end in 2014 and the sample period for 5-year bidder stock returns ends in 2009.  
59 The 2009 mean VP ratios in these industries were on average 34% higher than in 2007. In other words, the valuation 
peak in these industries occurred before the financial crisis (results untabulated).  
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99th percentile of a simulated distribution. The simulated distribution is generated by calculating 
the total number of bids per industry and decade from the real sample and then assigning randomly 
each bid occurrence to any given month in a decade. Each month has the same probability (1/120) 
of being assigned. The highest 24-month concentration is calculated and retained. The process is 
then repeated 1,000 times, thus generating, for each industry and decade, a distribution of highest 
24-month bids concentrations.  
To contrast the Q hypothesis and the misvaluation hypothesis more sharply, we partition our 
full sample of acquisitions into 27 subsamples, one each for the interaction of the means of 
payment (all, pure stock, pure cash), public status of the acquirer (all, public, private), and the 
public status of the target (all, public, private).60 We apply our wave-identification methodology 
to each subsample, which results in 27 sets of waves. Each set has a maximum of 144 waves, one 
per industry (48) and per decade (3). Among the 27 sets of waves, we focus on two: stock waves 
defined using pure stock acquisitions, and cash waves defined using pure cash acquisitions. 
Table 3.2 shows the number of waves in each of the subsample-specific sets, as well as the 
number of in-wave acquisitions and the total number of acquisitions in each subsample. For 
example, we identify 2,462 stock acquisitions, of which 1,668 are part of the 52 stock waves. 
Similarly, our subsample of pure cash acquisitions contains 6,016 acquisitions, of which 2,580 
occur during one of 82 stock waves that we identify.61  
Table 3.2 shows that waves are concentrated among public acquirers. Waves defined using 
acquisitions by public firms also concentrate more bids than waves defined using acquisitions by 
                                                          
60 Our analysis is unaffected if we also include deals involving the acquisition of or by a subsidiary firm. 
61 The waves identification methodology is applied to each one of the 36 subsamples independently. Therefore, there 
is no relation between the number of waves among the different subsamples. This explains for example why in Panel 
A of Table 3.2, and in the “All means of payment” subpanel, the number of waves by public bidders for all types of 
targets (107) is greater than the number of waves by all types acquirers for all types of targets (105). 
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private firms. For instance, approximately 47% of the acquisitions by public acquirers (all means 
of payment, all types of targets) are included in a wave, whereas only 37% of the acquisitions by 
private bidders (all means of payment, all types of target) occur during a wave. These differences 
in concentration of merger activity may reflect the sensitivity of these types of acquisitions to 
market- or industry-wide triggers, as opposed to firm-specific motivations. In untabulated tests, 
we also find that the number of waves is not evenly distributed across decades; there is a peak in 
acquisition activity in the 1990s, for almost all types of acquisitions, with the exception of cash 
acquisition of public targets by subsidiaries. 
An examination of Table 3.2 reveals that we have identified certain unlikely merger waves 
that encompass very few acquisitions, such as the waves of stock acquisitions by private acquirers. 
Imposing a minimum number of bids for a wave to be identified as such is a straightforward 
modification of the methodology that would avoid classify these clusters as waves; however, the 
two types of merger waves we focus on, stock and cash waves, are hardly affected by alternative 
ways of wave identification. Section 3.6.2 discusses alternative definitions of merger waves.  
 
3.3. Hypotheses and Methodology 
3.3.1 Hypotheses   
Research on the drivers of merger waves has produced conflicting evidence. A body of the 
literature maintains that economic variables, such as industry-level economic or deregulatory 
shocks, technological innovation and liquidity constraints, trigger merger waves (e.g., Jovanovic 
and Rousseau, 2002; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Harford, 2005; Maksimovic, Philips and Yang, 
2013). Another line of the literature suggests instead that high levels of misvaluation motivate 
firms to engage in acquisitive activity (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan, 2005).  
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Acquisitions paid by stock should be more strongly affected by stock valuation than deals paid 
by cash. Therefore, it should be more likely to detect the effect of stock misvaluation on the 
occurrence of merger waves if we define waves using stock deals only.  
We depart from the bulk of the current literature and instead of considering aggregate merger 
waves, we define characteristics-specific industry-level clusters of acquisitions. Specifically, we 
adapt the methodology of Harford (2005) and Duchin and Schmidt (2013) and use the subsamples 
of pure stock acquisitions and pure cash offers to define two sets of merger waves: stock and cash 
merger waves.  
In Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) model, even though overvaluation is the key driver behind an 
acquisition, some perceived synergies are needed to convince shareholders to accept the 
acquisition. Similarly, we believe that both misvaluation and pure economics motivations coexist 
in certain mergers, but we expect that misvaluation is relatively more important in valuation-
sensitive deals. Under the misvaluation hypothesis, stock overvaluation should lead to higher 
merger activity, and the effects of stock misvaluation should be strongest among deals paid by 
pure stock. This leads to our first pair of hypotheses:  
H1a (Q hypothesis): The pattern of acquirers’ stock valuation level with respect to the phase 
of merger waves is not contingent on the use of the cash or stock wave definition.  
H1b (Misvaluation hypothesis): In-wave acquirers have higher levels of overvaluation than 
pre-, post- or non-wave acquirers. This pattern should be especially strong for stock waves. 
We use the residual-income value-to-price ratio (VP) as our baseline misvaluation measure 
(described in Section 3.3.2 below). We compare the VP ratios of firms that announced an 
acquisition in the year prior to the beginning of a wave (“pre-wave” period), to the VP ratios of 
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acquirers that announced an acquisition during the wave and in the three years following the wave 
(“in-wave” and “post-wave” periods, respectively).62  
We use VP because it is less subject to the criticism that using ratios like MB to measure 
misvaluation reflects both stock misvaluation and growth opportunities. Still, to rule out the 
possibility that the misvaluation metric proxies for growth opportunities, we examine the 
acquirers’ post-announcement stock performance in order to separate the growth opportunities 
from the mispricing interpretations, as in Savor and Lu (2007) and Gu and Lev (2011). 
We posit that misvaluation, as measured by the industry mean market-book ratio of equity, is 
a significant driver of merger waves. However, the relevance of stock misvaluation should be 
particularly important when acquirers use pure stock to pay for the transaction. This leads to our 
second pair of hypotheses:  
H2a (Q hypothesis): The effect of industry-level stock valuation on industry-specific merger 
waves is not contingent on the use of the cash or stock wave definition. 
H2b (Misvaluation hypothesis): Industry-level stock valuation has a stronger effect on the 
occurrence of stock, rather than cash, industry merger waves.  
To test these hypotheses, we run logit regressions of the form: 
𝑃(𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛼+𝛽1𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡−1+𝛽2𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1)
 
Where P(Waveit = 1) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if year t is a wave year in industry i, 
and zero otherwise. VPit-1 is the industry i mean VP ratio, and Spreadt-1 is the spread between 
Moody's corporate BAA bond yield and the federal fund rate, both measured the end of year t-1. 
                                                          
62 Because our wave identification methodology identifies the beginning of a wave and uses a pre-determined wave 
length (2 years), it is possible that the end tail of certain waves is not identified as such. To capture these long tails, 
we use a longer post-wave period (3 years, versus 1 year for the pre-wave period), following Harford (2005).  
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Following Harford (2005), whenever they occur, waves last two years, and no more than one wave 
per industry per decade can occur.63  
In order to further distinguish the misvaluation hypothesis from the Q hypothesis, we analyze 
the acquirers’ post-bid 5-year abnormal buy-and-hold returns (buy-and-hold abnormal returns, or 
BHARs, are calculated using the returns of size and MB matched portfolios as the benchmark). 
We contrast post-announcement performance for pre-, in-, post-, and non-wave acquirers, and 
compare the within-wave variations for deals with different characteristics.  
H3a (Q hypothesis): Acquisitions should create the greatest bidder shareholder value for deals 
announced during merger waves. In-wave deals should lead to higher, or at least not negative, 
post-bid acquirer abnormal returns.  
H3b (Misvaluation hypothesis): Acquisitions are made by the most overvalued bidders during 
stock merger waves. In-wave stock deals should lead to lower post-bid acquirer abnormal 
returns. 
We also use multivariate regressions to test the third pair of hypotheses. Section 3.5 has more 
details.  
Finally, to allow for the possibility that the value-relevant information of the bid is fully 
reflected in the short window around the takeover announcement, we analyze the three-day 
acquirer CARs around the announcement date for pre-, in-, post- and non-wave acquirers around 
cash and stock waves. We check whether the short-run announcement period acquirer returns are 
consistent with the long-run post-bid stock performance. In further robustness tests, we also check 
the variation in premium paid by pre-wave, in-wave, post-wave, and non-wave acquirers to see 
whether post-bid stock returns are related to bidder overpayment.  
                                                          
63 We relax these assumptions in some of our robustness tests; see Section 3.6.1 for more details. 
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3.3.2 Measuring Misvaluation  
We use the residual-income-model value-to-price (VP) ratio as our baseline proxy for stock 
misvaluation. There is strong support for VP as an indicator of mispricing. It is a superior return 
predictor than BP (Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), Frankel and Lee (1998), Ali, Hwang, 
and Trombley (2003)). The residual income value has at least two important advantages over book 
value as a fundamental measure. First, it is designed to be invariant to accounting treatments (to 
the extent that the ‘clean surplus’ accounting identity obtains; see Ohlson (1995)), making VP less 
sensitive to such choices. Second, in addition to the backward-looking information contained in 
book value, it also reflects analyst forecasts of future earnings. When compared to MB or Tobin’s 
Q, VP is a ratio of equity rather than total asset misvaluation, and equity misvaluation rather than 
total misvaluation is more likely to matter for acquisition decisions. VP takes into account the 
future earnings power of the firm and filters out growth opportunities from valuation, and therefore 
is in principle a purer measure of misvaluation than MB. A limitation of the VP measure is that it 
requires analyst forecasts data which are scarce for smaller firms.64 However, this is of little 
consequence for our purposes given firms involved in acquisitions are relatively large firms.  
Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) and Dong et al. (2006, 2012) provide further details of 
the model estimation procedure; we also offer a summary of the procedure in Appendix B1. Since 
negative residual-income-model value reflects overvaluation, using the value-to-price ratio (rather 
than price-to-value) allows inclusion of negative residual-income value observations.  
We eliminate stocks whose pre-announcement price per share is less than $5. To measure 
acquirer valuation (Table 3.3), we estimate the firm-level VP at the end of the month prior to the 
                                                          
64 This requirement causes the sample to decrease to 915,144 firm-month observations. In comparison, the sample has 
1,777,434 firm-month observations with valid BP ratios. 
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acquisition announcement. We winsorize VP at the 95th percentile to minimize the impact of 
outliers. For our logit regressions which test the determinants of industry merger waves (Table 
3.4), we use the industry-level mean VP, measured at the end of the year preceding the 
identification of merger wave occurrence.  
Of course, the residual income V does not perfectly capture growth, so our misvaluation proxy 
VP does not perfectly filter out growth effects. We provide further means of valuation 
measurement. First, we examine the post-announcement acquirer stock performance (5-year buy-
and-hold abnormal returns, in Section 3.5). Long-run stock returns can be viewed as an ex post 
misvaluation measure (e.g., Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)). Second, for further robustness, we 
use two alternative valuation ratios: the book-to-price ratio (BP), and the Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, 
and Viswanathan (2005) valuation measure (Section 3.6).  
 
3.4. Stock Valuation around Merger Waves 
3.4.1 Variations in Acquirer Valuation around Waves 
Under the Q hypothesis, the pattern in valuation levels around waves should not be contingent 
on the definition of merger waves (H1a). In contrast, under the misvaluation hypothesis, valuation 
levels should peak during waves, especially during stock waves (H1b).  
To test our first pair of hypotheses, we adopt the following terminology. We name firms that 
announced an acquisition during a two-year wave period in-wave acquirers, whereas firms that 
announced an acquisition in the year prior to the beginning of a wave or in the three years following 
the end of a wave are pre-wave and post-wave acquirers, respectively. We calculate the mean VP 
of pre-, in-, and post-wave acquirers. For each acquirer, VP is measured at the end of month t-1, 
where month t is the announcement month. Hereafter in the empirical tests, we increase the 
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minimum deal value requirement to $50 million and 1% of the acquirer’s pre-announcement 
market capitalization, to ensure we are capturing economically significant merger effects.  
In Table 3.3, we use the stock and cash waves to contrast the acquirer VP patterns around 
merger waves. We also classify the acquisitions announced around these waves by deal type 
(acquirer and target public status and means of payment). Here and in all subsequent tables, Panel 
A reports results using the stock wave definition, whereas Panel B shows results using the cash 
waves. We find that, using the timing of stock waves, bidder valuation levels is highest precisely 
during the in-wave period, followed by the valuation in the post-wave years, for all subsamples of 
acquisitions. For example, considering the column of “stock acquisitions”, the in-wave and non-
wave acquirers have a mean VP of 0.472 and 0.552 (a low VP indicates higher valuation), 
respectively, substantially lower than the VP of pre-wave bidders (0.720) or non-wave bidders 
(0.788).65 In-wave stock bidders have a much lower VP than non-wave bidders (difference = 0.316; 
p < 0.001). Using the cash wave definition, this pattern is weaker and less clear-cut.  
In addition, as one would expect if an overvalued bidders tends to make a stock rather than 
cash offer, in-wave bidder valuation around stock waves is systematically higher than that around 
cash waves, as evidenced by the lower VP ratio of in-wave bidders around stock waves relative to 
the in-wave bidders around cash waves, for all subsamples of acquisitions.  
These patterns indicate that the behavior of bidder stock valuation is contingent on how waves 
are defined: bidder valuation peaks during wave periods, and the valuation gap between in-wave 
and non-wave bidders is much larger using stock waves. These findings lend support to the 
misvaluation hypothesis (H2b) rather than the Q hypothesis (H2a).  
                                                          
65 The very high valuation levels of in-wave acquirers are partially driven by small firms and technology firms, but 
even when we remove such outlier acquirers our results are qualitatively unchanged. Similarly, our results remain if 
we broaden the set of firms to exclude to all technology firms.  
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It is interesting to note that in Panel A, in-wave bidders have the lowest VP ratio in private 
target acquisitions (0.446), compared to the in-wave bidders in pure stock transactions (0.472), or 
in-wave bidders in pure stock acquisitions of a public target (pubpubstock deals; 0.540). A possible 
interpretation is that private target firms, facing illiquidity discount, have limited bargaining power 
and are open to offers from even the highest valued bidders during merger waves.   
The patterns identified in Table 3.3 are more pronounced in the 1990s (results untabulated). 
For instance, the difference in VP of non-wave and in-wave acquirers is 0.301 (p < 0.001) around 
stock waves. In contrast, the magnitude of the differences in acquirers’ VP around stock waves in 
the 1980s is smaller, although significant still (difference in VP between non-wave and in-wave 
acquirers is 0.254 with p < 0.001). 
  
3.4.2 Does Stock Valuation Trigger Merger Waves? 
Our second pair of hypotheses states that under the Q hypothesis, the association between 
industry valuation levels and the occurrence of merger waves should be independent of which 
types of acquisitions are used to define merger waves (H2a), whereas under the misvaluation 
hypothesis, the association between industry valuation levels and the occurrence of merger waves 
should be strongest when valuation-sensitive acquisitions are used to define merger waves (H2b). 
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the logit regression described in Section 3.3 and we contrast 
the strength of the VP effect between stock and cash waves.  
Table 3.4 presents the results of the logit tests when using the stock wave (Panel A) and the 
cash wave (Panel B) definitions. We see from Table 3.3 that acquirer valuation is high in both the 
in-wave and post-wave periods. We therefore set the dependant variable to 1 for wave years (either 
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in-wave or post-wave) and 0 otherwise.66 When we use the full sample of firms in an industry to 
compute the industry mean VP (the left “all firms” panel), Panel A shows that the VP effect is 
highly significant for the 1981-2000 subsample (coefficients = -1.931; p = 0.002), and the VP 
effect is weaker but still significant for the full 1981-2010 sample (coefficients = -0.997; p = 
0.038), possibly due to the low frequency of stock merger waves in the 2000s.67 In contrast, Panel 
B shows that the industry mean VP has no significant association with the incidence of cash merger 
waves. For both the cash and stock waves, credit spread has a significant negative impact on wave 
occurrence for the 1981-2000 period, indicating a role of liquidity in triggering merger waves.  
Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012) document that the valuation of potential bidders has a 
particularly strong impact on merger waves. Therefore, we repeat the analysis by considering only 
potential bidders when calculating the industry mean valuation ratios. Potential bidders are firms 
whose VP ratio is lower than the industry median. Using potential bidders to measure industry 
stock valuation, we find qualitatively similar results to those using all firms to measure industry 
valuation, with the noticeable exception that  the effect of VP on the initiation of stock merger 
waves becomes much more significant for the full 1981-2010 sample (coefficients = -1.385; p = 
0.002). This result lends support to the misvaluation hypothesis (H2b): the existing relation 
between industry valuation levels and the occurrence of merger waves is contingent on the type of 
                                                          
66 In similar industry-level logit tests, Harford (2005) sets the dependant variable to 1 for years in which a merger 
wave starts. Since merger waves are defined to last two years, and equity valuations can remain high throughout the 
post-wave period, setting the dependent variable to 0 for the second wave year and the post-wave years, as in Harford 
(2005), would reduce the power of detecting the link between industry-level equity valuation and merger intensity.  
67 Conducting regression tests by decade limits the power of detecting the effect of VP, because there are only 10 
yearly observations per industry, there is less within-decade variation in VP, and there are fewer industry merger 
waves per decade (e.g., only one stock wave in the 2000s).  
85 
 
merger waves, and is especially strong when merger waves are defined using valuation-sensitive 
acquisitions.68  
To confirm our findings, we extend the analysis to all 27 sets of waves defined in Table 3.2 
(results untabulated). We use in turn the VP and BP ratios as our valuation proxy, and for both 
valuation measures, we find that mean industry valuation levels are associated with the occurrence 
of pure-stock waves, with the pure-stock results likely driving the all means of payment results, 
but the association between valuation levels and the occurrence of cash merger waves is generally 
insignificant. The occurrence of stock or pubpubstock waves is particularly sensitive to valuation 
levels. These patterns hold when the valuation proxy is the industry median valuation ratio, 
although the effects are of a smaller magnitude (results untabulated). The systematic differences 
in the magnitude and strength of the relation between industry valuation levels and the occurrence 
of different sets of merger waves challenge the Q hypothesis but are consistent with the 
misvaluation hypothesis.  
 
3.5. Long-Run Stock Performance across Merger Wave Phases 
The previous section shows that industry-level stock valuation triggers stock merger waves. 
We now turn to the acquirers’ long-run stock performance, as analysis of the long-run stock 
performance gives further insight about whether stock misvaluation, rather than other factors such 
as growth prospects, drives merger waves.  
As shown in Table 3.3, acquirers’ valuation levels, as measured by the VP ratio, display a 
large variation around the waves, especially if we consider the stock waves; this variation is more 
                                                          
68 In unreported tests, we include more controls, such as economic shock and capital tightness variables (as in Harford 
(2005)). These controls are almost always insignificant in the regressions, and they do not alter the coefficient of VP 
in any meaningful way.  
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accentuated for acquirers that made a pure stock offer or that acquired a private target. Even though 
VP may reflect both stock misvaluation and growth opportunities, the patterns in VP around waves 
are already difficult to reconcile with the Q hypothesis. In this section, we further validate that the 
acquirer’s VP ratio is an effective proxy for mispricing by examining the acquirers’ post-bid stock 
performance.  
The long-term market responses to acquisitions allow us to test hypotheses H3a and H3b. 
Specifically, looking at the long-term stock performance of acquirers allows us to separate the 
growth opportunities from the mispricing interpretations. We calculate the acquirers’ raw and 
style-adjusted 5-year buy-and-hold returns, and contrast the post-announcement stock 
performance of pre-, in-, post- and non-wave acquirers across acquisitions classified by the public 
status of the target and the means of payment. 
For the tests of long-run returns, we impose an additional constraint. Namely, to avoid 
distorting the long-term returns of repeat acquirers with the market reaction to the announcement 
of a subsequent bid, we keep repeat acquirers’ largest bid (in constant dollar value) in any 5-year 
windows, so that there are no overlapping returns for any bidder.  
 
3.5.1 Portfolio Sorts 
We measure acquirer long-run stock performance by the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR), calculated as the difference between acquirers’ buy-and-hold 5-year returns and the 
compounded return of an equally weighted portfolio matched on size and book-to-market.69 We 
use the Fama-French breakpoints and portfolio returns to assign our sample firms to matching 
                                                          
69 Monthly delisting returns are calculated following the methodology of Beaver, McNichols and Price (2007).  
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portfolios and calculate the compound returns of the matching portfolios.70 The matching 
portfolios are the interaction of five size (market equity) portfolios and five Book-to-Market 
portfolios.71  
Table 3.5 presents the BHARs for different types of acquirers that announced an acquisition 
around the stock and cash waves. We first note that for all acquisitions, the overall mean BHAR 
is negative (-41.3%; p < 0.001), indicating that mergers on average do not create value for 
shareholders. Panel A shows that using the timing of stock waves, with the sole exception of 
bidders in pure-cash acquisitions, all types of in-wave acquirers generate post-bid 5-year BHARs 
that are significantly lower than those of non-wave acquirers. For all acquisitions, the in-wave 
acquirers underperform non-wave acquirers by 58.3% (p < 0.001). The spread of BHAR between 
in-wave and non-wave bidders are greater for stock acquisitions (difference = 58.4%; p < 0.001) 
than for cash acquisitions (difference = 35.8%; p = 0.129).72 In clear contrast, Panel B shows that 
using the cash wave definition, there is no significant in-wave bidder underperformance relative 
to non-wave bidders.  
Strikingly, the mean 5-year BHAR of bidders that make stock offers during the in-wave and 
post-wave periods is a dismal -98.0% and -130.4%, respectively. A similar remark can be made 
for in-wave and post-wave bidders of private targets. When viewed in combination with the peak 
                                                          
70 Data are available on Kenneth French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html.  
71 As a robustness test, we also use Savor and Lu’s (2009) methodology for building reference portfolios. Specifically, 
for each acquisition in our sample, we find potentially matching firms with the same two-digit SIC code and market 
value of equity between 50% and 150% of the market value of equity of the acquirer. Because we want to compare 
the performance of acquirers versus non-acquirers, we exclude firms having completed an acquisition in the previous 
five years from entering the matching portfolio. We then rank the potential matches by their book-to-market ratios 
and select the ten firms whose book-to-market ratios are closest to the acquirer’s. The reference portfolio is an equally-
weighted portfolio of these ten matching firms. If less than ten matching firms are available, we select them all. We 
do not replace matching firms that delist from CRSP. Our main results are robust to the use of either methodology.  
72 Our finding that even acquirers in cash deals have negative post-merger performance is consistent with other recent 
studies (e.g., Song (2007) and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009)).  
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valuation of the same types of bidders (Table 3.3), this result confirms the intuition that bids of 
most overvalued acquirers during stock merger waves are followed by a major market correction 
in the subsequent years. The negative post-bid performance of highly valued acquirers, together 
with the underperformance of in-wave acquirers relative to non-wave acquirers around stock 
waves, is at odds with the Q hypothesis prediction that in-wave merges will generate greatest value 
for bidder shareholders (H3a), and supports the misvaluation hypothesis (H3b).   
For robustness, we also examine the raw 5-year buy-and-hold bidder returns starting at the 
end of the acquisition month for a 5-year period or until delisting, whichever is earlier.  
Appendix B4 highlights that even though most types of acquirers generate a positive 5-year raw 
post-announcement stock performance, in-wave acquirers’ performance significantly lags that of 
the non-wave acquirers for all types of deals, especially using the stock wave definition (difference 
= 76.5%; p < 0.001). Notably, using stock waves, in-wave acquirers of private targets and pure 
stock acquirers generate negative 5-year raw returns (-7.2% and -7.6%), even though such raw 
returns are insignificantly different from zero.73  
Because the pattern—that in-wave bidders possess the highest valuation and have the lowest 
post-announcement long-run stock performance—applies to all types of acquisitions, including 
pure cash deals, the effects of stock misvaluation on merger waves are not limited to stock 
acquisitions; even in-wave bidders who pay cash have higher valuation than their non-wave 
counterparts. Such a pattern on bidder valuation is difficult to reconcile with other theories of 
merger waves, such as managerial herding (e.g., Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) or envy (Goel 
                                                          
73 A negative raw 5-year buy-and-hold bidder return is not to be expected from a risk-based rational theory, because 
a negative raw 5-year return would imply a negative benchmark-adjusted return even if we use the risk-free T-bill rate 
as the benchmark. 
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and Thakor (2010)), but is consistent with the misvaluation view that firms engage in mergers and 
acquisitions during a time of stock overvaluation.  
The underperformance of in-wave relative to non-wave bidders applies also for pubpubstock 
acquisitions (Table 3.5, difference = 49.7%; p = 0.005), a subsample of acquisitions that should be 
especially sensitive to valuation levels. Therefore, even the pubpubstock mergers announced 
during stock waves—deals that have the highest potential for the acquirer to exploit the target 
misvaluation according to the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theory—do not benefit acquirer 
shareholders. This finding suggests that agency costs of overvalued equity (Jensen (2004, 2005) 
and Polk and Sapienza (2009)) adversely affect the long-run value of the acquirer. Fu, Lin, and 
Officer (2013) and Duchin and Schmidt (2013) provide further evidence of agency-related costs 
associated with in-wave acquirers.  
Figure 2.1 graphically presents the main findings of the paper. Panel A shows the stock 
valuation level (measured by VP), and Panel B shows the long-run abnormal stock performance 
(measured by BHAR), of pre-wave, in-wave, post-wave and non-wave acquirers. Both panels use 
the stock wave definition. Bidder valuation peaks precisely during the in-wave phase of the merger 
waves for all categories of deals, including stock deals. Panel B shows that the long-term stock 
performance of the in-wave and post-wave acquirers is marked by severe underperformance 
relative to non-wave acquirers.  In sum, our approaches—focusing on valuation-sensitive stock 
deals in defining merger waves, and analyzing acquirer valuation level and long-run stock 
performance—allow us to uncover patterns that support the misvaluation hypothesis as opposed 
to the Q hypothesis.  
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3.5.2 Regression Test 
We confirm the univariate results of Table 3.5 by estimating the following OLS regressions: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛_𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛_𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 
+𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + +𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where In_and_post_wave and Prewave are indicator variables that are equal to 1 if year t is an in-
wave or post-wave year, or a pre-wave year, respectively, in firm i's industry. P-values (in 
parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered by both industry and year.  
Table 3.6 presents the regression results. Using the stock wave definition (Panel A), we find 
acquirers who announced bids during the in-wave or post-wave years underperform relative to 
other bidders, as indicated in the significant negative In_and_post_wave indicator in “all 
acquisitions” column (coefficient = -0.905; p = 0.022) and in the subsamples of public targets, 
private targets, and stock acquisitions. Strikingly, VP is insignificant in the “all acquisitions” 
model, but its interaction with the In_and_post_wave indicator is insignificant and positive 
(coefficient = 0.672; p = 0.050), indicating that bidder overvaluation as measured by VP has a 
negative effect on BHAR only during in-wave and post-wave years—periods of peak merger 
activity. This VP interaction effect is particularly strong in acquisitions involving private targets 
(coefficient = 0.826; p = 0.011) and in stock acquisitions (coefficient = 0.718; p = 0.001), 
consistent with the Table 3.3 finding that stock bidders and bidders of private targets possess the 
highest valuation during stock wave periods.  
 Moving to the cash waves (Panel B), we find no significant BHAR effects of the 
in_and_post_wave indicator variable; such contrast between the stock and cash waves lends 
further support to the misvaluation hypothesis. Interestingly, the only significant interaction 
between VP and the In_and_post_wave indictor is found in the subsamples involving pure stock 
payment (stock acquisitions and pubpubstock acquisitions), which is consistent the interpretation 
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that these transactions are most valuation sensitive, and overvaluation has an effect on acquirer 
post-bid performance even when we use the cash wave definition.  
 
3.6. Robustness 
Our results rely on two key variables: the identification of merger waves and the proxy for 
overvaluation. Although both Harford’s (2005) methodology to identify merger waves and the use 
of MB as a proxy for mispricing have been widely adopted in the literature, a valid question is 
whether our results are sensitive to these measures. In Section 3.6.1, we keep our original waves, 
but vary the measure of mispricing, whereas in Section 3.6.2, we replicate our analysis with waves 
identified using a different methodology.  
 
3.6.1 Alternative Measures of Mispricing 
We verify that our results are robust to using other mispricing proxies. We first consider book-
to-price ratio (BP).74 A drawback of BP is that it can be a relatively noisy proxy for mispricing; it 
closely relates to the empirical proxies for Tobin’s Q and is sometimes used to measure growth 
opportunities. However, BP (or the inverse, market-to-book) ratio is also commonly used to 
measure valuation, both in the industry and in academia.   
We replicate Table 3.3 with BP instead of VP (Appendix B2). Our main findings remain: 
Valuation peaks during the in-wave phase of the wave, and the difference between in-wave and 
non-wave acquirers’ BP is highly significant and has greater magnitude around stock waves, 
especially so for valuation-sensitive acquisitions.  
                                                          
74 We use the market-to-book equity, as opposed to market-to-book assets, ratio because what matters most for the 
misvaluation hypothesis is the valuation level of the equity rather than assets. This contrasts with some studies in the 
literature including Harford (2005) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005)). 
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To assess further the robustness of our results, we follow Fu, Lin and Officer (2013) and 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005; hereafter, RKRV) and we decompose the equity 
market-book ratio into firm-specific and industry-specific components. In Appendix B3, we 
contrast RKRV’s misvaluation measure across wave phases and we find results qualitatively 
similar to when using VP or BP as the misvaluation measure. For example, using the stock wave 
definition, for all acquisitions, valuation peaks in the in- or post-wave phase, and the difference in 
valuation between in- and non-wave acquirers is significant (difference = 0.884,  
p = 0.041). In contrast, the in-wave and non-wave valuation gap is insignificant using cash waves. 
Our main results that support the misvaluation hypothesis thus are robust to alternative valuation 
measures.  
 
3.6.2 Alternative Definitions of Waves 
Although many researchers have adopted Harford’s (2005) methodology to identify waves, 
Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki (2011) find that patterns of merger waves are sensitive to the 
methodology of wave identification and the sample used. We thus assess the robustness of our 
results by considering an alternative methodology to define merger waves.  
We first modify our original waves by allowing waves to bridge over two decades. The late-
1990s and late-2000s were periods of increased merger activity and as such, it is possible for the 
highest concentration of acquisitions to extend over a single decade. For example, a two-year wave 
starting in 2000 would bridge over two decades. We thus apply our waves-identification 
methodology to the full sample (1981-2010), but we limit the number of two-year waves to three 
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per industry,75 and we require at least one non-wave year between two waves. We then proceed to 
perform our tests (results untabulated) and confirm that our main results remain.  
 
3.6.3 Short-Run Announcement-Period Returns 
The style-adjusted long-term returns (Table 3.5) show a clear underperformance of in-wave 
acquirers with respect to non-wave acquirers for stock waves. A natural question is thus whether 
this underperformance starts immediately upon the acquisition announcement. We consider the 
acquirers’ three-day centered cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using the market-adjusted 
model. As in Section 3.5, we then contrast the mean CARs by deal type and timing relative to the 
wave.  
Table 3.7 shows that short-run CARs are quite inconsistent with the long-run stock 
performance of the acquirers. When considering either the stock or cash waves, we find 
insignificant differences between CARs of in-wave and non-wave acquisitions. Such differences 
fall short of the difference in post-announcement long-run returns (Table 3.5) by a large margin. 
Furthermore, the short-run CARs are often inconsistent with the long-run returns in direction. For 
instance, in Panel A, in-wave bidders of private targets earn an average of positive CAR (2.3%;  
p < 0.001), consistent with the literature (e.g., Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002)), but in sharp 
contrast with the large negative BHAR documented in Table 3.5. These results suggest that short-
run market reactions may reflect certain characteristics of the deal (e.g., private targets offer an 
opportunity of illiquidity discount), while ignoring the degree of stock overvaluation of these 
acquirers.  
                                                          
75 Roughly, one per decade, although we do not impose a one-per-decade constraint. 
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3.6.4 Bid Premiums  
Variations in bid premium paid around waves allow us to gain more understanding about the 
source of the in-wave acquirers’ post-announcement underperformance relative to non-wave 
acquirers. Bid premium is the SDC-calculated ratio of the offer price to the target price, where the 
target price is calculated four weeks before the announcement date. The non-availability of market 
value for private targets significantly reduces our sample size.76  
In unreported tests, we examine the mean bid premiums around the cash and stock waves. The 
average premium paid by all acquirers is 41.6%. The premium paid is stable throughout the waves 
if we consider cash waves and the full sample (all acquirers). There is some slight variation in 
premiums paid around stock waves: the mean in-wave premium paid is 45.3%, whereas the mean 
non-wave premium is 41.1% (p of the difference = 0.239). The insignificant differences in bid 
premium across wave phases rule out the possibility that differences in the post-bid stock 
performance between in-wave and non-wave years are primarily caused by differences in bid 
premium.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
We use a broad sample of acquisition announcements from 1981 to 2010 to test the hypothesis 
that stock misvaluation triggers merger waves. In contrast to previous research, we differentiate 
valuation-sensitive takeovers paid by stock from valuation-insensitive cash deals and analyze stock 
and cash merger waves separately.  
We distinguish the misvaluation hypothesis from the efficiency-based Q hypothesis in two 
ways. First, we consider the association between industry equity valuation levels and the 
                                                          
76 Mulherin (2014) discusses the limitations of SDC’s bid premium data.  
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occurrence of merger waves. The misvaluation hypothesis predicts this association should be 
stronger for stock waves than for cash waves, because stock waves are defined using the valuation 
sensitive pure stock acquisitions rather than the comprehensive sample. Meanwhile, the Q 
hypothesis is silent on this prediction. Second, we examine the long-run post-bid stock 
performance of the acquirers. The misvaluation hypothesis predicts poor post-acquisition bidder 
returns when the bids are made during stock waves, whereas the Q hypothesis forecasts the greatest 
value gains for acquirers during either type of merger waves.  
Our industry-level logit tests show that the incidence of a merger wave is strongly correlated 
with industry-level stock valuation only for stock waves, and acquirer valuation peaks during stock 
waves. On bidder stock performance, we find that acquirers have low post-bid stock performance 
in the 5-year period after the merger bid, and acquirer underperformance is especially acute for 
mergers announced during stock waves. These results lend credence to the misvaluation 
hypothesis, and suggest that bidders close to the peaks of stock merger waves make acquisition 
offers when their stocks are most overvalued.  
However, acquirers earn lower rather than higher post-bid long-run returns, especially for bids 
made during stock waves. Therefore, while stock acquisitions provide the acquirers with the 
opportunity to exploit target shareholders and benefit their own shareholders as in the Shleifer and 
Vishy (2003) model, other considerations such as the agency costs associated with overvalued 
equity (Jensen (2004, 2005)) can distort managerial incentives, so that market-driven acquisitions 
actually create large value losses to bidder shareholders.  
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Figure 3.1. Mean Acquirer Value-to-Price Ratio and 5-Year BHAR, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of Acquisition 
Panel A: Acquirers’ VP Ratio  
 
Panel B: Acquirers’ 5-Year BHAR 
 
 
 
This figure presents the acquirers’ mean value-to-price (VP) ratios (Panel A) and their post-acquisition 5-year BHAR (Panel B) during the pre-wave, in-
wave, post-wave, and non-wave periods. We sort the bidders according to the timing of the announcement date relative to the industry-specific waves. 
The pre-wave period includes the year before the beginning of the wave, the in-wave period includes the two years of the wave, and the post-wave period 
spans the three years following the end of the wave. Non-wave periods cover the rest of the time periods. Both panels report results using the stock wave 
definition.  
Panel A reports the mean VP for each category of bidders. Panel B reports the acquirers' 5-year post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs). Post-announcement 5-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns are the difference between acquirers’ buy-and-hold 60-month returns and the 
compound return of an equally weighted portfolio matched on size and book-to-market. For repeat bidders, only the largest bid (in constant dollar value) 
within a five-year period is considered. 
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of the Sample 
 (1) 
Year 
 (2) 
No. 
Bids 
 (3) 
Public Targets 
 (4) 
Private Targets 
 (5) 
Stock Acq. 
 (6) 
Cash Acq. 
 (7) 
VP 
(8) 
BP 
N 
(%) 
Value 
(%) 
N 
(%) 
Value 
(%) 
N 
(%) 
Value 
(%) 
N 
(%) 
Value 
(%) 
 
1981 184 35.3 58.9 31 23.3 2.2 0.7 8.2 10.1 1.336 0.826 
1982 188 31.4 41.7 38.3 21.3 0.5 0.6 0 0 1.697 1.046 
1983 282 29.1 46.1 26.2 19.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.048 0.707 
1984 372 35.8 46.8 15.1 7.6 1.9 1.5 8.9 13 1.368 0.738 
1985 333 46.8 69.4 9.6 5.9 11.1 8.9 43.2 38.8 1.292 0.708 
1986 508 37.2 53.2 17.1 9.7 9.3 8.7 35.8 41.2 0.982 0.594 
1987 472 37.7 51.5 13.8 7.8 8.3 7.1 37.3 37.0 0.989 0.583 
1988 613 34.7 59.0 15.3 7.6 4.7 2.8 40.1 44.3 1.222 0.674 
1989 524 30.2 57.6 17 6.5 8.8 16.9 38.2 29.2 1.195 0.603 
1990 332 19.3 42.4 16.6 7.7 10.5 17.5 29.5 26.6 1.302 0.759 
1991 286 26.6 45.8 17.5 10.3 16.8 29.6 25.2 22.7 1.141 0.746 
1992 358 25.7 36.5 20.7 12.1 21.2 22.1 27.4 24.2 0.957 0.620 
1993 471 28.0 57.9 21.9 8.2 24.0 26.4 27.6 15.4 0.917 0.516 
1994 635 32.0 47.5 22.2 12.3 22.7 20.4 30.1 35.5 1.022 0.516 
1995 738 34.0 65.2 22.4 7.8 23.8 36.8 27.8 23.1 1.087 0.530 
1996 989 31.5 62.4 29.3 11.1 22.5 27.4 24.9 18.2 0.947 0.505 
1997 1349 32.7 59.1 30 11.7 23.1 32.7 23.1 15.4 0.857 0.469 
1998 1474 32.7 80.7 29.8 5.7 23.7 58.0 23.3 9.9 0.899 0.519 
1999 1414 36.8 73.7 28.9 8.6 24.3 34.8 26.1 12.1 0.972 0.632 
2000 1377 30.7 73.6 36.4 11.5 28.1 43.8 26.5 11.0 1.096 0.806 
2001 826 31.6 55.8 27.4 7.9 16.2 18.8 28.3 17.4 1.103 0.756 
2002 747 25.0 46.4 27.6 12.5 8.2 25.3 33.5 22.8 1.033 0.728 
2003 865 25.4 54.9 25.8 9.4 8.4 27.2 35.4 22.8 1.050 0.721 
2004 985 22.2 61.5 31.8 11.6 7.6 23.8 37.5 31.7 0.825 0.490 
2005 1146 21.5 61.4 34.6 13.2 5.5 13.0 40.1 28.6 0.747 0.453 
2006 1325 24.5 66.5 31.4 9.0 3.9 8.3 43.8 31.8 0.695 0.460 
2007 1296 25.2 57.6 30.9 9.2 4.3 4.0 43.8 55.4 0.626 0.468 
2008 722 23.1 62.0 34.8 15.3 4.6 17.2 43.1 41.4 0.806 0.675 
2009 525 24.8 61.6 28.8 8.6 7.4 4.1 38.7 19.3 0.988 0.922 
2010 865 24.3 50.1 30.4 12.3 3.6 6.3 47.9 44 0.865 0.637 
All 22201 29.9 56.9 25.4 10.8 11.9 18.2 30.9 25.6 1.035 0.647 
This table reports the sample characteristics. Columns 2 reports the distribution of the number of deals in our sample, 
by year. Columns 3 to 7 report the percentage and value of, respectively, bids for public targets, bids for private targets, 
pure stock bids, and pure cash bids. Percentages are calculated with respect to the total number of bids in our sample 
in each year. Values are the total dollar value of each subsample in each year, relative to the total dollar value of 
acquisitions in our sample in that year. Column 7 shows the mean of industry-level mean VP ratios and Column 8 
shows the mean of industry-level mean BP. VP and BP ratios are calculated using months-end equity market values 
and year-end accounting values of equity. We winsorize the right tail of the VP distribution at the 95% (the left tail is 
winsorized at zero for all calculations). Negative VP ratios are set to missing. We delete observations where the stock 
price is less than $5. VP ratios include all observations, including the firms that did not complete a merger. 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics: Industry Merger Waves 
Panel A: Full sample          
 All means of payment  Pure stock acquisitions  Pure cash acquisitions 
 All bidders Public 
bidders 
Private 
bidders 
All 
bidders 
Public 
bidders 
Private 
bidders 
All 
bidders 
Public 
bidders 
Private 
bidders 
All targets            
No. of industry-specific waves 105 107 31  52 41 5  82 71 16 
No. of in-wave Acquisitions  6018 5317 947  1668 1522 11  2580 1476 181 
No. of Acquisitions considered 13146 11211 2572  2462 2375 27  6016 3686 1170 
Public targets           
No. of industry-specific waves 86 84 16  40 41 0  62 53 13 
No. of in-wave Acquisitions 2685 2077 285  904 881 0  983 511 183 
No. of Acquisitions considered 5526 4154 669  1534 1486 9  2120 1260 398 
Private targets           
No. of industry-specific waves 67 59 19  35 35 4  27 21 2 
No. of in-wave Acquisitions 2559 2044 168  722 707 6  452 303 18 
No. of Acquisitions considered 5321 4169 489  891 862 11  1316 970 145 
This table reports the counts of industry-level merger waves. Waves are defined following Harford's (2005) methodology. We identify merger waves by 
comparing the per-decade highest concentration of bids in each industry and in any period of 24 consecutive months with the 99th percentile of a simulated 
distribution. The simulated distribution is generated by calculating the total number of bids per industry and decade from the real sample and then assigning 
randomly each bid occurrence to any given month in a decade. Each month has the same probability (1/120) of being assigned. The highest 24-month 
concentration is calculated and retained. The process is then repeated 1000 times. 
            
We fraction our full sample of acquisitions into 27 subsamples, one each for the interaction of the means of payment (all, pure stock, pure cash), public status 
of the acquirer (all, public, private), and the public status of the target (all, public, private). We apply our wave identification methodology to each subsample, 
which results in 48 sets of waves. Each set has a maximum of 144 waves, that is, one per industry (48) per decade (3). 
            
Each panel of this table has 48 cells, one each for our 48 subsamples. In each cell, we report a) the number of industry-specific waves we identified; b) the 
number of acquisitions encompassed in these waves; and c) the total number of acquisitions considered to define these waves. Bold-faced entries indicate the 
two types of waves we focus on: stock waves and cash waves.  
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Table 3.3. Residual-Income Value-Price (VP) Ratio of Acquirers, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of Acquisition 
Panel A: 1981-2010, stock waves 
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N VP  N VP  N VP  N VP  N VP  N VP 
1) All (including 
non-wave 
industries) 
6770 0.7761  2612 0.8100  2156 0.6652  1741 0.6298  1806 0.7869  1135 0.7082 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 704 0.7897  307 0.8732  220 0.6632  254 0.7199  135 0.7371  163 0.8251 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
3) In-wave 1165 0.5774  542 0.6448  366 0.4460  596 0.4720  161 0.6627  378 0.5395 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 689 0.6870  317 0.7538  208 0.5276  248 0.5521  126 0.8505  156 0.6672 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
786 0.8929  324 0.9444  209 0.8337  297 0.7879  165 0.9215  188 0.8714 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
4323 0.8391  1481 0.8726  1391 0.7400  676 0.7590  1403 0.7964  458 0.8198 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-
wave (5 - 3) 
 0.3156   0.2996   0.3876   0.3160   0.2588   0.3318 
p-value of 
difference 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
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Table 3.3 (Continued). Residual-Income Value-Price (VP) Ratio of Acquirers, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of 
Acquisition 
Panel B: 1981-2010, cash waves 
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N VP  N VP  N VP  N VP  N VP  N VP 
1) All (including 
non-wave 
industries) 
6770 0.7761  2612 0.8100  2156 0.6652  1741 0.6298  1806 0.7869  1135 0.7082 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 1268 0.7773  501 0.8397  434 0.6899  339 0.7015  277 0.7588  222 0.7832 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
3) In-wave 1750 0.6989  688 0.7658  547 0.5722  412 0.5791  596 0.7601  264 0.6616 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 1151 0.7366  472 0.8532  389 0.5594  345 0.7079  292 0.7680  233 0.8526 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
1494 0.8728  614 0.8486  420 0.8141  469 0.6199  309 0.8065  317 0.6588 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
2712 0.8380  986 0.8099  815 0.7586  678 0.5804  660 0.8231  436 0.6211 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-
wave (5 - 3) 
 0.1739   0.0827   0.2420   0.0408   0.0464   -0.0028 
p-value of difference  (0.0000)   (0.0119)   (0.0000)   (0.2382)   (0.1446)   (0.9474) 
This table reports the acquirers' mean residual-income model value-to-price (VP) ratios. We sort the bidders according to the timing of the announcement date 
relative to the industry-specific waves. The pre-wave period includes the year before the beginning of the wave, the in-wave period includes the two years of 
the wave, and the post-wave period spans the three years following the end of the wave. Non-wave periods cover the rest of the time period. Panel A reports 
the results using the stock waves (industry merger waves defined using only pure stock offers), whereas Panel B reports the results using the cash waves 
(industry merger waves defined using only pure cash offers). We report the mean market-book ratios for each category, along with the p-value associated with 
the t-test for statistical difference from zero. The bottom part of each panel shows the results of a t-test for difference in mean VP ratios of non-wave acquirers 
(line 5) and in-wave acquirers (line 3).  
We report the mean acquirer VP ratios for: all types of acquisitions (column 1), the acquisitions of public and private targets (columns 2 and 3), the pure stock 
and pure cash acquisitions (columns 4 and 5), and public acquirers that made a pure stock offer for a public target (column 6). P-values are presented in 
parentheses. Boldfaced differences in mean market-book ratios and associated p-values are significant at the 5% level or higher. For ease of reading, we do 
not use boldface characters for simple mean VP ratios, even when they are significantly different from zero.   
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Table 3.4 - Determinants of Industry Merger Waves 
Panel A. Stock waves.    
 All firms Potential bidders only 
 1981-2010 1981-2000 1981-2010 1981-2000 
Intercept -0.5051 2.3408 -0.6805 1.4473 
 (0.5431) (0.0077) (0.3390) (0.0590) 
VP -0.9971 -1.9314 -1.3846 -1.8616 
 (0.0380) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
Spread -0.0427 -0.7469 -0.0620 -0.7388 
 (0.7968) (0.0001) (0.7034) (0.0000) 
R-squared (0.0193) (0.1237) (0.0329) (0.1210) 
N 1440 960 1440 960 
Panel B. Cash waves.    
 All firms Potential bidders only 
 1981-2010 1981-2000 1981-2010 1981-2000 
Intercept 0.0009 0.7741 -0.0618 0.7595 
 (0.9984) (0.2922) (0.8633) (0.2124) 
VP -0.4367 -0.1990 -0.6194 -0.3292 
 (0.2071) (0.6302) (0.0796) (0.4184) 
Spread -0.0913 -0.4412 -0.0991 -0.4399 
 (0.1864) (0.0062) (0.1507) (0.0063) 
R-squared (0.0115) (0.0638) (0.0159) (0.0651) 
N 1440 960 1440 960 
This table presents the results of the logit estimation of the following model: 
 𝑃(𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1) =
1
1+𝑒−(𝛼+𝛽1𝑉𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽2𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1)
,  
where P(Waveit =1) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if year t corresponds to a wave year or a post-
wave year in industry i. Industry-level stock valuation (VPt-1) is the mean VP value of all firms in an industry 
measured at the end of year t-1. Spreadt-1 is the spread between Moody's corporate BAA bond yield and the 
federal fund rate.  
 
We use Firth's penalized likelihood logistic regressions to mitigate the issues stemming from quasi- or 
complete separation. In Panel A, waves are defined using only pure stock offers (stock waves), whereas in 
Panel B, the waves considered are defined using only the cash bids (cash waves). For both Panels A and B, 
the left “all firms” panel uses all firms in an industry to calculate industry mean VP; the right “potential bidders 
only” panel uses potential bidders (firms with below median VP) to calculate industry mean VP. We report 
results for the full sample (1981-2010), and subsample results for the 1981-2000 period. The number of 
observations and pseudo R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are 
calculated using standard errors clustered by both industry and year. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-
values indicate statistical significance at the 5% level or higher. 
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Table 3.5. Post-Announcement Acquirer 5-Year BHAR, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of Acquisition 
Panel A: 1981-2009, stock waves 
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N BHAR  N BHAR  N BHAR  N BHAR  N BHAR  N BHAR 
1) All (including non-
wave industries) 
3182 -0.4137  1368 -0.4976  915 -0.4119  774 -0.7656  828 -0.2128  544 -0.6849 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 276 -0.3890  134 -0.3675  80 -0.5016  105 -0.3378  42 -0.2528  67 -0.3945 
  (0.0000)   (0.0002)   (0.0008)   (0.0148)   (0.1583)   (0.0145) 
3) In-wave 522 -0.7939  268 -0.7990  125 -0.9778  252 -0.9798  66 -0.6857  177 -0.8582 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0002)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 306 -0.7358  155 -0.7727  92 -1.0959  105 -1.3040  50 0.0343  70 -1.0915 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.8854)   (0.0000) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
283 -0.3478  129 -0.3847  69 -0.3404  101 -0.3963  59 -0.3276  68 -0.3613 
 (0.0000)   (0.0005)   (0.0774)   (0.0085)   (0.0386)   (0.0200) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
2079 -0.2736  811 -0.3669  618 -0.1841  312 -0.5554  670 -0.1821  230 -0.5124 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0001)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-wave 
(5 - 3) 
 0.4460   0.4143   0.6374   0.5835   0.3580   0.4969 
p-value of difference  (0.0000)   (0.0011)   (0.0044)   (0.0005)   (0.1292)   (0.0045) 
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Table 3.5 (Continued). Post-Announcement Acquirer 5-Year BHAR, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of Acquisition 
Panel B: 1981-2009, cash waves 
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N BHAR  N BHAR  N BHAR  N BHAR  N BHAR  N BHAR 
1) All (including 
non-wave 
industries) 
3182 -0.4137  1368 -0.4976  915 -0.4119  774 -0.7656  828 -0.2128  544 -0.6849 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 554 -0.2796  245 -0.3537  175 -0.2227  150 -0.4247  97 -0.2224  100 -0.4405 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0080)   (0.0000)   (0.0212)   (0.0001) 
3) In-wave 797 -0.3900  368 -0.5043  206 -0.3994  175 -0.8568  262 -0.1471  132 -0.7314 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0315)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 578 -0.3660  251 -0.4186  185 -0.4262  144 -0.8711  154 -0.0889  98 -0.7250 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.2385)   (0.0000) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
628 -0.4998  284 -0.6122  161 -0.4888  194 -0.7464  137 -0.2823  148 -0.7236 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0001)   (0.0000)   (0.0039)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
1254 -0.5091  504 -0.6019  349 -0.5067  305 -0.8312  315 -0.3251  214 -0.7521 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-
wave (5 - 3) 
 -0.1098   -0.1079   -0.0894   0.1104   -0.1353   0.0078 
p-value of 
difference 
 (0.1091)   (0.2283)   (0.5417)   (0.3949)   (0.2485)   (0.9553) 
This table reports the mean acquirers' 5-year post-acquisition, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). Post-acquisition 5-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
are the difference between acquirers’ buy-and-hold 60-month returns and the compound return of an equally weighted portfolio matched on size and book-to-
market. We sort the bidders according to the timing of the announcement date relative to the industry-specific waves. The pre-wave period includes the year 
before the beginning of the wave, the in-wave period includes the two years of the wave, and the post-wave period spans the three years following the end of 
the wave. Non-wave periods cover the rest of the time period. Panel A reports the results using the stock waves (industry merger waves defined using only 
pure stock offers), whereas Panel B reports the results using the cash waves (industry merger waves defined using only pure cash offers). We report the mean 
return for each category, along with the p-value associated with the t-test for statistical difference from zero. The bottom part of each panel shows the results 
of a t-test for difference in mean return of non-wave acquirers (line 5) and in-wave acquirers (line 3).  
We report the mean acquirers’ 5-year post-acquisition BHARs for: all types of acquisitions (column 1), the acquisitions of public and private targets (columns 
2 and 3), the pure stock and pure cash acquisitions (columns 4 and 5), and public acquirers that made a pure stock offer for a public target (column 6). P-values 
are presented in parentheses. Boldfaced differences in mean post-acquisition returns and associated p-values are significant at the 5% level or higher. For ease 
of reading, we do not use boldface characters for simple mean returns, even when they are significantly different from zero.   
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Table 3.6. Regressions of Acquirer 5-Year BHAR on Value-to-Price Ratios and Merger Wave Phases 
Panel A: 1981-2009, stock waves    
 All acquisitions Public targets, all 
acquirers 
Private targets, all 
acquirers 
Stock acquisitions  Cash acquisitions “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
Intercept -0.3742 -0.4341 -0.3603 -0.7730 -0.2135 -0.6964 
 (0.0050) (0.0009) (0.0288) (0.0000) (0.0701) (0.0000) 
VP 0.0994 0.0617 0.2165 0.3060 0.0061 0.2355 
 (0.3384) (0.5276) (0.1145) (0.0003) (0.9471) (0.0000) 
In-and-post-wave -0.9053 -0.8210 -1.2302 -0.8208 -0.3790 -0.7320 
 (0.0222) (0.0277) (0.0012) (0.0253) (0.0988) (0.0844) 
In-and-post-
wave*VP 
0.6721 0.6078 0.8264 0.7176 0.2556 0.6427 
 (0.0497) (0.0272) (0.0112) (0.0012) (0.3573) (0.0364) 
Pre-wave -0.1594 -0.1331 -0.0779 0.2119 0.0130 0.0687 
 (0.2016) (0.3770) (0.7983) (0.3776) (0.9712) (0.8249) 
Pre-wave*VP 0.0775 0.1880 -0.2969 0.0728 -0.0667 0.1243 
 (0.5430) (0.2314) (0.2181) (0.7532) (0.8338) (0.6553) 
       
R-squared (0.0689) (0.0735) (0.1336) (0.1486) (0.0071) (0.1111) 
N 3042 1333 870 768 753 545 
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Table 3.6 (Continued). Regressions of Acquirer 5-Year BHAR on Value-to-Price Ratios and Merger Wave Phases 
Panel B: 1981-2009, cash waves    
 All acquisitions Public targets, all 
acquirers 
Private targets, all 
acquirers 
Stock acquisitions  Cash acquisitions “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
Intercept -0.7992 -0.7904 -1.0382 -1.1296 -0.5216 -0.9209 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0307) (0.0000) 
VP 0.3028 0.2050 0.6374 0.5265 0.1723 0.2689 
 (0.0148) (0.0965) (0.0009) (0.0046) (0.3873) (0.1008) 
In_and_post_wave 0.0707 -0.0091 0.2356 -0.2687 0.3733 -0.3403 
 (0.7704) (0.9727) (0.4330) (0.2461) (0.1599) (0.2685) 
In_and_post_wave*VP 0.1664 0.2112 -0.0213 0.3913 -0.1706 0.5530 
 (0.3914) (0.2293) (0.9421) (0.0213) (0.4634) (0.0078) 
Prewave 0.4305 0.2656 0.8099 0.6555 0.0662 0.3406 
 (0.0073) (0.1438) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.7622) (0.3358) 
Prewave*VP -0.1919 0.0007 -0.6300 -0.4575 0.1051 -0.1151 
 (0.1133) (0.9965) (0.0079) (0.0166) (0.7226) (0.6967) 
       
R-squared (0.0367) (0.0377) (0.0656) (0.1170) (0.0135) (0.0890) 
N 3042 1333 870 768 753 545 
This table presents the results of the logit estimation of the following model: 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛_𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛_𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where BHAR is the acquirers' 5-year post-acquisition, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). Post-acquisition 5-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
are the difference between acquirers’ buy-and-hold 60-month returns and the compound return of an equally weighted portfolio matched on size and 
book-to-market. VPt-1 is the firm i's Value-to-Price ratio measured at the end of year t-1. Prewave and In_and_post_wave are indicator variables that 
take the value 1 if year t is a pre-wave or an in-wave or post-wave year in firm i's industry.  
 
In Panel A, waves are defined using only pure stock offers (stock waves), whereas in Panel B, the waves considered are defined using only the cash bids 
(cash waves). We report regression coefficients for all types of acquisitions (column 1), the acquisitions of public and private targets (columns 2 and 3), 
the pure stock and pure cash acquisitions (columns 4 and 5), and public acquirers that made a pure stock offer for a public target (column 6). The number 
of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered by both 
industry and year. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values indicate statistical significance at the 5% level or higher. 
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Table 3.7. Acquirers’ Announcement-Period Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR), by Merger Wave Phase and Type of 
Acquisition 
Panel A: 1981-2009, stock waves 
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, all 
acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, all 
acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N CAR  N CAR  N CAR  N CAR  N CAR  N CAR 
1) All (including 
non-wave 
industries) 
3181 0.0025  1368 -0.0170  921 0.0156  777 -0.0101  829 0.0118  546 -0.0250 
 (0.0540)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0032)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 277 0.0062  134 -0.0138  81 0.0258  106 -0.0012  42 0.0059  67 -0.0215 
  (0.1419)   (0.0115)   (0.0022)   (0.8847)   (0.5289)   (0.0336) 
3) In-wave 530 -0.0006  271 -0.0217  129 0.0232  257 -0.0131  69 0.0227  179 -0.0288 
  (0.8694)   (0.0000)   (0.0227)   (0.0457)   (0.0056)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 308 -0.0076  155 -0.0314  93 0.0183  105 -0.0067  51 -0.0003  70 -0.0196 
  (0.2040)   (0.0000)   (0.1918)   (0.5155)   (0.9797)   (0.0351) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
285 0.0067  130 -0.0199  69 0.0242  102 -0.0108  60 0.0065  69 -0.0262 
 (0.1060)   (0.0009)   (0.0017)   (0.1414)   (0.4120)   (0.0024) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
2092 0.0042  817 -0.0133  621 0.0125  313 -0.0111  674 0.0115  231 -0.0247 
 (0.0028)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0201)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-
wave (5 - 3) 
 0.0074   0.0018   0.0011   0.0023   -0.0162   0.0025 
p-value of difference  (0.1981)   (0.8105)   (0.9325)   (0.8154)   (0.1515)   (0.8128) 
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Table 3.7 (Continued). Acquirers’ Announcement-Period CAR, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of Acquisition 
Panel B: 1981-2005, cash waves 
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N CAR  N CAR  N CAR  N CAR  N CAR  N CAR 
1) All (including 
non-wave industries) 
3181 0.0025  1368 -0.0170  921 0.0156  777 -0.0101  829 0.0118  546 -0.0250 
 (0.0540)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0032)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 556 0.0016  245 -0.0168  177 0.0148  151 -0.0106  98 0.0071  100 -0.0312 
  (0.5761)   (0.0001)   (0.0006)   (0.1699)   (0.1929)   (0.0003) 
3) In-wave 805 0.0038  371 -0.0129  209 0.0146  177 -0.0028  267 0.0139  133 -0.0113 
  (0.1613)   (0.0001)   (0.0169)   (0.7242)   (0.0014)   (0.0804) 
4) Post-wave 582 -0.0030  251 -0.0195  188 0.0039  145 -0.0125  154 0.0051  98 -0.0221 
  (0.3743)   (0.0000)   (0.5318)   (0.1123)   (0.3471)   (0.0107) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
634 0.0002  288 -0.0195  161 0.0145  196 -0.0162  139 0.0101  150 -0.0283 
 (0.9341)   (0.0000)   (0.0148)   (0.0068)   (0.0299)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
1264 0.0044  510 -0.0190  350 0.0232  308 -0.0123  317 0.0137  216 -0.0318 
 (0.0303)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0167)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-wave 
(5 - 3) 
 -0.0036   -0.0067   -0.0002   -0.0134   -0.0038   -0.0170 
p-value of difference  (0.3581)   (0.1946)   (0.9845)   (0.1714)   (0.5519)   (0.0462) 
This table reports the mean 3-day acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) centered around the announcement date. CARs are calculated using a 3-day 
window centered on the announcement day. We use the market model, using CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark, to calculate abnormal returns. We 
sort the bidders according to the timing of the announcement date relative to the industry-specific waves. The pre-wave period includes the year before the 
beginning of the wave, the in-wave period includes the two years of the wave, and the post-wave period spans the three years following the end of the wave. 
Non-wave periods cover the rest of the time period. Panel A reports the results using the stock waves (industry merger waves defined using pure stock offers), 
whereas Panel B reports the results using the cash waves (industry merger waves defined using only pure cash offers). We report the mean return for each 
category, along with the p-value associated with the t-test for statistical difference from zero. The bottom part of each panel shows the results of a t-test for 
difference in mean return of non-wave acquirers (line 5) and in-wave acquirers (line 3).  
 
We report the mean 3-day acquirers’ CARs for: all types of acquisitions (column 1), the acquisitions of public and private targets (columns 2 and 3), the pure 
stock and pure cash acquisitions (columns 4 and 5), and public acquirers that made a pure stock offer for a public target (column 6). P-values are presented in 
parentheses. Boldfaced differences in mean post-acquisition returns and associated p-values are significant at the 5% level or higher. For ease of reading, we 
do not use boldface characters for simple mean returns, even when they are significantly different from zero.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Does the Weather Influence Global Stock Returns?77 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Does daily weather influence investor behavior? This question is of great interest to 
financial economists as well as psychologists. Indeed, because there is no ambiguity in causality 
between the weather and stock returns, studying the relationship between weather and returns 
avoids the endogeneity problem that plagues finance research. Moreover, because daily weather 
conditions such as sunlight and wind are extraneous and transitory events that are hardly related 
to economic prospects, a significant association between weather and returns, if established, will 
strongly suggest that weather influences stock returns through the channel of investor psychology. 
However, prior research has produced mixed evidence of the impact of weather on stock returns. 
On the one hand, some authors document a positive association between sunlight and stock returns 
(Saunders (1993), Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) and Goetzmann et al. (2015)). On the other 
hand, it has been argued that such a relationship is either spurious or sample-specific (e.g., 
Trombley (1997), Loughran and Schultz (2004), and Dowling and Lucey (2008)). Evidence on the 
effects of other weather variables is either weak or more controversial.78  
Existing studies have assumed that the effects of weather on returns are uniform across 
geographical regions and seasons. However, as we argue below, there are strong reasons to expect 
that the psychological effects of weather on optimism or risk-taking will be highly dependent on 
regional and seasonal conditions. This implies that the same weather variable could be expected 
                                                          
77 The current version is co-authored with Ming Dong.  
78 For example, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) find that rain and snow are unrelated to returns after controlling for 
sunshine. Cao and Wei (2005) document a negative effect of temperature on returns, but others have raised doubt on 
this effect (e.g., Jacobsen and Marquering (2008)). There is additional sporadic research that tries to relate stock returns 
to the weather. Among others, Shu and Hung (2009) show a negative effect of wind on stock returns of a sample of 
European countries, but it is unclear why a wind effect is not reported for other countries.  
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to have opposite mood effects in different climates. If so, prior research may not adequately capture 
such weather effects. In this paper, we probe more deeply into the effects of weather on investor 
mood by analyzing a wide range of weather variables, allowing for the possibility that the weather 
effects vary by climatic conditions and season.79  In addition, weather-related research increasingly 
focuses on the mechanisms through which weather-influenced mood affects asset prices (e.g. 
Bassi, Colacito and Fulghieri (2013) and Goetzmann et al. (2015)). By relating the strength and 
timing of the weather effects to individuals’ seasonal propensity to spend time outdoors, we make 
further headway in this direction. 
 We believe that the effects of the weather on mood depend critically on geographical 
regions, and more precisely, regions defined by their annual average temperature. The psychology 
literature shows that the valence of mood (e.g., good versus bad mood) is sensitive to temperature: 
mood is positively associated with temperature, except in very high or low temperature 
environments (e.g., Wyndham (1969), Allen and Fisher (1978), and Howarth and Hoffman 
(1984)). Countries located near the Equator experience lower seasonal variations in temperature 
than colder countries; as such, we expect differentiated behavioral responses to weather across 
climates. In addition, other weather variables may also have a climate-specific impact on affect, 
thus reinforcing the case for climate-specific tests. For example, rain and wind may adversely 
influence mood in cold countries because they tend to exacerbate the perceived temperature, but 
in hot countries, rain and wind may be much less disruptive, or may even be welcomed, if they 
reduce the effective temperature.  
                                                          
79 The literature on the effects of weather on stock returns has moved from the aggregate index level effects to the 
effects on individual stocks of a particular country, and most often focuses on the sunshine effect (e.g., Loughran and 
Schultz (2004) and Goetzmann et al. (2015)). In contrast, we examine the effects of five weather variables on country 
index returns by conditioning the weather effects on climate and season. As discussed below, we uncover previously 
undocumented patterns of effects of all five weather variables on index returns.  
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 Similarly, there are strong reasons to expect the psychological effects of the weather to 
vary with seasons. To the extent that the effects of temperature fluctuations and other weather 
conditions depend on temperature, the effects should vary across the seasons. Also, there is 
psychological evidence of seasonal shifts in human mood (e.g., Keller et al. (2005), Kamstra, 
Kramer, and Levi (2003)). Furthermore, if the weather effects are felt more strongly in the 
outdoors, the strength of these effects may show seasonal patterns because individuals allocate 
outdoor time differently across the seasons. 
 Two additional considerations further support our idea to conduct separate tests sorted by 
climate and season. First, this approach isolates the well-known seasonality in returns from the 
genuine weather effects. For example, since winter tends to have higher returns than summer (e.g., 
Jacobsen and Marquering (2008)), in testing the effect of snow on returns, summer days should 
not be pooled with winter days to isolate the effect of snow from non-weather related seasonality. 
Second, conducting separate tests by climate and season allows us to capture weather effects 
unique to each climate/season. For instance, we find that summertime wind and rain have a 
negative effect on returns in cold countries, but they have a positive effect in hot countries. Such 
effects are unable to be picked up in a pooled all-month or all-region test, even if we allow 
nonlinearity in the specification.  
We investigate the effects of five weather variables—sunshine, wind speed, rain, snow 
depth on the ground, and temperature—on nominal index returns of 49 countries from 1973 to 
2012. Following Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), we use daily weather variables observed in the 
cities where our sample countries’ national exchanges are located as proxies for the most relevant 
conditions for each country, and conduct both ordinary least squares regressions (of daily returns) 
and logit regressions (of the probability of a positive return) on the weather variables, with standard 
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errors clustered by both country and day to take into account the possible error correlations across 
countries and time. We sort the countries into three groups based on the average year-around 
temperature, shift the timing of countries in the Southern Hemisphere by six months to align the 
seasons, and conduct month-by-month tests for each temperature region. Our large sample is 
essential for conducting tests for each region and each month; since stock returns are primarily 
driven by non-weather economic events, a large sample is necessary to neutralize various 
economic effects and detect the effects of the weather.80  
The regression results indicate wide-spread statistical significance of all five weather 
variables. We use two approaches to verify that the relation between weather and returns is real 
rather than spurious. First and most directly, we test the profitability of a trading strategy based 
purely on daily weather. Since the null hypothesis predicts no relationship between weather and 
daily return, finding significant profits from this trading strategy would indicate that the 
associations between weather and returns are real. Such a conclusion does not rely on specific 
interpretations of the weather effects. Second, we examine whether the patterns of relationships 
between weather and returns in both the OLS and logit tests can be interpreted in a systematic way 
that is consistent with finance and psychology theories.  
To test the profitability of a weather-based trading strategy, we assume that the weather 
variables can predict daily index returns, and we use the predicted returns (estimated with the OLS 
regression coefficients and the pre-market weather conditions) to construct a hedge strategy. 
Specifically, for each day we form a hedge portfolio by taking a long position in the index of the 
country that has the highest predicted return and a short position in the country that has the lowest 
                                                          
80 Trombley (1997) also conducts month-by-month tests on the relation between U.S. index returns and cloud cover, 
but fails to establish a clearly positive relationship between sunshine and returns, presumably because the sample used 
is only one index series spread across the 12 calendar months.  
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predicted return, and we rebalance the hedge portfolio on a daily basis. We test the profitability of 
two types of strategies. The first strategy defines one hedge portfolio for each of the three 
temperature regions, whereas the second defines one hedge portfolio for each of the three time 
zones (the Americas, Asia-Pacific, and Europe-Africa).  
We find that using an out-of-sample estimation in which we construct trading portfolios 
using only ex ante information, a temperature-region based hedge strategy generates significant 
gross profits for the cold and mild regions. We also find that the time-zone based hedge strategy 
produces significant profits for the Europe-Africa region. The gross profits range from an 
annualized return of 17.6% (t = 2.38) for the Europe-Africa time zone to 25.1% (t = 2.80) for the 
mild temperature region (with trading of the latter strategy limited to the Northern Hemisphere) 
during 1993-2012.81 Assuming transaction costs of five basis points per transaction, the net profits 
of the weather-based hedge strategy range from an annualized return of 4.3% for the Europe-Africa 
time zone to 11.8% for the mild temperature region (trading again limited to the Northern 
Hemisphere). Therefore, a strategy that exploits the stock return predictability of the weather can 
indeed generate substantial profits.  
Our second approach to judging whether the results from the regression analysis represent 
real effects is to evaluate whether the patterns of the weather effects can be interpreted in a 
systematic way compatible with financial and psychological theories. Drawing from the finance 
and psychology literatures, we make two hypotheses about the weather effects (Section 4.4.1 has 
more details). First, comfortable weather should lead to an upbeat investor mood and therefore 
                                                          
81 Such high magnitude of hedge profits is only possible when we use the full observable weather variables to predict 
daily returns. If we use one weather condition at a time (such as sunshine) to construct hedge portfolios, trading profits 
are mostly insignificant in the out-of-sample estimation, with the sunshine-only hedge strategy producing significant 
but weaker results in the full-sample estimation and insignificant profit in the out-of-sample estimation. Section 4.3 
has more details. 
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high stock returns. This “comfortable weather” hypothesis offers a basic guidance as to the sign of 
each weather variable in different seasons and regions. Second, the weather effects on returns 
should be stronger when people spend more time outdoors or when outdoor time is more valuable. 
This “outdoors” hypothesis offers guidance about the strength of the weather effects and the times 
when we are more likely to observe them. Owing to the contingent nature of the weather effects, 
the purpose of these hypotheses is to provide a useful general guidance of expectations from the 
tests. We estimate the average time spent outdoors following the methodology of Graff Zivin and 
Neidell (2014), and confirm the intuition that for all temperature regions, the outdoor time is 
longest in the summer and shortest in the winter, and that the hot region has considerable outdoor 
time in the winter. Most of the weather effects appear to be consistent with our “comfortable 
weather” and “outdoors” hypotheses. The following are our salient findings:  
 Sunshine has a positive effect on daily returns for all temperature regions, and the strength of 
this effect tends to correlate with the time spent outdoors.  
 In the cold region, wind and rain have a negative effect on returns both in the summer and in 
the spring, suggesting that windy or rainy conditions are disruptive to outdoor activity during 
the long-awaited warmer seasons. In the hot region, wind and rain have a positive effect on 
returns in the summer, consistent with the cooling effects they provide, and in sharp contrast 
to their effects in the cold region. 
 Snow depth (applicable only to cold countries from December to March) has a negative effect 
on returns.  
 Temperature exhibits nonlinear effects on mood, some of which are consistent with the 
comfortable weather hypothesis. Returns in the cold region are negatively influenced by 
summertime temperature, suggesting a preference for cooler weather under high temperatures. 
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In hot countries, returns are higher on cool days in the summer and on warm days in the winter 
and spring, possibly because people in hot countries welcome warmer, but not sweltering, 
weather.  
 However, in cold and mild countries, stock returns and temperature are strongly negatively 
correlated in the winter (from December to February). This is incompatible with the 
comfortable weather hypothesis, but it is consistent with evidence from experimental 
psychology that at very low temperatures, subjects tend to exhibit increased aggression or risk-
seeking behaviors (e.g, Howarth and Hoffman (1984) and Schneider et al. (1980)).82 
In summary, even though the exact psychological effect of each weather condition for each 
climate and season warrants further investigation, the preponderance of our results tends to support 
the hypothesis that comfortable weather conditions promote investor optimism and lead to high 
stock returns, especially during seasons of increased outdoor activity. The sole exception, but one 
that is also consistent with psychological evidence, is our finding that in cold environments, low 
temperature is associated with high returns, consistent with bitter low temperature stimulating risk 
seeking and stock buying. The existence of systematic patterns of the weather effects on stock 
returns suggests that emotions are the channel through which weather and returns are related.  
We make several contributions to the literature on how weather affects investor 
psychology. First, we confirm that weather has real effects on global stock returns. We show that 
these effects are substantial by constructing profitable hedge strategies based purely on ex ante 
                                                          
82 The regression tests suggest very high statistical significance of the weather effects. For example, based on the p-
values of the OLS estimates, in the cold region, the probability of randomness causing the observed negative wind 
effects during June-August is approximately 0.0002 (assuming independent effects for different months); the 
probability of random negative temperature effects during December-February is 0.00006. Similar conclusions can be 
made simply from the sign of the weather effects. For example, the probability of randomly observing 15 negative 
signs (out of 16) for the wind and rain effects (both OLS and logit) during March-October is 0.0002. Considering the 
entire pattern of weather effects strengthens our case against the spurious effects argument.   
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weather variables. Second, while prior literature treats the weather effects as uniform across 
climates and seasons, we show that the weather effects are contingent on the geographical and 
seasonal environments. This explains why we find a number of previously undocumented effects 
and why we find all five weather conditions significantly influence returns. In contrast, previous 
research primarily focuses on the effect of sunshine on financial markets (e.g., Saunders (1993), 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), and Goetzmann et al. (2015)), and treats other effects such as 
temperature as either insignificant or uniformly negative on returns (e.g., Dowling and Lucey 
(2008), Cao and Wei (2005), and Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2003)); rain, snow, and wind have 
never been documented as significantly affecting returns in a well-presented global sample in prior 
literature.83 Third, while most of our findings of the weather effects support the intuitive 
interpretation that comfortable conditions lead to higher stock returns (especially during seasons 
when people expect to spend time in the outdoors), we also uncover a strong perverse effect in 
cold climates that low temperature leads to higher returns, suggesting a rich structure of the 
weather effects on mood.  
 
4.2. Sample and Research Design 
4.2.1. Sample  
We retrieve daily index returns from Datastream. All countries for which Datastream’s 
Global Equity Index is available are included in our sample. Table 4.1 lists the countries included 
in our sample, as well as the coverage period where both the returns and weather data are available. 
                                                          
83 The relatively consistent effect of sunshine on returns across regions and seasons helps explain why prior research 
finds a positive sunshine effect even without conditioning the analysis on region and season. Still, this unconditional 
approach misses the more subtle aspects of the sunshine effect, such as its higher strength during seasons of increased 
outdoor activity. In addition, given that rain has the opposite emotional effect under cold versus warm climates, the 
perception in prior literature of a negative rain effect on mood seems to be attributable to negligence of the hot region. 
Lastly, the overall negative relation between temperature and returns conceals the fact that both positive and negative 
associations exist between temperature and returns for both the cold and hot regions, with differing strengths of this 
relation across seasons.  
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For some countries, there are gaps in coverage; hence the varying numbers of valid of observations. 
Table 4.1 also shows each country’s mean and standard deviation of percentage daily returns over 
that coverage period. All returns are nominal returns in local currency and include dividends.   
We collect weather data from the Integrated Surface Database (ISD) managed by the 
National Climatic Data Center (NCDC, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/quick-links#dsi-
3505). For each country included in our sample, we select the weather station closest to the 
country’s main stock exchange. If the selected series have a gap in coverage, we complement the 
weather data series with data from the second-nearest weather station, if available, as long as the 
complementing weather station is within a distance of 50 kilometers from the country’s main stock 
exchange.84  
We sort our full sample into three geographical regions. Specifically, we classify cold, 
mild, and hot countries using the 33rd and 67th percentiles of the full sample’s distribution of annual 
temperature. Panel A of Table 4.2 lists the countries included in each region.  
We retrieve sky cover, temperature, wind speed, precipitation, and snow depth data from 
the ISD. We construct all five weather variables based on the average value of hourly observations 
of each weather condition between 6:00 AM and 4:00 PM local time, following Hirshleifer and 
Shumway (2003). We operationalize the descriptive sky cover variable (SKC) by following 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) and assigning a value of 0 to clear skies, a value of 2.5 to scattered 
cloud cover, a value of 6 to broken cloud cover, and a value of 8 to completely overcast skies. 
Wind speed (SPD) is measured in miles per hour and temperature (TEMP) is in Fahrenheit. RAIN 
                                                          
84 Our results remain if we do not complement the principal weather series, or if we take the average of the observations 
from the weather station closest to the financial exchange and the second-nearest station. 
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is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if some liquid precipitations were recorded between 6:00 
AM and 4:00 PM local time on the day of the measurement.85,86 Otherwise, RAIN is equal to zero.  
We measure snowiness condition by snow depth (SD), which is the average daily snow 
cover in inches on the ground measured between 6:00 AM and 4:00 PM. Non-zero or non-missing 
snow related variables are sparse in the mild and hot regions. We thus exclude SD from the 
regression models for the mild and hot countries. Likewise, for the cold countries, we omit SD in 
the regression tests from April through November owing to the sparse and sometimes implausible 
non-zero records for those months.87   
We run month-by-month tests to take into account any seasonality effects. Like Loughran 
and Schultz’s (2004), our methodology departs from Hirshleifer and Shumway’s (2003) by not 
deseasonalizing the weather variables. We shift the timing of Southern Hemisphere countries by 
six months, so that seasons in both hemispheres are synchronous.  
Panel B of Table 4.2 reports the mean, median and standard deviation of the annual average 
temperatures of the countries included in each region. Panel B also shows the number of 
observations with non-missing weather and returns data by region, and reveals that countries with 
shorter coverage periods are almost exclusively mild or hot countries. Panel C reports the mean, 
median and standard deviation of our main weather variables and of percentage daily returns, by 
                                                          
85 The ISD dataset contains four different precipitation variables: PCP01, PCP06 and PCP24 record the liquid 
precipitations (in inches) in, respectively, the 1, 6 and 24 hours immediately preceding the weather record. PCPXX 
records the liquid precipitations in an indefinite period of time immediately preceding the record. We construct the 
variable RAIN using the PCP06 raw variable, as this variable is the one with the least missing observations. As such, 
RAIN is defined based on the average PCP06 value observed between 12:00 AM and 4:00 PM local time. 
86 In unreported tests, we find similar results when RAIN is defined with the further requirement that the average 
temperature on the measurement day is equal or above 32° Fahrenheit. Also, if we define RAIN to be a continuous 
rather than an indicator variable, our results remain materially unchanged. 
87 In untabulated tests, we exclude observations with extreme weather conditions. Specifically, we exclude 
observations for which SPD and SNOW are higher than the historical country-month 95th SPD and SNOW percentiles, 
and observations for which SKC and TEMP are either above the historical country-month 95th SKC or TEMP 
percentiles, or below the 5th SKC or TEMP percentiles, respectively. Our main results are robust to the exclusion of 
such observations, suggesting that the weather effects we document are not caused by extreme weather conditions.  
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region. Cold countries are significantly cloudier, windier and rainier than hot countries. In cold 
countries, RAIN seems to be correlated with SKC. We address this concern in our multivariate 
tests by testing for multicollinearity (results unreported) and conclude that multicollinearity is not 
a concern in our sample, with the highest correlation being 0.289 (between SKC and RAIN). Panel 
C also shows that cold countries have mean returns that are lower and less volatile than hot 
countries, although the difference in mean returns is not significant.  
 
4.2.2. Regression Test Design 
We sort our sample by region and month (rather than by country and month, to allow for a 
sufficient sample size in each region-month group), and estimate the following pooled regression 
of daily index returns of countries in each region-month group: 88  
rit =αt + β1SKCit + β2SPDit + β3RAINit + β4SDit + β5TEMPit +εit, 
where i indexes countries in a particular region-month group and t denotes trading day. For the 
mild and hot countries and for the months from April through November in the cold countries, we 
estimate a reduced form of this model and drop SD from the regression, to reflect the absence of 
snow cover in these periods and regions. In addition, because it is possible that weather effects are 
related to the sign of the returns and not their magnitude, we estimate the following logit model:  
𝑃(𝑟𝑖𝑡 > 0) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛼+𝛽1𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝑆𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡+𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡)
 , 
where P(rit  > 0) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the returns of country i’s market index 
on day t is positive, and zero otherwise.  
                                                          
88 In unreported tests, we also regress returns on the changes in the weather variables from the previous day. Results 
show that the change variables are much less significant and consistent compared to the level variables, suggesting 
that it is the current weather conditions themselves that influence returns. Also, to the extent that countries in the same 
temperature region still have differing climates, forming region-month groups tends to bias our tests against finding 
significant weather effects on returns.  
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For both the OLS and the logit regressions, in addition to estimating the model on a month-
by-month basis, we also run an “all-month” regression by pooling all months together, to see the 
net effect of the weather on daily returns by region only. In both the OLS and the logit regressions, 
standard errors are clustered by country and day to account for the regression residuals’ 
contemporaneous correlation for each region-month group and within-group autocorrelation 
across time, in line with the recommendations of Petersen (2009) and Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller (2011).  
A technical point in detecting the effects of the weather on stock returns is the treatment of 
return outliers. Our purpose is to examine the effects of non-economic, weather variables. If 
extreme daily returns are primarily caused by economic events, it seems necessary to remove 
extreme return outliers from our tests, because such outliers are least likely caused by the weather 
while exerting the largest impact on regression results. We therefore follow Saunders (1993) and 
remove returns with absolute value greater than a certain threshold, and assess the robustness of 
our results by varying this threshold. The selection of the threshold value reflects a tradeoff: a 
stricter (i.e., lower) threshold eliminates non-weather driven observations, but if we remove too 
many large return observations, we risk omitting valuable signals and making our tests influenced 
by noises (i.e., small returns) caused by liquidity trading.   
When we do not apply any filter and keep all observations, we find significant effects of 
the weather variables, at least for certain regions and months. (The OLS and logit regression results 
for the full sample with no filter rule applied are available from the authors upon request.) We 
obtain our base case results, presented in this paper, when we apply a 2.5% filter rule 
(corresponding to filtering out 4.9% of all observations). Our results are fairly robust to the specific 
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filters we use: results strengthen (relative to using no filters) if we apply the 3% filter rule, and 
vary only slightly if we impose a 2% filter rule.89  
We report the OLS and logit regression results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. For each 
of these regression tables, Panels A, B, and C report results for the cold, hot, and mild region, 
respectively. For both the OLS and logit regressions, we report the estimates of the coefficients, 
their associated p-values (in parentheses) and the economic impact [in square brackets]. The 
economic impact estimation procedures are described in Section 4.4.3, following a discussion of 
the results in Section 4.4.2. 
In untabulated tests, for the “all-month” pooled regression, we also follow Jacobsen and 
Marquering (2008) and include a Sell-in-May (SIM) variable as an additional independent 
variable. SIM is an indicator variable equal to 1 during the months of January, February, March, 
April, November and December, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. This indicator is included to allow 
for the possibility that the effect of any weather variable may be caused by a seasonal weather 
pattern such as the Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) as presented in Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi 
(2003) or certain unidentified non-weather related seasonality factor.90 We find that the all-month 
weather effects are robust to the inclusion of SIM, indicating that the weather effects we document 
are not caused by unknown seasonality factors.91 
  
                                                          
89 Under the null hypothesis of market efficiency, there should be no relation between weather and daily return no 
matter what filter rule we use. In Section 4.3, we discuss whether we can form profitable trading strategies by making 
use of the relation between weather and daily return. We find that trading strategies in which filters are used to estimate 
the weather-return relation lead to higher profits than when filters are not used, confirming that the use of filters helps 
capture genuine relationship between weather and returns.  
90 In further untabulated tests, we use the daylight-related Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) variable, as defined in 
Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003), instead of the Sell-In-May indicator variable. The weather effects remain 
unchanged. 
91 In addition, since we examine the weather effects on country index returns, the effects we study here are different 
from the seasonality in cross-sectional returns documented in Heston and Sadka (2010).  
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4.2.3. Assessing the Weather Effects  
The results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate wide-spread statistical significance of all five 
weather variables in both the OLS and logit regressions. We use a two-stage approach to verify 
whether the relation between weather and returns is real rather than spurious. First, before getting 
to the interpretation of the weather effects, we test (in Section 4.3) whether a trading strategy based 
purely on daily weather can be profitable; significant profitability from the weather-based trading 
strategies debilitates the spuriousness argument. We use the OLS regression coefficients and ex 
ante weather variables to predict daily returns and form hedge strategies. Second, we examine 
whether the salient effects of the weather on returns exhibit systematic patterns across climates 
and season (Section 4.4). The consistency of these patterns with hypotheses based on finance and 
psychology literatures is further evidence that the weather effects are real.  
 
4.3. Trading Profits of Weather-Based Hedge Strategies 
The premise of a weather-based strategy is that, if the weather variables predict daily 
returns, we can use the predicted returns to form a profitable hedge strategy that is long the country 
index with the highest predicted return and short the country index with the lowest predicted return. 
We adjust the hedge position on a daily basis and hold it for at least a 10-year horizon in order to 
neutralize non-weather effects.  
Specifically, a hedge strategy consists of two steps. In the first step, we measure all five 
weather variables using pre-market hourly observations between 5:00 and 9:00 AM local time. We 
run OLS regressions (as in Table 4.3) excluding observations with absolute returns greater than 
2.5%, because using this filter better captures the effects of the weather on returns and leads to 
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more reliable return predictability. For each country, we estimate the predicted daily return using 
the OLS coefficients and the observed 5:00 – 9:00 AM weather variables.92 
In the second step, for each region and each day, we form a hedge portfolio that takes a 
long position in the country with the highest predicted return and a short position in the country 
with the lowest predicted return, and we compute the daily portfolio’s return (we keep all return 
observations including return outliers when computing portfolio profits). The daily actual return 
of the long-short strategy is R_hedge= R_high – R_low, where R_high and R_low are the realized 
returns of the countries with the highest and lowest predicted returns, respectively. We rebalance 
the hedge portfolio on a daily basis.  
For each region i, we compute the mean and t-statistic of the profit from the hedge portfolio 
for a certain trading period, and we estimate the following time-series regression:  
R_hedgeit = alphai + bi R_wit + εit,  
where R_w denotes Datastream’s world index return. The intercept alpha is the "CAPM-adjusted" 
average daily hedge profit for a particular region. We use standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to four lags to calculate t-statistics of the mean hedge 
returns and p-values of the regression coefficients.  
We construct hedge strategies both by temperature regions (cold, mild, and hot countries, 
as defined in Section 4.2) and by time zones (the Americas, Europe-Africa, and Asia-Pacific).93 
For implementality, a strategy within a certain temperature region assumes that we can accurately 
forecast and make use of same-day pre-market weather information for all countries in the same 
                                                          
92 There is a loss of weather variable observations using pre-market weather data compared to using the 6:00 AM – 
4:00 PM (local time) data, possibly because weather stations are less than fully staffed during pre-market hours. This 
loss is even greater if we use weather data observed during 5:00 AM – 8:00 AM as in Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) 
to estimate the predicted daily returns, although hedge results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
93 These “time zones” are geographical regions that each encompasses several contiguous official time zones. 
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temperature region, whereas a time-zone strategy imposes a relatively minor assumption that 
weather information of countries in the same time zone is available, or easily forecast due to the 
short forecast horizon, at the time of forming the daily hedge positions.  
 
4.3.1. Hedge Profits Using Out-of-Sample Estimation 
In the out-of-sample estimation, we use only ex ante data to predict daily returns and 
construct hedge portfolios. Specifically, we use the first half of the sample period (1973-1992) as 
the start-up period to estimate the OLS regressions of daily returns on the weather variables, and 
we form hedge portfolios in the second half of the sample period, starting January 1993. Then, we 
increase the length of the estimation period incrementally by one full year at a time. For instance, 
we use the observations from 1973-1993 to predict the returns starting January 1994, and so forth. 
The equal split between the start-up estimation period and the trading period reflects a trade-off: a 
longer estimation period increases the accuracy of predicting  returns but decreases the sample size 
of the trading period needed to reduce non-weather related effects.94, 95  
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report the (gross) profits of hedging strategies using the out-of-sample 
estimation method, sorted by temperature region and by time zone, respectively. Since the mean 
daily hedge return and the corresponding regression alpha are highly consistent with each other, 
we focus on the mean hedge returns in the discussions below. 
Panel A of Table 4.5 shows that the weather-based strategies are profitable for the cold and 
mild regions. The hedge profits are substantial: a daily return of 0.055% (14.8% annually; t = 2.55) 
                                                          
94 Our results are not highly sensitive to the choice of the estimation period. In unreported tests, when we use 1973-
1997 as the start-up estimation period and 1998-2012 as the trading period, we find qualitatively similar but slightly 
stronger hedge profits. 
95 The out-of-sample method likely understates the hedge profits, because many of the observations in the estimation 
period come from the early part of the sample period and are of relatively poor data quality, introducing noise in 
calculating predicted returns and forming hedge portfolios.  
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for the cold region, and a daily return of 0.066% (18.0% annually; t = 2.26) for the mild region. 
When trading is limited to the Northern Hemisphere (Panel B), we observe a similar pattern of 
profits, but the hedge profits for the mild region are larger: daily return is 0.090% (25.1% annually; 
t =2.80). This may be a result of offsetting forces at play: allowing Southern Hemisphere countries 
in the strategy expands tradable assets, but at the same time introduces more region-specific risks 
that are more difficult to hedge away, if the Southern Hemisphere economies are less integrated 
with the rest of the world markets.  
Panel A of Table 4.6 confirms that when forming portfolios by time zone, the out-of-
sample hedge strategy is still profitable for the Europe-Africa time zone, when both hemispheres 
are tradable (daily return of 0.065%, or 17.6% annually; t = 2.38). When trading is limited to the 
Northern Hemisphere (Panel B), this strategy becomes less profitable (daily 0.048%, or 12.7% 
annually; t = 1.70).  
Therefore, the gross profits of strategies formed using pre-market weather conditions 
appear substantial: the out-of-sample profits range from an annualized return of 17.6% for the 
Europe-Africa time zone to 25.1% for the mild region (limited to the Northern Hemisphere). The 
weather-based trading strategy remains profitable if we factor in transaction costs of five basis 
points per day (for the long and short positions): the net out-of-sample profits then range from an 
annualized return of 4.3% for the Europe-Africa time zone to 11.8% for the mild region (again, 
with trading limited to Northern Hemisphere countries). Our estimated transaction costs appear 
reasonable, because index funds of the countries our trading strategy invests in are, for the most 
part, highly liquid Northern Hemisphere countries (at least, during the out-of-sample period). 
However, our hypotheses do not hinge on the accuracy of the transaction costs associated with our 
trading strategy: under the efficient market hypothesis, our weather-based trading strategy should 
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not generate profits even before transaction costs. Our findings that a weather-based hedge strategy 
yields significant (gross or net) profits thus further validate the realness of weather effects.   
 
4.3.2. Hedge Profits Using Full-Sample Estimation 
In the full-sample estimation, we use the weather and returns data of the entire 1973-2012 
sample period to estimate the OLS regressions (with the weather observed between 5:00 AM and 
9:00 AM local time each day), and to calculate the daily predicted returns. Given the importance 
of sample size for estimating the weather effects, this method has the advantage of obtaining the 
most reliable estimation of the OLS coefficients as well as the daily predicted returns. This method 
also allows us to examine the time trend of the hedge profits over the entire sample period. 
However, this method is subject to the look-ahead criticism that ex post weather-returns 
relationship is used to predict each daily return. Therefore, we only present the hedge profits 
graphically to compare the magnitude of weather-based trading profits across time.  
Figure 4.1 displays the hedge profits for each of the four decades in our sample (1973-
1982, 1983-1992, 1993-2002, and 2003-2012), for the temperature-region and time-zone sorted 
strategies. It is evident that the weather-based strategies are more profitable in more recent periods, 
especially the last decade. This holds true both when trading is open to both hemispheres and when 
trading is limited to the North Hemisphere (results untabulated). Despite the increased popularity 
of global equity investments in more recent periods, there are no signs of fading profitability of 
weather-based strategies; the emotions of investors seem increasingly influenced by the weather 
over time. However, data quality may be partly responsible for the increasing trend of the hedge 
profits—the recent weather data are of higher quality, thus allowing a more precise estimation of 
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the OLS regression coefficients, and there are more countries to trade in the more recent periods.97 
Additionally, in unreported tests, we find the hedge strategies (both full-sample and out-of-sample) 
mostly generate insignificant profits if we use only one weather variable (such as SKC) at a time 
to predict daily returns, suggesting the importance of including all the observable weather 
conditions for generating a profitable strategy.98  
In summary, the strong and significant profits of weather-based hedge strategies suggest 
systematic, rather than spurious, weather effects on returns. We next discuss possible 
interpretations of the weather effects.  
 
4.4. Discussion of the Weather Effects 
4.4.1. Hypotheses  
To provide a general guidance of expectations of the weather effects, we develop two 
hypotheses about the effects of the weather on stock returns. The first one concerns the sign of the 
effect of each weather variable on returns for each season and each temperature region; the second 
hypothesis predicts the strength of the weather effects and the probable times to observe these 
effects.   
 
4.4.1.1. What should be the sign of each weather effect?  
A body of psychology and finance literatures suggests that “comfortable” or “pleasant” 
weather should promote investor happiness and optimism, and an upbeat mood tends to lead to 
enhanced “spending” or “buying” tendency. For example, good moods lead to positive assessment 
                                                          
97 The limited number of tradable countries in the first half of our sample is one reason for the close to zero profits of 
several strategies for the first two subperiods.  
98 For example, using only SKC to predict daily returns, the full-sample hedge strategy for all regions produces a mean 
daily return of 0.0165% (t = 1.16), or 0.0297% (t = 1.98) if we exclude Southern Hemisphere countries. The out-of-
sample hedge profits based on SKC only are insignificant.  
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of various outcomes (Wright and Bower (1992)); inducement of positive affect stimulates risk 
taking (Isen and Patrick (1983)); good weather is found to be related to tipping and giving 
(Cunningham (1979), Lockard et al. (1976), and Rind (1996)); sunshine positively predicts returns 
around the world (Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)); good weather is associated with buying 
propensities of institutional or retail investors (Goetzmann et al. (2015) and Schmittmann et al. 
(2015)); stock returns are higher before holidays (Ariel (1990) and Kim and Park (1994)); sports-
induced bad moods negatively affect stock returns (Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007)); happy 
investors are more optimistic (Kaplanski et al. (2014)); and experimental research finds a positive 
association between mood and financial risk taking (Kuhnen and Knutson (2011), Kramer and 
Weber (2012), and Bassi, Colacito, and Fulghieri (2013)). Therefore, we predict a positive relation 
between “comfortable” weather conditions and stock returns: 
H1 (The “comfortable weather” hypothesis): Comfortable and pleasant weather conditions lead 
to higher stock returns.   
Owing to the contingent nature of the weather effects on mood, it is not possible to pin 
down effects to each climate and each month. However, for our five weather variables, we can 
make broad testable predictions as follows. First, sunshine is well-known in the literature to lead 
to an upbeat mood (e.g., see Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) and their extensive literature 
review). We therefore expect a positive sunshine effect on returns. Second, wind and rain are 
generally disruptive to the outdoor experience, but when the temperature is extremely high, rain 
and wind may be likable cooling conditions. Third, snow cover on the ground exacerbates the 
winter toughness and hinders outdoor activity. We therefore expect a negative effect of snow depth 
on stock returns. Finally, temperature should have a contingent effect on mood. Research suggests 
that people would prefer higher temperatures in the coldest months and lower temperatures in the 
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hottest months (Rehdanz and Maddison (2005)). We therefore expect low temperature during 
summer times and high temperature during the winter to promote happiness.99 There may also be 
temperature effects during seasonal transitions.100  
 
4.4.1.2. When should we observe stronger weather effects?  
Because happiness is positively related to leisure time spent outdoors (e.g., MacKerron and 
Mourato (2014)), and also because the effects of the weather on mood are felt more strongly in the 
outdoors than indoors (Keller et al., (2005)), we expect that conditions conducive to a pleasant 
outdoor experience should be especially effective in promoting investors’ emotions when investors 
are likely to spend more time outdoors. Our second hypothesis is thus: 
H2 (The “outdoors” hypothesis): The effects of the weather on returns are stronger when 
individuals expect to spend more time outdoors and when they place a higher value on outdoor 
time. 
The relevance of this hypothesis rests on an estimation of the time people spend outdoors 
each month. Casual intuition suggests that people would spend more time outdoors during the 
summer than during the winter. However, to obtain a more precise measure, we adopt the 
methodology of Graff Zivin and Neidell (2014) who estimate the time spent outdoors based on 
American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data. The ATUS data contain information about how people 
living in various regions of the U.S. spent their time during 2003-2006. Graff Zivin and Neidell 
(2014) apply econometric models to estimate the relationship between daily leisure time spent 
                                                          
99 A priori, we do not have a firm definition of “low” and “high” temperature. In untabulated tests, we find that most 
weather effects disappear when we define our weather variables in terms of deviations from their monthly country 
mean. It thus appears that individuals respond to current absolute weather conditions. 
100 Research in psychology also finds that individuals suffer from apathy under extreme high temperatures (Wyndham 
(1969) and that individuals exhibit risk-taking and aggression behaviors during extreme low temperatures (Howarth 
and Hoffman (1984) and Schneider et al. (1980)). Such effects are not in our basic comfortable weather hypothesis, 
but may still exert an influence on investor mood.  
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outdoors and daily maximum temperature.101 Since the temperatures in the ATUS data cover a 
wide range, from 25°F to 105°F, we can use the estimated relationship between outdoor time and 
daily maximum temperature to provide an estimation of the time spent outdoors for all months and 
for all three temperature regions.  
Specifically, the estimation of the outdoor leisure time is a three-step process. First, leisure 
time spent outdoors as a function of the maximum daily temperature is retrieved from Graff Zivin 
and Neidell (2014). Second, for each country and each month, we calculate the average maximum 
daily temperature. For each country and each month, we then estimate the time spent outdoors 
relative to when the temperature is between 76°F and 80°F. Third, we use the unconditional daily 
average outdoor leisure time (0.73 hours) estimated in Graff Zivin and Neidell (2014) to convert 
the relative outdoor leisure time into the total leisure time spent outdoors, in minutes, and we 
compute the average outdoor leisure time for each month by temperature region. Appendix C2 
contains the daily maximum temperature and estimated time spent outdoors for each month for 
each temperature region.  
We observe several patterns of outdoor time, from which we can make more specific 
predictions of the outdoors hypothesis. First, in all temperature regions, individuals spend the most 
and least time outdoors in the summer and winter, respectively. Therefore, we should expect most 
weather effects to be particularly strong around summer time for all temperature regions. 
Second, individuals spend very limited time outdoors during the winter in both the cold 
and mild countries. Consequently, the marginal utility of outdoor time should be especially high 
in the spring when the transition from winter to increasingly mild weather translates into more 
                                                          
101 Graff Zivin and Neidell (2014) find that the time spent outdoors increases with daily maximum temperature at low 
temperatures until 76°F -80°F, remains fairly stable until 100°F, and declines after that.   
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opportunities for outdoor activity. We thus expect stronger weather effects in the spring than in 
the autumn in the cold and mild regions. 
Third, hot countries have the least variation in outdoor time across the seasons, and 
individuals spend considerable time outdoors even during the winter. This implies that we could 
observe some strong weather effects even in the winter in the hot region.  
Fourth, the hot region has much higher temperatures and longer outdoor time in all seasons 
than both the cold and mild regions, but the mild region is closer to the cold than to the hot region 
in terms of temperature and outdoor time. Therefore, we expect the mild region to have more 
similar weather effects to the cold region than to the hot region.  
 
4.4.2. Interpretation of the Weather Effects 
As mentioned earlier, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the OLS and logit regression results, 
respectively, with the 2.5% filter rule applied to filter out return outliers. To help gain an overall 
picture of the effects of all five weather variables, we summarize both the OLS and logit test results 
in Appendix C1 by keeping only results that are significant at the 20% level or higher.102 Given 
the large number of regressions, the climate/season contingent nature of the weather effects, and 
the fact that the “pure” emotional weather effects are inevitably mixed with fundamental economic 
effects as reflected in index returns, we do not claim we can identify the definitive source of 
weather’s emotional effects. Instead, gaining insights into these effects in the light of our 
                                                          
102 Although the overall patterns of the weather effects do not rely on the cut-off significance levels, keeping results 
significant at the 20% level (rather than a higher significance level) is helpful in obtaining a more comprehensive 
picture of the weather effects, especially when viewed in combination with the neighboring effects either in terms of 
calendar months or the same-month OLS and logit tests. We judge the patterns based on how consistently the effects 
vary across regions and seasons. For instance, in the cold region, the SKC (OLS) effects for March and April are both 
negative and significant at the 20% level, with a p-value of 0.161 and 0.136, respectively. Taken together, the 
probability of these two effects being caused by randomness is only 0.022, assuming independent sunshine effects for 
different months. These results in combination with the February SKC effect strengthen the case of a significant 
sunshine effect from February to April in the cold countries.  
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hypotheses helps support the case that the effects of weather on stock returns are systematic rather 
than spurious.  
We first examine the effect of sunshine. Considering the pooled results (column 13) of 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, we confirm that the magnitude of the daily market index returns is 
negatively related to the current cloudiness (a negative proxy for sunshine), consistent with the 
comfortable weather hypothesis. Results are particularly strong for cold countries, both in the OLS 
(p = 0.0004) and in the logit specification (p = 0.0041). Judging by the OLS results of Table 4.3, 
there is clear evidence of a sunshine effect in hot countries (p = –0.0014) and weaker evidence in 
mild countries (p = 0.093), but the logit results of Table 4.4 indicate much weaker significance 
levels of SKC for hot and mild countries. These results suggest that while sunshine has a global 
positive effect on returns, this effect is strongest and most consistent in the cold region.  
The strength of the sunshine effect in all temperature regions exhibits patterns consistent 
with the outdoors hypothesis. In the cold countries, the SKC effect concentrates in the summer 
when individuals spend the longest time outdoors (Table 4.3:  p = 0.11 for August; Table 4.4:  p = 
0.019 and 0.053 for June and July, respectively) and in the spring when the marginal utility of 
outdoor time is presumably the highest (Table 4.3:  p = 0.053, 0.16, and 0.14 for February, March, 
and April, respectively; Table 4.4:  p = 0.083 for February). Likewise, in the mild region, the SKC 
effect is negative in June (Table 4.3: p =0.098; Table 4.4:  p =0.0095) and in March (Table 4.3:  p 
=0.020; Table 4.4:  p =0.015). In the hot countries, the sunshine effect is present during the warmer 
months of May, August and September (p < 0.20 in at least one test) when individuals spend the 
most time outdoors, and during the winter when people still spend considerable time outdoors 
(Table 4.3:  p < 0.1 for December, January and February; Table 4.4:  p = 0.018 for December). 
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The insignificance of the sunshine effect in July and August may reflect the fact that sunshine 
aggravates the oppressive summer heat.  
An interesting but surprising regularity in the logit tests of Table 4.4 is that in the mild 
region, cloudiness is positively associated with the probability of a positive return in February and 
December, although this pattern is not robust to the OLS tests. We also find a marginally 
significant positive October SKC effect in the hot region. While these results do not counter the 
overwhelming positive relation between sunlight and returns globally, it does indicate that even 
the sunshine effect is not completely uniform across temperature regions and seasons.  
Moving to the effects of wind and rain, we find further revealing evidence in support of 
both the comfortable weather and the outdoors hypotheses for all three temperature regions. 
Considering the pooled results (Column 13), we find that wind is generally negatively associated 
with returns in cold (Table 4.3: p = 0.070) and mild countries (Table 4.4:  p = 0.064). This is 
consistent with the comfortable weather hypothesis in that the wind’s cooling and disruptive 
effects make the weather uncomfortable.  
In line with the outdoors hypothesis, we find in the OLS tests of Table 4.3 that there is a 
significant negative wind (SPD) effect in cold countries in March (p = 0.0006) and in the summer 
months (June through August, p < 0.10). It appears that the wind’s cooling effect is especially 
unwelcome in the spring, when the marginal utility of outdoor time is possibly at its highest, and 
in the few months of warmer weather that cold countries enjoy. In the mild region, there is a similar 
pattern of negative wind effect in the spring and summer, but there is also a negative wind effect 
in December (p < 0.05 in both the OLS and logit tests), possibly because of the wind-chill effect 
in the early winter when the mild region still offers outdoor opportunities, albeit limited.  
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In contrast, and in line with both the comfortable weather and the outdoors hypotheses, the 
same cooling effect of wind appears to be appreciated in the hot countries’ warmer months; we 
find a positive wind effect in June in hot countries (Table 4.4:  p = 0.019) and in April (Table 4.3:  
p = 0.027). Wind’s disruptive effect appears to dominate in November (Table 4.3:  p = 0.048) and 
in later summer (Table 4.3:  p < 0.20 in both August and September). The later summer negative 
wind effect may also be related to the tropical storms.103 The varying effects of wind across the 
seasons result in an insignificant all-month wind effect in the hot region.  
In cold countries, rain is negatively associated with returns in the summer (Table 4.3:   
p = 0.017 in June) and in the spring (Table 4.3:  p = 0.13 for April; Table 4.4:  p = 0.20 for May). 
RAIN has an overall negative effect on returns (Table 4.3, all-month regression:  p = 0.061). 
However, in line with our comfortable weather hypothesis, and in sharp contrast with the rain 
effect observed in the summer of cold countries, in hot countries, and especially when average 
maximum daily temperatures are higher than 85°F (in June, July and August, Table A2), rain is 
positively perceived (Table 4.3:  p = 0.003 and 0.081 for July and August, respectively; Table 4.4:  
p = 0.021 for June). Accordingly, RAIN in the hot region has an overall positive effect on returns 
as shown in the all-month regression (Table 4.3:  p = 0.016; Table 4.4: p =0.038).  
There is a noteworthy pattern about the sign of the wind and rain effects in the cold region. 
In the OLS regressions of Table 4.3, the negative signs of both SPD and RAIN concentrate in the 
warmer portion of the year, in line with the outdoors hypothesis. Out of the eight months from 
March through October, SPD has a negative sign in all months except April, and RAIN is negative 
                                                          
103 Tropical hurricanes and tropical storms, both in the Atlantic and Eastern Pacific basins, tend to peak on September 
10; see http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/.  
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in all eight months.104 This pattern reinforces the idea that in the cold region, the negative effect 
of wind and rain on mood is stronger when people expect to spend more time outdoors. 
The temperature-contingent rain effect also exists in the mild countries. In the logit tests, 
RAIN has a negative sign in 10 out of the 12 months, which suggests that rain is disliked in the 
mild region, and in the spring in particular (Table 4.4:  p = 0.058 and 0.022 for March and April, 
respectively). On the other hand, rain positively affects returns in the warm month of June (Table 
4.3:  p = 0.044; Table 4.4:  p = 0.12), possibly because it provides a cooling effect similar to the 
one observed in the hot countries. The all-month logit regression indicates a strong negative effect 
of RAIN (Table 4.4:  p < 0.0001), confirming the overall negative emotion associated with RAIN 
in the mild countries and lending support to the comfortable weather hypothesis.105  
Results regarding snow depth are in line with both the comfortable weather and the 
outdoors hypotheses. In the all-month regression, snow cover on the ground has a negative impact 
on the probability of getting positive returns in the cold region (Table 4.4:  p = 0.026). The month-
level regressions further reveal that this effect is significant after December (p = 0.0008, 0.12, and 
0.0079 for January, February and March, respectively). This suggests that snow accumulations 
may hinder daily activities and make outdoor experiences less pleasant. 
The comfortable weather and outdoors hypotheses also explain at least part of our findings 
regarding the daily average temperature. The hypotheses are consistent with the negative TEMP 
                                                          
104 If each of the 16 signs was independently binomial (p = 0.5) as implied by the null hypothesis of zero weather 
effects, the probability of observing 15 negative SPD and RAIN coefficients would be 0.00024.  
105 The cooling role of wind should not account for the marginally positive January RAIN effect in the logit test in the 
cold and hot regions. Rather, this effect is possibly caused by the fact that individuals in dry regions would prefer 
more precipitation (Rehdanz and Maddison (2005)); January is among the driest months in both regions. This 
interpretation is confirmed in our unreported tests, where we divide the sample into dry and non-dry countries based 
on median January precipitation and find the positive January RAIN effect is entirely driven by the dry countries, for 
which RAIN is significant at the 5% level in the logit test for January for both the cold and hot regions. By contrast, 
dryness does not appear to be a major factor in January in the mild region as January has average precipitation in that 
region.  
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coefficients observed in the summer of cold and mild countries (Table 4.3 and Table 4.4:  p < 0.05 
for at least one test in June), as cooler temperatures are more comfortable in the summer. The 
hypotheses’ predictions are also consistent with the positive TEMP coefficient observed in 
September in cold countries (Table 4.3:  p = 0.0053; Table 4.4:  p = 0.0016). In untabulated tests, 
we find that the positive TEMP effect is driven by the second half of September, and we also find 
a weaker, but still significant positive TEMP effect in the second half of May (p < 0.05 in both the 
OLS and logit tests). These findings are particularly noteworthy because May and September stand 
out as the only two months in the cold countries with a significant positive temperature effect. 
These positive temperature effects suggest that people in cold countries favor warmer weather that 
permits enjoyable outdoor activity just before or after the summer period.106  
In the hot region, returns are negatively affected by average daily temperature in the 
summer, particularly in June (Table 4.3:  p = 0.11; Table 4.4:  p = 0.018) and August (Table 4.3:  
p = 0.0045; Table 4.4:  p = 0.017). Investors may find the hot countries’ maximum temperatures 
of above 85°F (Appendix C2) too hot for the outdoors to be enjoyable, thus explaining the negative 
temperature effect on returns.107 However, returns are positively related to temperature in the 
winter (Table 4.3:  p = 0.12 for December; Table 4.4:  p = 0.0002 and 0.20 for December and 
January, respectively) and spring (p < 0.10 in April and May in at least one test), when investors 
possibly want warmer temperatures, so that they can enjoy more of the outdoors.  
                                                          
106 Temperature in the cold region has a negative effect on returns in October (p < 0.05 in Tables 4.3 and 4.4). A 
possible interpretation is that a cool temperature in October is comfortable. Alternatively, a lower temperature in 
October may alert people of the cold weather to come, leading to increased risk-seeking behaviors. We leave it to 
future research to distinguish the interpretations.  
107 The insignificant (rather than significantly negative) temperature effect in July for the hot region seems to be 
consistent with findings in psychology that in extreme hot temperature, individuals experience apathy and inactivity 
(e.g., Wyndham (1969)). Cao and Wei (2005) cite this literature in explaining the less negative effect of temperature 
on returns during the summer than during the winter across all countries in their sample, but we find here that the 
summertime negative effect of temperature on returns is strongest in the hot region, which suggests that the overall 
summertime negative effect of temperature is more consistent with the comfortableness rather than the apathy 
interpretation.   
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However, the highly consistent and negative TEMP coefficients that we observe in both 
the cold and mild regions between December and February (for the cold region, in Tables 4.3 and 
4.4, p < 0.05 in five out of the six TEMP coefficients; in the mild region, p < 0.10 in five out of 
the six TEMP coefficients, with three less than 0.01) are not consistent with the basic comfortable 
weather hypothesis, but rather with the explanation of Cao and Wei (2005), Howarth and Hoffman 
(1984) and Schneider et al. (1980) that in extremely cold temperatures, individuals exhibit risk-
seeking behaviors.108 The strong association between extremely low temperature and high stock 
returns is a major departure from the nearly ubiquitous “positive-emotion-promotes-optimism” 
theme (see footnote 19), and confirms the complex relation between mood and risk assessment 
(Isen (2000)).109  
Overall, as seen in the summary of Appendix C1, the signs of the weather effects on returns 
are broadly consistent with the comfortable weather hypothesis, with the main exception of a 
strong negative effect of winter-time temperature in the cold and mild regions. Furthermore, 
Appendix C1 also makes it apparent that in the cold and mild regions, the weather effects show 
similar patterns and are stronger in the summer and spring when individuals like to spend time 
outdoors. In the hot region, there are stronger weather effects over the warmer portion of the year, 
and winter-time sunshine and warmer temperature—conditions conducive to a pleasant outdoor 
time—also impact stock returns. These patterns are consistent with the outdoors hypothesis.    
 
                                                          
108 The link between extreme low temperature and stock returns can potentially be attributed to two reasons: a more 
optimistic attitude of investors under very low temperatures, and/or a more risk-seeking attitude under such low 
temperatures. Since the former stretches credulity (e.g., the financial press often blames the cold winter weather for a 
slow pace in economic activity), the latter seems to be the more logical reason.  
109 Novy-Marx (2014) documents that New York City temperatures are correlated with the monthly returns of a 
number of asset pricing anomaly strategies. He also notes the apparently contradictory interpretations of the negative 
temperature effect of Cao and Wei (2005) and the positive sunshine effect of Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003). Our 
comprehensive approach of studying five weather effects on daily returns makes it clear to what extent the comfortable 
weather hypothesis holds among all these effects.  
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4.4.3. Economic Impact 
 In the OLS tests, we estimate the economic impact of a continuous weather variable (SKC, 
SPD, SD or TEMP) as the change in stock returns (in terms of annualized returns) that results from 
a change in that weather variable from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile, holding all other 
variables at their sample mean values;110 similarly, the impact of an indicator variable (RAIN and 
SIM) is the change in annualized returns caused by a change from 0 to 1 of the indicator variable, 
keeping all other variables at their sample means.111 In the logit tests, the economic impact of a 
weather variable is the change in the dependent variable (the probability of a positive daily return) 
as a result of a change in that weather variable from the 10th to the 90th percentile (or for RAIN, 
from 0 to 1), holding all other variables at their sample mean values.  
The figures [in brackets] in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate substantial economic impacts of the 
weather on stock returns. For example, based on the OLS results in Table 4.3, in the cold region, 
SKC, SPD, RAIN, and TEMP all have a significant impact on stock returns, with an annualized 
return impact as high as 13.3% for RAIN in July, 13.4% for SKC in February, 13.7% for SPD in 
March, and 28.7% for TEMP in February. In comparison, SD has a relatively low economic 
impact, reaching as high as 5.0% in March, although this may partly be due to the smaller number 
of valid snow depth observations. Similar conclusions hold based on the logit test in Table 4.4. 
For instance, a decrease in February TEMP from the 90th to the 10th percentile increases the 
probability of a positive daily return by 6.4%.  
                                                          
110 SKC is considered as a continuous variable even though it takes discrete values, because when estimating the 
economic impact, we use the same calculation method for SKC as for other continuous variables. Furthermore, our 
operationalized SKC variable is the daily mean cloud cover observed between 6:00 AM and 4:00 PM local time and 
as such, it can take any value between 0 and 8.  
111 For example, to estimate the impact of SKC in the cold region in January, we follow a 3-step procedure. First, we 
compute the change in daily return (denoted as d) caused by a change in SKC from the 10th to the 90th percentile (for 
the cold region in January) and holding other variables at their sample means. Second, we compute the mean daily 
index return (denoted as r) of all cold countries in January, and estimate the range of the daily return caused by a 
change in SKC to be (r – d/2, r + d/2). Third, we calculate the economic impact as the corresponding change in 
annualized returns (using 250 trading days per year) in absolute value.  
138 
 
We rank the economic impacts of the weather variables for each geographical region. In 
the cold region, the top weather effect based on the OLS results is TEMP in February [-28.7%]; 
based on the logit regression, the top effect is February TEMP [-6.4%]. In the hot region, the top 
effect based on the OLS is February SKC [-28.9%]; based on the logit test, the top effect is 
December TEMP [+5.7%]. Even though sunshine has the most consistent positive effect across 
regions and months, temperature often exerts the highest economic impact on returns, with rain’s 
effect comparable to sunshine’s, on an individual region-month basis. These results also indicate 
that despite the differences in the way weather affects stock returns across regions and seasons, 
the economic magnitude of the weather effects on investor behavior is comparable across the 
geographical regions.  
 
4.4.4. Robustness Tests 
 Our OLS and logit results are not highly sensitive to the filter rules used to control for the 
effect of return outliers: our results remain if we use filters ranging from 1.5% to 3%, and some 
results remain when we do not filter out return outliers. We discuss several further robustness tests 
below (results are untabulated). Finally, the Internet Appendix contains tables briefly referred to 
in the paper.  
 
4.4.4.1. Classification of Temperature Regions 
The definition of temperature regions reflects a trade-off: Sorting the full sample into more 
temperature-subsamples makes each region more uniform, but reduces the sample size of each 
region. In addition to our base-line classification into hot, mild, and cold regions, we also conduct 
tests using a 2-region or 4-region classification. In both schemes (especially the 2-region one), the 
results for the cold region are very much in line with our baseline; all results with respect to the 
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five weather variables remain unaffected with only minor changes in magnitude and significance 
levels. The results for the hot region are also quite similar to our baseline, with the only exception 
that the temperature effect tends to be noticeably weaker, especially under the 4-region scheme. In 
addition, we conduct a full-sample, 1-region test of the weather effects. Results suggest a net set 
of weather effects more resembling the cold region: SKC, SPD, and TEMP are all negatively 
related to returns in the all-month OLS regression, but the effects of RAIN and SD vanish, 
confirming the importance of dividing the sample into temperature regions.  
 
4.4.4.2. Northern and Southern Hemispheres  
In our baseline specification, we shift the timing of variables of the Southern Hemisphere 
countries by six months to align the season with the Northern Hemisphere. However, one issue 
arising from this shift is that the clustering of standard errors by day implies clustering together 
errors of day t (for the Northern Hemisphere countries) and day t+6 months (for the Southern 
Hemisphere countries). To deal with this issue, we repeat our tests using observations of the 
Northern Hemisphere countries only. Section 4.3 discusses how removing Southern Hemisphere 
countries affects the profitability of the hedge strategies. OLS and logit results indicate that all the 
baseline weather effects are preserved for the cold region. The calendar patterns of the weather 
effects for the mild region is less pronounced regarding SPD and RAIN. For the hot region, which 
suffers the largest sample size reduction, the effects of SKC and SPD are little affected relative to 
the baseline results, the effect of RAIN is weakened but remains positive in June and July, but 
TEMP shows a substantially weakened pattern. Therefore, while including both hemispheres tends 
to strengthen our OLS and logit test results, the identification of weather effects is unaffected by 
whether we include the Southern Hemisphere countries in our analysis.  
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4.4.4.3. Subperiods 
To verify whether the weather effects hold in the more recent period, we split our sample 
into two subperiods, 1973-1992 and 1993-2012. The beginning of the 1990s is a natural cut-off 
point because Datastream started covering many of our sample countries around that date. Our 
OLS and logit results hold in both subperiods. Most exceptions to our prior results occur in the 
earlier period, where data quality is sometimes an issue, especially in hot countries, and where the 
reduced number of observations makes the regression results particularly sensitive to outliers.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
We test the effects of five weather variables (sunshine, wind, rain, snow, and temperature) 
on stock index returns of 49 countries from 1973 to 2012 by sorting our sample by temperature 
region and calendar month. We conjecture that the weather effects on mood are contingent on 
climate and season, and uncover a number of new weather effects on stock returns. Weather 
appears to exert a substantial real impact on returns judging by the highly profitable weather-based 
hedge strategies. Furthermore, the weather effects across climates and seasons suggest systematic 
patterns. These patterns are in turn consistent with two themes. First and primarily, comfortable 
weather conditions promote optimism and lead to higher returns, especially during seasons when 
individuals like to spend time outdoors. Secondly, in a cold environment (i.e., winter times in cold 
or mild regions), low temperature elevates the risk-taking tendency and leads to higher returns.  
We recognize that a study of the effects of weather on stock returns has, by construction, 
limitations. Even though our research design tries to pick up the weather effects (by allowing 
effects to vary by climate and season, removing return outliers, and using a large sample to 
neutralize other effects), returns are obviously affected by economic events. Also, given the 
latitude in interpreting our hypotheses, further independent research is needed to confirm our 
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findings. Nonetheless, our results do indicate that there exist substantial weather effects on stock 
returns, and the patterns of the effects across climates and seasons suggest systematic effects of 
the weather on investor psychology. Our evidence that the strength of the weather effects tends to 
vary with the time spent outdoors sheds light on the mechanism through which weather-induced 
mood affects asset prices, lending support to the notion that temporary emotional states influence 
individuals’ judgment about long-term prospects (e.g., Shiller (1981), Schwarz and Clore (1983), 
and Lowenstein et al. (2001)).  
Our results should also be relevant to psychology research. Our evidence suggests that 
global stock markets are not only a barometer of the world’s financial fortunes, but also a 
convenient platform to study how weather influences human emotions. We have suggested 
possible interpretations for our salient results, but we believe that many intriguing weather effects 
on mood need to be further explored.
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Figure 4.1. Average Daily Hedge Portfolio Profits by Temperature Region and Time Zone, Using Full-Sample 
Estimation 
Panel A: Temperature Regions 
 
Panel B: Time Zones 
 
 
 
This figure presents the per-decade average daily trading profits (in percentage) associated with the hedge portfolios for each temperature region 
(Panel A) and time zone (Panel B). In the full-sample estimation, we use the full sample (1973-2012) to estimate the coefficients of the following 
OLS regression for each temperature region and month: rit = α + β1SKCit + β2SPDit + β3RAINit + β4SDit + β5TEMPit + εit. 
Returns are calculated using the Datastream Global Equity country indices. All weather variables are based on the average of hourly readings 
between 5:00 AM and 9:00 AM local time on the day of the measurement. Absolute returns greater than 2.5% are excluded from the sample for 
the estimation of the regression coefficients. We then use the estimated coefficients and the weather variables, based on hourly readings between 
5:00AM and 9:00AM, to calculate daily predicted returns for each country. For each temperature region (time zone) and each day, we form a 
hedge portfolio by taking a long position in the country with the highest predicted return and a short position in the country with the lowest 
predicted return. For each temperature region (time zone), the daily return of the hedge portfolio is the difference between the realized returns of 
the long and short positions. In Panel A, we form one portfolio for each temperature region (cold, mild and hot countries). In Panel B, we form 
one portfolio for each time zone (Americas, Asia-Pacific and Europe-Africa).   
 
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
1973-1982 1983-1992 1993-2002 2003-2012
Cold Mild Hot
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
1973-1982 1983-1992 1993-2002 2003-2012
Americas Asia-Pacific Europe-Africa
 143 
 
Table 4.1. Summary Statistics, by Country 
 
This table lists the countries and cities included in our sample. Stock return and standard deviation are in 
percentage points. For each country, the begin date (column 3) is the first year for which neither the returns 
nor the weather information is missing. Series for all countries end on December 31, 2012. Columns 4 and 5 
list the mean and standard deviations of percentage returns in local currency for each country. Column 6 
shows the number of observations with valid daily return and hourly weather data for each country. 
  
Country  
(1) 
City 
(2) 
Begin date 
(3) 
Mean return  
(4) 
Standard deviation, 
return (5) 
N  
(6) 
Argentina Buenos Aires 1988 0.198 2.898 5993 
Australia Sydney 1973 0.026 1.084 10184 
Austria Vienna 1973 0.021 0.959 10434 
Belgium Brussels 1973 0.027 0.968 10427 
Brazil Sao Paolo 1994 0.059 1.617 4783 
Bulgaria Sofia 2000 0.055 1.883 3186 
Canada Toronto 1982 0.029 0.952 8073 
Chile Santiago 1989 0.061 0.956 6098 
China Shanghai 1991 0.033 1.716 3702 
Colombia Bogotá 1992 0.058 1.023 5260 
Denmark Copenhagen 1973 0.038 1.083 10397 
Finland Helsinki 1988 0.024 1.770 6434 
France Paris 1973 0.029 1.218 10002 
Germany Frankfurt 1973 0.028 0.998 8841 
Greece Athens 1988 0.025 1.763 6500 
Hong Kong Hong Kong 1987 0.014 1.651 4238 
Hungary Budapest 1996 0.036 1.721 3233 
India Mumbai 1990 0.052 1.689 5982 
Indonesia Jakarta 1990 0.028 1.855 4714 
Ireland Dublin 1973 0.024 1.189 10327 
Israel Tel Aviv 1993 0.031 1.273 5182 
Italy Milan 1973 0.026 1.360 10381 
Japan Tokyo 1996 -0.012 1.331 4127 
Korea Seoul 1996 0.043 1.977 3548 
Luxemburg Luxemburg 1992 0.016 1.259 5471 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 1986 0.037 1.341 6936 
Mexico Mexico City 1988 0.083 1.514 5410 
Netherlands Amsterdam 1973 0.021 1.102 10419 
New Zealand Wellington 1989 0.015 0.988 5664 
Norway Oslo 1980 0.032 1.468 8505 
Pakistan Karachi 1992 0.020 1.722 5222 
Peru Lima 1994 0.033 1.394 4945 
Philippines Manila 1987 0.046 1.355 6593 
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 Table 4.1 (Continued). Summary Statistics, by Country 
 
Country  
(1) 
City 
(2) 
Begin date 
(3) 
Mean return 
(4) 
Standard deviation, 
return (5) 
N 
(6) 
Poland Warsaw 1994 0.008 1.746 4912 
Portugal Lisbon 1996 0.007 1.117 3509 
Romania Bucharest 1996 0.061 2.274 4167 
Russia Moscow 1998 0.089 2.822 3863 
Singapore Singapore 1973 0.017 1.328 10138 
South Africa Johannesburg 1973  0.053 1.286 10383 
Spain Madrid 1987 0.023 1.340 6709 
Sri Lanka Colombo 1987 0.055 1.317 6091 
Sweden Stockholm 1982 0.041 1.397 7354 
Switzerland Zurich 1979 0.030 0.949 8833 
Taiwan Taipei 1987 0.024 1.834 6552 
Thailand Bangkok 1987 0.038 1.762 6773 
Turkey Istanbul 1988 0.144 2.540 6504 
UK London 1973 0.029 1.091 10344 
USA New York 1973 0.029 1.092 10428 
Venezuela Caracas 1990 0.126 2.224 4835 
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Table 4.2. Classification of Countries According to Yearly Average Temperature 
 
 
This table describes the composition of the temperature regions. Panel A lists the countries included in each 
region. We define cold, mild, and hot regions based on the 33rd and 67th percentiles of the full sample's 
distribution of annual temperatures. Panel B shows the mean, median and standard deviation of the annual 
temperature (in Fahrenheit), by region. N is the number of observations with valid return and weather data for 
each region. 
 
Panel C reports summary statistics for each of the temperature regions. All weather variables are based on the 
average of hourly readings between 6:00 AM and 4:00 PM local time on the day of the measurement. SKC is 
the average sky cover. SPD is the average wind speed (in miles per hour). RAIN is an indicator variable that 
is equal to 1 if the average of the hourly records of liquid precipitations (in inches) registered in the 6 hours 
prior to any hourly readings is positive; and zero otherwise. SD is equal to the depth (in inches) of the snow 
cover on the ground. SD is set to zero in summer months and in hot and mild countries. RET is each country's 
daily percentage returns of Datastream's Global Equity Index, in local currency. 
 
The last two columns of Panel C show the difference in means of the weather variables and the returns, 
between cold and hot countries, and between mild and hot countries. ***; **, * indicate that the hypothesis 
of the equality of means was rejected using a standard t-test at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Countries in Each Temperature Region 
  Cold Mild Hot 
 
Austria Argentina Australia 
 
Belgium Bulgaria Brazil 
 
Canada China Greece 
 
Chile Colombia Hong Kong 
 
Denmark France India 
 
Finland Hungary Indonesia 
 
Germany Italy Israel 
 
Ireland Japan Malaysia 
 
Luxemburg Korea New Zealand 
 
Netherlands Mexico Pakistan 
 
Norway Philippines Peru 
 
Poland Portugal Singapore 
 
Russia Romania South Africa 
 
Sweden Spain Sri Lanka 
 
Switzerland Turkey Taiwan 
 
United States United Kingdom Thailand 
   
Venezuela 
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Table 4.2 (Continued). Classification of Countries According to Yearly Average 
Temperature 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Temperature, in Fahrenheit, by Region 
  Cold Mild Hot 
Mean 49.930 57.530 76.317 
Median 50.545 56.636 80.000 
Standard deviation 15.130 13.509 10.885 
N 130813 109875 91728 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics of Weather and Returns in the Cold, Mild, and Hot Regions 
Variable   Cold  
(1) 
Mild  
(2) 
Hot  
(3) 
Difference  
(1 - 3) 
Difference  
(2 - 3) 
SKC Mean 5.032 4.319 4.589 0.4431*** -0.296***  
Median 5.500 4.500 5.125 
  
 
Standard deviation 2.139 2.286 2.235 
  
       
SPD Mean 9.149 7.832 6.982 2.167*** 0.851***  
Median 8.316 6.750 6.250 
  
 
Standard deviation 5.352 5.334 4.349 
  
       
RAIN Mean 0.167 0.091 0.111 0.056*** -0.019***  
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
Standard deviation 0.373 0.288 0.314 
  
       
SD Mean 0.546 0.000 0.000 0.546*** N/A 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000   
 Standard deviation 2.788 0.000 0.000   
       
RET Mean 0.045 0.040 0.040 0.005* 0.001  
Median 0.007 0.000 0.000 
  
  Standard deviation 0.752 0.840 0.824 
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Table 4.3. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regressions of Daily Return on Weather 
Variables: 2.5% Absolute Return Filter Applied 
  
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the following model: rit = α  + β1SKCit + β2SPDit + 
β3RAINit + β4SDit + β5TEMPit +  εit. 
Returns are calculated using the Datastream Global Equity country indices. Returns include dividends. All 
weather variables are based on the average of hourly readings between 6:00 AM and 4:00 PM local time 
on the day of the measurement. SKC is the average sky cover. SPD is the average wind speed (in miles per 
hour). RAIN is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the average of the hourly records of liquid 
precipitations (in inches) registered in the 6 hours prior to any hourly readings is positive; and zero 
otherwise. SD is equal to the depth (in inches) of the snow cover on the ground. SD is set to zero in summer 
months and in hot and mild countries. TEMP is the daily average temperature, in Fahrenheit. 
 
Panels A, B, and C present the results for the cold, mild, and hot countries, respectively. We define cold, 
mild, and hot regions based on the 33rd and 67th percentiles of the full sample's distribution of annual 
temperatures. Absolute returns greater than 2.5% were deleted from the sample. The number of 
observations and adjusted R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values are presented in 
parentheses and boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values are significant at the 10% level or higher. 
Figures in brackets indicate the economic significance of the independent variables. The economic impact 
of a variable is the change in annualized return as a result of a change in that variable from the 10th to the 
90th percentile (or for RAIN, from 0 to 1), holding all other variables at their sample mean values. Standard 
errors are clustered by day and country.  
 
  
 148 
 
Table 4.3 (Continued). Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regressions of Daily Return on Weather 
Variables: 2.5% Absolute Return Filter Applied 
Panel A. Cold Countries. 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
SKC 0.0004 -0.0069 -0.0068 -0.0062 -0.0008 -0.0047 
  (0.9332) (0.0535) (0.1611) (0.1360) (0.8419) (0.3483) 
  [0.0072] [0.1339] [0.1197] [0.1076] [0.0124] [0.0691] 
SPD 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0032 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0039 
  (0.7085) (0.4984) (0.0006) (0.4498) (0.8789) (0.0343) 
  [0.0282] [0.0553] [0.1365] [0.0413] [0.0069] [0.1203] 
RAIN 0.0024 0.0301 -0.0152 -0.0382 -0.0134 -0.0071 
  (0.8935) (0.3170) (0.5959) (0.1346) (0.5907) (0.7797) 
  [0.0076] [0.0953] [0.0437] [0.1139] [0.0358] [0.0194] 
SD -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0035    
 (0.2430) (0.6411) (0.1129)    
 [0.0361] [0.0147] [0.0497]    
TEMP -0.0027 -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0007 0.0012 -0.0029 
  (0.0085) (0.0183) (0.3015) (0.6535) (0.4899) (0.0323) 
  [0.2485] [0.2869] [0.1281] [0.0441] [0.0666] [0.1545] 
        
Intercept 0.1803 0.2464 0.2131 0.1306 -0.0319 0.2803 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0168) (0.1462) (0.7783) (0.0037) 
R2 (0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0009) 
N 10440 9716 10536 10211 10519 10306 
Panel A (Continued). Cold Countries. 
 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC -0.0063 -0.0063 0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0044 -0.0020 -0.0052 
  (0.2171) (0.1088) (0.9624) (0.5451) (0.2899) (0.6419) (0.0004) 
  [0.0938] [0.0919] [0.0040] [0.0423] [0.0640] [0.0329] [0.0868] 
SPD -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0023 -0.0016 0.0022 0.0003 -0.0009 
  (0.0966) (0.0714) (0.3204) (0.4339) (0.3127) (0.8004) (0.0703) 
  [0.1104] [0.1111] [0.0713] [0.0548] [0.0841] [0.0146] [0.0328] 
RAIN -0.0486 -0.0314 -0.0116 -0.0197 0.0149 -0.0006 -0.0115 
  (0.0171) (0.4399) (0.6081) (0.3161) (0.4797) (0.9727) (0.0606) 
  [0.1328] [0.0844] [0.0279] [0.0494] [0.0396] [0.0019] [0.0321] 
SD      0.0028 -0.0001 
      (0.3331) (0.9322) 
      [0.0248] [0.0000] 
TEMP -0.0016 -0.0017 0.0048 -0.0049 -0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0017 
  (0.2597) (0.2457) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.2304) (0.3887) (0.0000) 
  [0.0791] [0.0809] [0.1979] [0.2406] [0.1229] [0.0690] [0.1864] 
         
Intercept 0.2112 0.2126 -0.2768 0.2787 0.1106 0.1021 0.1656 
  (0.0419) (0.0310) (0.0158) (0.0022) (0.1734) (0.0329) (0.0000) 
R2 (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010) 
N 10626 10561 10215 10293 10252 10722 124397 
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Table 4.3 (Continued). Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regressions of Daily Return on Weather 
Variables: 2.5% Absolute Return Filter Applied 
Panel B. Mild Countries. 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
SKC -0.0058 0.0034 -0.0109 0.0045 -0.0060 -0.0095 
  (0.2519) (0.5534) (0.0203) (0.4719) (0.4055) (0.0975) 
  [0.1296] [0.0734] [0.2210] [0.0837] [0.0918] [0.1488] 
SPD 0.0013 -0.0021 0.0004 -0.0033 -0.0008 0.0009 
  (0.4233) (0.2137) (0.7815) (0.0910) (0.6952) (0.6581) 
  [0.0541] [0.0846] [0.0152] [0.1270] [0.0231] [0.0285] 
RAIN -0.0061 0.0055 0.0208 -0.0284 0.0241 0.0543 
  (0.8850) (0.9199) (0.5638) (0.4275) (0.4090) (0.0436) 
  [0.0187] [0.0163] [0.0591] [0.0846] [0.0607] [0.1450] 
TEMP -0.0025 -0.0042 -0.0020 -0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0023 
  (0.0728) (0.0002) (0.3411) (0.2593) (0.8627) (0.0300) 
  [0.1905] [0.2940] [0.1156] [0.1561] [0.0146] [0.1423] 
        
Intercept 0.2006 0.2684 0.1992 0.2521 0.0573 0.2226 
  (0.0032) (0.0000) (0.0766) (0.1391) (0.6468) (0.0026) 
R2 (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
N 6968 6549 7044 6779 6962 6987 
Panel B (Continued). Mild Countries. 
 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC -0.0006 -0.0047 -0.0014 -0.0041 -0.0026 0.0037 -0.0031 
  (0.9240) (0.3918) (0.8373) (0.5150) (0.5933) (0.4642) (0.0927) 
  [0.0100] [0.0736] [0.0210] [0.0697] [0.0496] [0.0763] [0.0575] 
SPD -0.0027 -0.0027 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0040 -0.0011 
  (0.1559) (0.2403) (0.9150) (0.7318) (0.5659) (0.0450) (0.1342) 
  [0.0881] [0.0886] [0.0066] [0.0225] [0.0338] [0.1521] [0.0367] 
RAIN 0.0093 0.0197 -0.0419 -0.0361 0.0295 -0.0270 -0.0001 
  (0.7001) (0.7728) (0.2725) (0.3150) (0.5265) (0.4382) (0.9883) 
  [0.0256] [0.0526] [0.1038] [0.0929] [0.0771] [0.0765] [0.0003] 
TEMP 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0014 
  (0.9250) (0.5029) (0.8955) (0.2197) (0.7281) (0.1487) (0.0019) 
  [0.0082] [0.0731] [0.0089] [0.1350] [0.0277] [0.1184] [0.1484] 
         
Intercept 0.0655 0.1453 -0.0040 0.2011 0.0605 0.1385 0.1455 
  (0.5358) (0.2174) (0.9654) (0.1306) (0.4063) (0.0200) (0.0000) 
R2 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0005) 
N 7200 7128 7021 7067 6985 7233 83923 
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Table 4.3 (Continued). Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regressions of Daily Return on Weather 
Variables: 2.5% Absolute Return Filter Applied 
 
Panel C. Hot Countries. 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
SKC -0.0067 -0.0120 -0.0006 -0.0041 -0.0121 -0.0031 
  (0.0818) (0.0487) (0.9227) (0.4655) (0.0189) (0.6904) 
  [0.1578] [0.2893] [0.0123] [0.0770] [0.1826] [0.0488] 
SPD 0.0015 0.0014 -0.0033 0.0045 0.0004 -0.0002 
  (0.4640) (0.5355) (0.2050) (0.0274) (0.8814) (0.9361) 
  [0.0447] [0.0440] [0.0930] [0.1316] [0.0119] [0.0058] 
RAIN 0.0083 0.0498 -0.0087 0.0229 0.0283 0.0458 
  (0.8394) (0.2038) (0.7991) (0.3655) (0.3628) (0.2176) 
  [0.0247] [0.1491] [0.0236] [0.0640] [0.0758] [0.1308] 
TEMP -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0016 -0.0004 -0.0024 
  (0.8239) (0.8583) (0.5132) (0.0654) (0.7155) (0.1116) 
  [0.0203] [0.0168] [0.0615] [0.1267] [0.0236] [0.1428] 
        
Intercept 0.0942 0.1199 0.1202 -0.0994 0.1078 0.2633 
  (0.1802) (0.1437) (0.2600) (0.2203) (0.2486) (0.0672) 
R2 (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
N 8482 8038 8533 8344 8417 8493 
Panel C (Continued). Hot Countries. 
 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC -0.0086 -0.0072 -0.0119 0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0091 -0.0059 
  (0.2151) (0.1992) (0.1402) (0.2527) (0.6406) (0.0020) (0.0014) 
  [0.1339] [0.1081] [0.1802] [0.0772] [0.0356] [0.2033] [0.1023] 
SPD 0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0039 0.0009 -0.0038 -0.0013 -0.0002 
  (0.3097) (0.1425) (0.1240) (0.7578) (0.0483) (0.5303) (0.7673) 
  [0.0657] [0.0957] [0.1006] [0.0220] [0.0936] [0.0393] [0.0066] 
RAIN 0.0713 0.0454 0.0229 -0.0177 0.0059 0.0057 0.0250 
  (0.0029) (0.0814) (0.4048) (0.5578) (0.8698) (0.7654) (0.0155) 
  [0.2068] [0.1240] [0.0634] [0.0464] [0.0152] [0.0172] [0.0699] 
TEMP 0.0005 -0.0042 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0004 
  (0.8055) (0.0045) (0.2051) (0.7340) (0.7969) (0.1178) (0.3980) 
  [0.0260] [0.1918] [0.0852] [0.0314] [0.0180] [0.1179] [0.0275] 
         
Intercept 0.0307 0.4409 0.2632 0.0327 0.0625 0.0174 0.0974 
  (0.8625) (0.0003) (0.0226) (0.8136) (0.4699) (0.7654) (0.0150) 
R2 (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0002) 
N 8557 8317 8417 8432 8384 8617 101031 
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Table 4.4. Logit Regressions of the Probability of A Positive Daily Return on Weather 
Variables: 2.5% Absolute Return Filter Applied 
 
This table presents the results of the logit estimation of the following model: 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑖𝑡 > 0) =
1
1+𝑒−(𝛼+𝛽1𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝑆𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡+𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡)
, 
 
where P(rit >0) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the market return in country i on day t is positive, and 
zero otherwise. Returns are calculated using the Datastream Global Equity country indices. Returns include 
dividends. All weather variables are based on the average of hourly readings between 6:00 AM and 4:00 PM 
local time on the day of the measurement. SKC is the average sky cover. SPD is the average wind speed (in 
miles per hour). RAIN is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the average of the hourly records of liquid 
precipitations (in inches) registered in the 6 hours prior to any hourly readings is positive; and zero otherwise. 
SD is equal to the depth (in inches) of the snow cover on the ground. SD is set to zero in summer months and in 
hot and mild countries. TEMP is the daily average temperature, in Fahrenheit.  
 
Panels A, B, and C present the results for the cold, mild, and hot countries, respectively. We define cold, mild, 
and hot regions based on the 33rd and 67th percentiles of the full sample's distribution of annual temperatures. 
Absolute returns greater than 2.5% were deleted from the sample. The number of observations and pseudo R-
squared of each regression are also reported. P-values are presented in parentheses and boldfaced coefficients 
and associated p-values are significant at the 10% level or higher. Figures in brackets indicate the economic 
significance of the independent variables. The economic impact of a variable is the change in the dependent 
variable (the probability of a positive daily return) as a result of a change in that variable from the 10th to the 90th 
percentile (or for RAIN, from 0 to 1), holding all other variables at their sample mean values. Standard errors 
are clustered by day and country. 
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Table 4.4 (Continued). Logit Regressions of the Probability of A Positive Daily Return on Weather 
Variables: 2.5% Absolute Return Filter Applied 
Panel A. Cold Countries. 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
SKC -0.0021 -0.0148 -0.0029 -0.0096 0.0087 -0.0256 
  (0.8832) (0.0834) (0.8147) (0.2981) (0.4789) (0.0192) 
  [0.0029] [0.0217] [0.0044] [0.0138] [0.0117] [0.0313] 
SPD 0.0062 0.0007 -0.0056 0.0013 0.0028 -0.0018 
  (0.2788) (0.8508) (0.1161) (0.7663) (0.5772) (0.7464) 
  [0.0249] [0.0024] [0.0201] [0.0042] [0.0080] [0.0046] 
RAIN 0.0634 0.0566 -0.0400 -0.0073 -0.0835 0.0101 
  (0.1667) (0.2765) (0.5120) (0.9236) (0.1964) (0.8778) 
  [0.0158] [0.0137] [0.0098] [0.0018] [0.0203] [0.0024] 
SD -0.0087 -0.0057 -0.0106    
 (0.0008) (0.1176) (0.0079)    
 [0.0035] [0.0028] [0.0045]    
TEMP -0.0061 -0.0095 -0.0036 -0.0043 0.0055 -0.0060 
  (0.0457) (0.0001) (0.3692) (0.3485) (0.1277) (0.0680) 
  [0.0430] [0.0636] [0.0208] [0.0227] [0.0275] [0.0267] 
        
Intercept 0.5175 0.6653 0.4714 0.5410 -0.1461 0.6961 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0155) (0.0387) (0.5178) (0.0041) 
R2 0.0011 0.0025 0.0010 0.0003 0.0006 0.0007 
N 10440 9716 10536 10211 10519 10306 
Panel A (Continued). Cold Countries. 
 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC -0.0188 -0.0101 -0.0112 -0.0066 -0.0092 0.0127 -0.0109 
  (0.0533) (0.3592) (0.3457) (0.4978) (0.3552) (0.2345) (0.0041) 
  [0.0243] [0.0136] [0.0154] [0.0090] [0.0125] [0.0174] [0.0158] 
SPD -0.0032 -0.0057 -0.0000 -0.0017 0.0044 0.0054 0.0008 
  (0.5733) (0.2055) (0.9956) (0.7359) (0.4049) (0.2244) (0.7031) 
  [0.0085] [0.0157] [0.0001] [0.0053] [0.0161] [0.0208] [0.0028] 
RAIN -0.0785 0.0651 -0.0446 -0.0347 0.0346 -0.0404 -0.0132 
  (0.1460) (0.3608) (0.4392) (0.3225) (0.5062) (0.4101) (0.4649) 
  [0.0188] [0.0163] [0.0104] [0.0081] [0.0086] [0.0100] [0.0032] 
SD      -0.0079 -0.0044 
      (0.4649) (0.0257) 
      [0.0017] [0.0006] 
TEMP -0.0040 -0.0001 0.0106 -0.0095 -0.0048 -0.0085 -0.0048 
  (0.1359) (0.9653) (0.0016) (0.0174) (0.2124) (0.0127) (0.0000) 
  [0.0173] [0.0006] [0.0412] [0.0427] [0.0258] [0.0537] [0.0453] 
         
Intercept 0.5621 0.2535 -0.5170 0.6094 0.3467 0.5459 0.5006 
  (0.0039) (0.2121) (0.0178) (0.0010) (0.0515) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
R2 0.0007 0.0003 0.0017 0.0014 0.0006 0.0015 0.0012 
N 10626 10561 10215 10293 10252 10722 124397 
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Table 4.4 (Continued). Logit Regressions of the Probability of A Positive Daily Return on Weather 
Variables: 2.5% Absolute Return Filter Applied 
Panel B. Mild Countries. 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
SKC 0.0028 0.0209 -0.0145 0.0065 -0.0071 -0.0392 
  (0.7185) (0.0151) (0.1691) (0.5542) (0.6207) (0.0095) 
  [0.0050] [0.0378] [0.0250] [0.0096] [0.0106] [0.0478] 
SPD -0.0024 0.0007 0.0004 -0.0060 -0.0059 0.0082 
  (0.6120) (0.8131) (0.9192) (0.1118) (0.1184) (0.2120) 
  [0.0079] [0.0025] [0.0014] [0.0178] [0.0175] [0.0207] 
RAIN -0.1150 -0.0802 -0.0988 -0.1781 0.0531 0.0805 
  (0.1334) (0.4389) (0.0584) (0.0216) (0.5214) (0.1153) 
  [0.0279] [0.0193] [0.0238] [0.0407] [0.0132] [0.0178] 
TEMP -0.0070 -0.0103 -0.0056 -0.0087 -0.0021 -0.0094 
  (0.0645) (0.0029) (0.2844) (0.0936) (0.6042) (0.0035) 
  [0.0429] [0.0571] [0.0270] [0.0357] [0.0102] [0.0456] 
        
Intercept 0.5845 0.5878 0.5314 0.7347 0.2823 0.8906 
  (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0672) (0.0302) (0.3442) (0.0003) 
R2 0.0014 0.0028 0.0008 0.0014 0.0003 0.0023 
N 6968 6549 7044 6779 6962 6987 
Panel B (Continued). Mild Countries. 
 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC 0.0070 -0.0066 0.0044 -0.0146 -0.0050 0.0256 -0.0016 
  (0.5789) (0.5390) (0.7287) (0.3157) (0.6348) (0.0076) (0.7078) 
  [0.0106] [0.0095] [0.0064] [0.0235] [0.0091] [0.0445] [0.0027] 
SPD -0.0060 -0.0050 0.0018 0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0123 -0.0024 
  (0.0364) (0.2554) (0.6670) (0.8129) (0.2489) (0.0215) (0.0643) 
  [0.0179] [0.0147] [0.0053] [0.0067] [0.0130] [0.0373] [0.0075] 
RAIN -0.0490 -0.0690 -0.1181 -0.0298 -0.0745 -0.1659 -0.0785 
  (0.5296) (0.4552) (0.1221) (0.7264) (0.4623) (0.0534) (0.0000) 
  [0.0122] [0.0168] [0.0293] [0.0072] [0.0186] [0.0379] [0.0191] 
TEMP -0.0006 -0.0032 0.0031 -0.0049 -0.0004 -0.0127 -0.0048 
  (0.8069) (0.2776) (0.1773) (0.2972) (0.8803) (0.0006) (0.0000) 
  [0.0041] [0.0205] [0.0171] [0.0228] [0.0023] [0.0688] [0.0432] 
         
Intercept 0.2075 0.4275 -0.1831 0.4066 0.1729 0.8184 0.4597 
  (0.3325) (0.0668) (0.2775) (0.1637) (0.2813) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0066 0.0011 
N 7200 7128 7021 7067 6985 7233 83923 
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Table 4.4 (Continued). Logit Regressions of the Probability of A Positive Daily Return on Weather 
Variables: 2.5% Absolute Return Filter Applied 
 
Panel C. Hot Countries. 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
SKC -0.0061 -0.0064 0.0080 -0.0100 -0.0157 0.0023 
  (0.6373) (0.6931) (0.5950) (0.5281) (0.1956) (0.9200) 
  [0.0121] [0.0128] [0.0147] [0.0161] [0.0215] [0.0029] 
SPD 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0050 0.0046 0.0014 0.0130 
  (0.9329) (0.8530) (0.2554) (0.4222) (0.8256) (0.0194) 
  [0.0011] [0.0031] [0.0129] [0.0115] [0.0036] [0.0292] 
RAIN 0.1052 0.1113 -0.0118 0.0153 0.0658 0.1696 
  (0.1437) (0.2742) (0.8365) (0.7533) (0.4863) (0.0205) 
  [0.0258] [0.0278] [0.0029] [0.0037] [0.0158] [0.0382] 
TEMP 0.0036 0.0006 0.0019 0.0056 0.0054 -0.0105 
  (0.1972) (0.7954) (0.4782) (0.0513) (0.0655) (0.0188) 
  [0.0278] [0.0046] [0.0138] [0.0363] [0.0313] [0.0455] 
        
Intercept 0.0342 0.2036 0.0271 -0.2504 -0.2313 0.9185 
  (0.8520) (0.2388) (0.9005) (0.3617) (0.3930) (0.0290) 
R2 0.0007 0.0002 0.0004 0.0012 0.0010 0.0033 
N 8482 8038 8533 8344 8417 8493 
Panel C (Continued). Hot Countries. 
 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC -0.0086 -0.0072 -0.0119 0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0091 -0.0059 
  (0.2151) (0.1992) (0.1402) (0.2527) (0.6406) (0.0020) (0.0014) 
  [0.1339] [0.1081] [0.1802] [0.0772] [0.0356] [0.2033] [0.1023] 
SPD 0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0039 0.0009 -0.0038 -0.0013 -0.0002 
  (0.3097) (0.1425) (0.1240) (0.7578) (0.0483) (0.5303) (0.7673) 
  [0.0657] [0.0957] [0.1006] [0.0220] [0.0936] [0.0393] [0.0066] 
RAIN 0.0713 0.0454 0.0229 -0.0177 0.0059 0.0057 0.0250 
  (0.0029) (0.0814) (0.4048) (0.5578) (0.8698) (0.7654) (0.0155) 
  [0.2068] [0.1240] [0.0634] [0.0464] [0.0152] [0.0172] [0.0699] 
TEMP 0.0005 -0.0042 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0004 
  (0.8055) (0.0045) (0.2051) (0.7340) (0.7969) (0.1178) (0.3980) 
  [0.0260] [0.1918] [0.0852] [0.0314] [0.0180] [0.1179] [0.0275] 
         
Intercept 0.0307 0.4409 0.2632 0.0327 0.0625 0.0174 0.0974 
  (0.8625) (0.0003) (0.0226) (0.8136) (0.4699) (0.7654) (0.0150) 
R2 (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0002) 
N 8557 8317 8417 8432 8384 8617 101031 
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Table 4.5. Hedge Portfolio Profits during 1993-2012 by Temperature Region, Using Out-of-Sample Estimation 
 
This table reports the daily trading profits (in percentage) associated with the hedge portfolios. We present results for each temperature region (cold, 
mild and hot countries) as well as for an equal-weighted portfolio of these three regions.  In the out-of-sample estimation, we use the first half of the 
sample (1973-1992) as a start-up period to estimate the following OLS regression for each temperature region and month:  
rit = α + β1SKCit + β2SPDit + β3RAINit + β4SDit + β5TEMPit + εit. 
All weather variables are based on the average of hourly readings between 5:00 AM and 9:00 AM local time on the day of the measurement. Absolute 
returns greater than 2.5% are excluded from the sample for the estimation of the regression coefficients. We use the first set of estimated coefficients to 
predict the 1993 returns. We then expand the estimation period by one year, so that observations from 1973-1993 are used to predict 1994 returns, and 
so forth. We use the estimated coefficients and the weather variables to calculate daily predicted returns for each country. For each temperature region 
and each day, we form a hedge portfolio by taking a long position in the country with the highest predicted return and a short position in the country 
with the lowest predicted return. The daily return of the hedge portfolio is the difference between the realized returns of the long and short positions. In 
Panel A, trading is open for countries in both hemispheres. In Panel B, we exclude Southern Hemisphere countries before forming the hedge portfolio. 
Hedge profits are calculated for the period 1993-2012. Each panel presents the mean daily return from the hedge portfolio with its associated t-statistic, 
as well as the results from the regression of the daily returns of the hedge portfolio on the daily Datastream's world index return. T-statistics of the mean 
hedge returns and p-values of the regression coefficients use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to four lags. The number 
of observations and adjusted R-squared of each regression are also reported. Boldface indicates statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
 
Panel A: Both Hemispheres Tradable 
 
Panel B: Only Northern Hemisphere Tradable 
  Cold 
countries 
Mild 
countries 
Hot 
countries 
All 
regions 
 
  Cold 
countries 
Mild 
countries 
Hot 
countries 
All 
regions 
Mean hedge return 0.0553 0.0662 -0.0013 0.0392 
 
Mean hedge return 0.0552 0.0896 0.0308 0.0575 
T-statistic 2.5487 2.2641 -0.0494 2.6191 
 
T-statistic 2.4098 2.8047 1.0626 3.5243 
  
     
      
Alpha 0.0553 0.0664 -0.0016 0.0391 
 
Alpha 0.0542 0.0891 0.0300 0.0567 
(P-value) (0.0113) (0.0238) (0.9520) (0.0093) 
 
(P-value)  (0.0188) (0.0055) (0.3020) (0.0005) 
World return -0.0196 -0.1129 0.2053 0.0382 
 
World return 0.6962 0.3280 0.6126 0.5301 
(P-value) (0.9692) (0.8432) (0.7009) (0.9063) 
 
(P-value) (0.2025) (0.5711) (0.2636) (0.1259) 
  
     
      
R2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
R2 (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
N 4909 4923 4915 4948 
 
N 4901 4910 4917 4948 
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Table 4.6. Hedge Portfolio Profits during 1993-2012 by Time Zone, Using Out-of-Sample Estimation 
 
This table reports the daily trading profits (in percentage) associated with the hedge portfolios. We present results for each time zone (Americas, Asia-
Pacific, and Europe-Africa) as well as for an equal-weighted portfolio of the three time zones.  In the out-of-sample estimation, we use the first half of the 
sample (1973-1992) as a start-up period to estimate the following OLS regression for each temperature region and month: 
rit = α + β1SKCit + β2SPDit + β3RAINit + β4SDit + β5TEMPit + εit 
All weather variables are based on the average of hourly readings between 5:00 AM and 9:00 AM local time on the day of the measurement. Absolute 
returns greater than 2.5% are excluded from the sample for the estimation of the regression coefficients. We use the first set of estimated coefficients to 
predict the 1993 returns. We then expand the estimation period by one year, so that observations from 1973-1993 are used to predict 1994 returns, and so 
forth. We use the estimated coefficients and the weather variables to calculate daily predicted returns for each country. For each time zone and each day, 
we form a hedge portfolio by taking a long position in the country with the highest predicted return and a short position in the country with the lowest 
predicted return. The daily returns of the hedge portfolio is the difference between the realized returns of the long and short positions. In Panel A, trading 
is open for countries in both hemispheres. In Panel B, we exclude Southern Hemisphere countries before forming the hedge portfolio. Hedge profits are 
calculated for the period 1993-2012. Each panel presents the mean daily return from the hedge portfolio with its associated t-statistic, as well as the results 
from the regression of the daily returns of the hedge portfolio on the daily Datastream's world index return. T-statistics of the mean hedge returns and p-
values of the regression coefficients use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to four lags. The number of observations and 
adjusted R-squared of each regression are also reported. Boldface indicates statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
 
Panel A: Both Hemispheres Tradable 
 
Panel B: Only Northern Hemisphere Tradable 
  Americas Asia-
Pacific 
Europe-
Africa 
All 
regions 
 
  Americas Asia-
Pacific 
Europe-
Africa 
All 
regions 
Mean hedge return -0.0201 0.0174 0.0648 0.0205 
 
Mean hedge return 0.0125 0.0215 0.0478 0.0262 
T-statistic  -0.9374 0.6063 2.3773 1.4023 
 
T-statistic 0.5874 0.7204 1.6978 1.7463 
  
     
      
Alpha -0.0206 0.0177 0.0669 0.0211 
 
Alpha 0.0123 0.0213 0.0491 0.0265 
(P-value)  (0.3402) (0.5394) (0.0143) (0.1493) 
 
(P-value) (0.5664) (0.4776) (0.0817) (0.0788) 
World return 0.2925 -0.1869 -1.3943 -0.4256 
 
World return 0.1488 0.1584 -0.8426 -0.1672 
(P-value) (0.4875) (0.7564) (0.0047) (0.1358) 
 
(P-value) (0.7063) (0.7889) (0.0994) (0.5500) 
  
     
      
R2 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0005) 
 
R2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0001) 
N 4929 4918 4910 4951 
 
N 4908 4905 4905 4950 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
The three essays of this dissertation consider various ways in which human behavior interacts 
with corporations and financial markets. Anthropologists define culture as the full range of learned 
human behavior patterns (Tylor, 1871). The first essay thus examines the impact of differences in 
learned corporate behavior around mergers. Specifically, it relies on textual analysis of the 
acquirers’ and targets’ annual reports to estimate each merging firm’s corporate culture, and to 
then compute a measure of cultural distance between the acquirer and the target. The essay finds 
that while cultural distance relative to an acquirer reduces the probability that a firm will be 
selected as a target, upon the announcement, greater cultural distance is associated with positive 
combined acquirer and target abnormal announcement returns. However, the positive synergistic 
gains arise only if the acquirer is culturally stronger than its target, which is consistent with the 
interpretation that the acquirer is in a power position to culturally integrate the target, while 
benefiting from the diversity associated with the cultural differences. Post-merger improvements 
in industry-adjusted operating performance confirm the announcement returns results.  
The second essay, Does Stock Misvaluation Drive Merger Waves?, considers the 
consequences of large variations in industry-wide valuations ratios on the intensity of industry-
specific merger activity. Although the essay does not analyze the behavioral factors leading to 
such variations, it hypothesizes that if these variations represent deviations from stocks’ intrinsic 
value, then at the industry level, managers respond by using their misvalued stock as means of 
payment for a relatively-undervalued target. More precisely, the essay contrasts two hypotheses: 
the Q hypothesis predicts that merger activity is driven by synergy factors at the deal level and 
economic and regulatory shocks at the aggregate or industry level, whereas the misvaluation 
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hypothesis posits that stock misvaluation affects merger propensity and merger waves are triggered 
by sharp deviations of stock prices from fundamental values.  
To differentiate the two hypotheses, the essay uses two sets of industry-specific merger waves, 
“stock” waves defined on pure stock acquisitions, and “cash” waves formed on pure cash offers. 
The paper exploits the opposite predictions of the hypotheses by contrasting different metrics: 
valuation levels around stock and cash merger waves, the relation between industry valuation 
levels and the likelihood of the occurrence of a wave and the bidders’ long-run post-announcement 
abnormal returns. Using the evidence and the opposite predictions of the Q and misvaluation 
hypotheses regarding the patterns of valuation levels around waves and the post-announcement 
returns, the paper finds support for the misvaluation hypothesis.  
Finally, the third essay, Does the Weather Influence Global Stock Returns?, examines a direct 
link between investors’ psychology and financial markets. Indeed, the essay investigates the 
effects of five weather variables (sunshine, rain, wind, snow and temperature) on daily index 
returns of 49 countries from 1973 to 2012 and documents pervasive weather effects that are climate 
and season specific. A hedge strategy that exploits the predictability of daily weather generates 
significant out-of-sample gross profits. Furthermore, the patterns of weather effects are consistent 
with the interpretation that “comfortable weather”, which is contingent on climate and season, 
positively affects investors mood and that these effects are particularly strong when people spend 
more time outdoors. Taken together, these findings show that the weather effects are real rather 
than spurious, and that investors’ collective mood relates to financial markets.  
In short, the three essays included in this dissertation find that investors’ and workers’ 
psychology, behavior and culture interact significantly with corporate policies and financial 
markets. These findings raise further research questions. For example, does corporate culture 
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impact other corporate policies and if so, through which mechanisms? Is it possible to design a 
profitable trading strategy based on corporate culture? How do corporate culture and national 
culture interact and what are the marginal impact of each? And as a natural extension of this 
dissertation, how does culture moderate or modify the impact of investors psychology? Taken 
together, these questions constitute a rich agenda for future research.  
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Appendix A1. Parsing the 10-K Forms 
 
The following Appendix provides a detailed description of the parsing method applied to 
obtain cultural scores from forms 10-K. 
I first retrieved annual reports (forms 10-K and 10-K405) from SEC’s EDGAR FTP server, 
in text or HTML format. I used a text parsing software to convert all characters into lowercase 
characters and contractions into full-form expressions (for example, “don’t” into “do not”). I then 
remove punctuation, html tags and stop words, using Python’s Natural Language Tool Kit’s list of 
stop words.112 I deliberately keep negation words (no, not, neither, none, nobody, nowhere, nor, never) 
in the text, to make adjustments for semantical negation possible. I remove morphological affixes 
from words in the remaining text with Python’s Natural Language Tool Kit’s English Snowball 
Stemmer algorithm.113 Finally, tables and appendixes to the financial statements are removed.  
I follow Tetlock (2007) and compute the frequency of the lexical fields’ words in the parsed 
10-Ks, net of the frequency of the negated form of each word (for example: the net frequency for 
“known” is the total count of the string “known”, minus the occurrences of the strings “unknown” 
and “unbeknownst”). Following Audi, Loughran and MacDonald (2016), I also adjust for common 
idioms. For instance, the expression “with respect to” does not count toward the frequency count 
of “respect”. Finally, I divide each word’s frequency count by the total number of words in the 
parsed 10-K forms.  
                                                          
112 The list of stop words that I used contains the following words: through, itself, any, to, our, and, theirs, because, 
few, some, of, how, have, same, on, above, who, or, were, only, my, more, while, from, such, up, was, whom, having, 
each, at, me, they, yourself, these, about, again, against, should, down, them, then, myself, those, do, you, out, all, the, 
does, during, your, an, am, him, into, ourselves, where, own, by, his, as, what, very, we, there, but, their, them, did, 
doing, can, just, being, its, yours, herself, has, is, than, below, are, if, why, hers, had, in, s, himself, before, this, she, 
will, been, it, once, I, yourselves, for, a, her, both, further, when, under, now, over, between, with, that, until, after, be, 
so. 
113 I obtain similar results if I lemmatize (using Python’s WordNet’s English lemmatizer) the words instead of 
stemming. 
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Appendix A2. Lexical Fields 
Framework Dimension Lexical Field 
Cameron 
et al. 
(2006),  
O’Reilly et 
al (1991) 
Collaborate affiliation, alliance, assist, association, certitude, chief, cohesion, collaboration, collegiality, combination, communion, 
community, connection, cooperation, coordination, detail, document, efficacy, efficiency, federation, fellowship, help, human, 
inform, involve, joint, kinship, liaison, logic, method, mutualism, oneness, outcoming, participation, partnership, people, 
predict, quality, receive, reciprocity, relation, relationship, service, share, solidarity, solution, solve, standard, supportive, 
symbiosis, synergy, team, teamwork, teamwork, togetherness, train, uniform, unity, work 
 
Cameron 
et al. 
(2006) 
Compete accord, achieve, acquire, aggressive, agreement, attack, benefit, budget, challenge, charge, client, compete, customer, deliver, 
direct, drive, earn, end, excellent, expand, fast, gain, goal, growth, hard, invest, market, move, outsource, performance, 
position, present, pressure, profit, rapid, reputation, result, return, revenue, satisfaction, scan, success, signal, speed, strong, 
superior, target, win 
 
Create acclimatize, accommodate, adapt, adjust, begin, catalyze, change, commence, convert, create, cultivate, design, develop, 
discontinue, dream, elaborate, encourage, engender, entrepreneur, envision, establish, experiment, fantasy, father, foster, 
freedom, future, generate, idea, inaugurate, induce, initiation, innovation, install, institute, intellectual, introduce, invoke, 
launch, learn, make, new, nourish, nurture, original, pioneer, prediction, produce, promote, prompt, radical, risk, start, style, 
tailor, thought, trend, unafraid, venture, vision  
 
Control accelerate, acceptance, accession, accomplished, accord, accustom, additional, address, adept, adhesion, adroitness, alliance, 
approval, aptitude, assent, assist, assurance, capable, charge, collective, commanding, commit, competence, concurrence, 
conditions, conflict, consensus, control, culture, decentralization, deftness, delegation, directing, embrace, employee, 
empowerment, engage, expectation, expedite, experienced, expert, facilitator, fortify, govern, grant, habituate, hasten, hire, 
hurry, improve, instinct, instruct, interpersonal, involve, long-term, loyal, manage, mandate, master, mentor, monitor, mutual, 
norm, operations, ordering, orientate, parent, participation, power, prepared, procedure, process, productive, proficient, 
qualified, quicken, require, resourcefulness, retain, retention, seasoned, simplify, skill, smooth, social, speed, straighten, 
streamline, supervise, talent, tension, trained, unanimity, unanimous, unison, usage, usefulness, value 
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Appendix A2 (Continued). Lexical Fields 
Framework Dimension Lexical Field 
O’Reilly et 
al (1991) 
Adaptability adapt, chance, experience, fast-moving, flexible, groundbreak, innovate, modern, opportune, quick to take advantage, risk-
taking, taking in, try out 
 Customer-
orientation 
client, custom, customer-oriented, customers first, hear, listen, market-driven 
 Attention to 
Detail 
analytical, calibre, detail, item, lineament, paying attention to detail, point, precis, quality, select, tone 
 
 Integrity appropriate, correct, decency, decor, decorum, ethic, etiquette, fair, good, high ethical standard, honest, honor, honour, 
incorrupt, integral, irreproachable, lesson, moral, nicety, probity, pure, rectitude, reward, right, right-minded, righteous, 
scrupulous, true, upright, virtuous, whole 
 Results-
orientation 
achievement, achievement-oriented, carrying into act, expect, high expectations for perform, not calm, not easy go, perform, 
prospect, public present, results-oriented 
 Transparency individual goals are transparent, partake in, share-out, sharing information freely, transparent 
Hofstede 
(1980) 
Individualism case, character, character refer, distinct, distinguishing characteristic, harden, humour, ident, identity, idiosyncrasy, 
independent, indistinguishable, individual, irritable, lineament, manner, mollify, normal, one, peculiar, person, persona, rarity, 
self-ident, selfhood, separate, severalty, single, singular, straightforward, surlier, temper, tough, unique, unity 
 Masculinity achievement, assert, bold, boy, boyish, brave, brave out, caveman, courage, entire, gay, hardier, hearty, heroism, hoyden, 
human, intensity level, isle of man, machismo, macho, male, male person, man, manhood, manly, masculine, military 
personnel, muscular, posture, self-assert, sheer, stallion, strength, sturdy, succeed, success, tomboy, unfear, valiant, vigor, vim, 
viril, zip 
 Uncertainty 
avoidance 
abid, accord, ambiguous, average, banner, bromide, commonplace, conform, decree, disquietude, dubious, equivocal, 
exemplar, find, formula, good example, intend, jurisprudence, law, law of nature, legal philosophy, linguistic rule, mean, 
meanspirit, medial, median, mental reject, monetary standard, natural law, norm, normal, ordinary, par, practice of law, 
precarious, prescript, prevail, queasy, receive, regulate, rein, rigid, rule, ruler, sceptic, skeptic, stand for, standard, status quo, 
stiff, stock, strict, suspicious, suspicion, think, tight, touchstone, unbend, uncertainty, uncomfortable, uneasy, unglamourous, 
unorthodox, well-worn 
 Power 
distance 
admit, arrest, assurance, author, bear, center, command, concord, contain, control, custody, dictate, direct, dominate, dominion, 
eminence, exclusive right, force, give, go for, grasp, grip, hierarchy, higher-rank, hold, hold back, hold up, imperium, index, 
instruct, keep, manage, master, moderate, note, nurse, obligate, obtain, overtop, pecking order, personnel, power, power 
distance, predominance, prepotency, prerogative, prevail, program line, ram, reign, require*, rule, sanction, say-so, shake, 
sovereignty, spellbind, storage area, strength, subordinate, suitcase*, superior, superordinate, superpower, supremacy, sure, 
sway, take for, take hold, thrust, tilt, tycoon, verify, wait, way 
This table presents the non-stemmed lexical fields used to compute corporate culture scores by matching these fields to the lemmatized reviews or 10-K 
forms. The initial lexical fields come from descriptions included in the listed frameworks and from Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) for the Cameron et al. (2006) 
lists. I extend all lexical fields using WordNet’s synonyms, with an imposed path similarity threshold of 0.10. 
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Appendix A3. Cultural Scores for Selected Companies 
Panel A. Creativity Panel B. Competitiveness 
1 Bio Rad Laboratories 1 Getty Realty Corp. 
2 Texas Instruments 2 Colonial Gas 
3 Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings 3 Citizens South Banking 
… … …  
83713 Midwestone Financial Corp. 83713 Patient Safety Technologies 
83714 Rurban Financial Group 83714 Paradigm Holdings 
83715 First Place Financial Corp. 83715 First Place Financial Corp. 
    
Panel C. Control Panel D. Collaboration 
1 Laclede Steel Co. 1 FFP Partners LP. 
2 V.F. Corp. 2 Radioshack Corp. 
3 Convergys Group 3 Lifepoint Hospitals Inc. 
…  …  
83713 Orbital Sciences Corp. 83713 Albemarle Corp. 
83714 Micros Systems 83714 First Place Financial Corp. 
83715 Patient Safety Technologies 83715 Greenman Brothers Inc. 
This table gives examples of the highest and lowest ranked firms in terms of each of the four cultural 
value scores (Cameron et al., 2006). Panel A presents the ranking for creativity, whereas Panels B, C 
and D do so for Competitiveness, Control and Collaboration, respectively. The ranking was done across 
the full, pooled sample and in the perspective of mentioning more firms, I deleted the repeat firms 
within the same category.  
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Appendix A4. Randomization and Placebo Tests. 
 
As a further robustness test to ensure that cultural scores provide value-relevant 
information about the firm, I perform placebo tests. More specifically, I randomized the cultural 
scores assigned to each sample firm by assigning, for each firm-year and each cultural attribute, a 
cultural score ci selected randomly from a normal distribution N(xi, θi), where xi is the non-
randomized sample mean score for cultural attribute i and θi is the standard deviation of the non-
randomized cultural score i in the full sample. I randomly assign scores for each of the four cultural 
attributes (i = create, compete, control or collaboration). This process is repeated 1,000 times and 
for each firm-year and each cultural score, the average value is retained. The (randomized) cultural 
scores are then treated as described in Section 2.2.  
I re-estimate Table 2.2 using the randomized cultural scores; Panel A of Appendix A5 
presents the results. Appendix A5, Panel A, shows that none of the randomized cultural scores is 
significantly related to the observable outputs that in theory relates to the cultural values measured. 
Therefore, the results of Table 2.2 do not seem to be caused by spurious correlations. In fact, a 
strong argument against the possibility of spurious correlations is the finding that for each 
regression, the economic impact114 is largest precisely for the cultural score that according to 
Cameron et al.’s (2006) framework, theoretically associates with the observable output in the 
dependent variable. I thus conclude that in spite of the noise with which they are estimated, the 
cultural scores constructed by textual analysis provide value-relevant information about firm-
specific intangibles. 
To further confirm this interpretation, I conduct additional robustness tests to ensure that 
the cultural variables do not reduce to noisy proxy variables for the observable accounting 
                                                          
114 The economic impact is calculated as the change in the dependent variable associated with a change from the 10th 
to the 90th percentile in the distribution of cultural score i while maintaining the other variables at their sample mean. 
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variables they associate with. Namely, I develop a lexical field for R&D (associated with Create), 
employees (Collaboration), profitability (Compete) and turnover (Control). The lexical fields are 
developed using Merriam-Webster and WordNet thesauruses. Appendix A6 presents the lexical 
fields; bolded words are words common in both the accounting variable lexical field, and in the 
lexical field of the cultural value associated with the observable accounting measure. Appendix 
A6 shows that for any cultural value, no more than three words overlap with the associated 
accounting measure’s lexical fields.  
I then re-estimate the raw cultural scores, but using non-overlapping words only. Panel B 
of Appendix A5 shows that the adjusted cultural scores retain their association with observable 
accounting variables. More specifically, using the economic significance to gauge the strength of 
the association of a cultural variable with an observable accounting variable, Create remains the 
variable with the strongest association with R&D expenses and similarly, Collaboration, Compete 
and Control are the cultural attributes with the highest correlations to, respectively, the number of 
employees, operating profit margin and total asset turnover. In addition, main results of this paper 
remain when using the cultural scores adjusted for common words (results untabulated). In short, 
evidence supports the interpretation that cultural scores provide value-relevant information beyond 
the informational contents of accounting variables associated with the cultural values.   
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Appendix A5. Placebo Tests. 
Panel A. Randomization of Cultural Variables 
 Dependent variable 
 R&D/AT 
(1) 
Employees/AT 
(2) 
EBIT/Sale 
(3) 
Turnover 
(4) 
CREATE -0.3542 3.8208 1.1911 -1.4156 
 (0.2471) (0.3677) (0.7316) (0.6548) 
 [-0.0043] [0.0462] [0.0144] [-0.0171] 
COLLABORATION -0.0925 1.7235 2.1481 1.0927 
 (0.6435) (0.5340) (0.3432) (0.5973) 
 [-0.0017] [0.0323] [0.0403] [0.0205] 
COMPETE -0.1729 2.0699 1.2024 -2.6514 
 (0.2676) (0.3341) (0.4965) (0.1005) 
 [-0.0042] [0.0501] [0.0291] [-0.0642] 
CONTROL -0.1647 0.5372 -0.2924 0.0181 
 (0.2003) (0.7634) (0.9840) (0.9892) 
 [-0.0047] [0.0154] [-0.0084] [0.0005] 
Intercept 0.0358 0.4527 -0.0252 0.0742 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.8787) (<0.001) 
R-Square 0.0002 0.0011 0.0007 0.0014 
N 2252 2109 2244 2252 
Panel B. Cultural Variables, Adjusted for Common Words 
 Dependent variable 
 R&D/AT 
(1) 
Employees/AT 
(2) 
EBIT/Sale 
(3) 
Turnover 
(4) 
CREATE 0.1642 -0.3826 -1.1482 0.0393 
 (0.0097) (0.0064) (0.3673) (0.7209) 
 [0.0485] [-0.1131] [-0.3394] [0.0116] 
COLLABORATION 0.0001 0.3554 -2.7029 0.2559 
 (0.9876) (0.0098) (0.0292) (0.0165) 
 [0.0001] [0.1469] [-1.1175] [0.1058] 
COMPETE 0.0404 0.1855 2.0485 0.2942 
 (0.0001) (0.2133) (0.1296) (0.0112) 
 [0.0151] [0.0695] [0.7672] [0.1102] 
CONTROL 0.021 0.2503 0.2104 0.2599 
 (0.0047) (0.0204) (0.8298) (0.0021) 
 [0.0117] [0.1391] [0.1169] [0.1445] 
Intercept 0.0326 0.3513 -0.0900 0.6596 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.6671) (0.0001) 
R-Square 0.1723 0.0228 0.0012 0.0383 
N 2115 1996 2109 2115 
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Appendix A5 (Continued). Placebo Tests. 
This Table reports the results of the OLS estimation of the following model:  
Outputit+1 = α + Createit + Collaborationit + Competeit + Controlit, where cultural scores and outputs are 
measured for each firm-year it.  
Each column uses a different output variable. In Column 1, the dependent variable is the R&D expenses scaled 
by total assets. Column 2’s dependent variable is the number of employees (in thousands), scaled by total 
assets. Column 3 uses the Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), scaled by total sales, and in Column 4, 
the dependent variable is the asset turnover, measured as EBIT scaled by total assets.  
 
Panel A presents the results when the cultural scores are the randomized cultural scores. The Internet 
Appendix describes how they are generated. Panel B presents the results when the cultural scores are adjusted 
for the presence of common words between the cultural value lexical field and the lexical field of the 
accounting variable associated with the cultural value. The Internet Appendix has more details.  
 
The number of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) and 
economic significance [in brackets] are also reported. Economic significance is calculated as the change in 
the dependent variable that is associated with a change from the 10th to the 90th percentile in the independent 
variables, while maintaining the other independent variables at their sample mean. Boldfaced coefficients and 
associated p-values indicate statistical significance at the 5% level or higher. 
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Appendix A6. Overlapping of Lexical Fields 
Accounting 
Measure 
Associated Cultural 
Value  
Lexical Field 
R&D Create addition, advance, audit, augment, better, blossom, challenge, check, checkup, cross-examination, delve, 
diagnosis, disquisition, elaborate, emerge, enhance, evolution, evolve, examen, examine, expansion, 
explore, feeler, flourish, flower, going-over, grill, growth, hear, improve, incubate, inquest, inquiry, 
inquisitive, inspect, interrogate, investigate, mature, maturity, metamorphosis, perfect, poll, probation, 
probe, probe, progress, progress, query, quest, question, questionaries, questionnaire, quiz, refine, rehear, 
reinvestigate, ripen, self-examination, self-explore, self-quest, self-reflect, self-scrutinize, soul-search, 
study, supplement, survey, trial 
 
Employees Collaboration assist, associate, cog, colleague, coworker, drudge, flunky, gandy dancer, grub, hack, hand, hireling, 
jobber, jobholder, labor, navvy, nine-to-fiver, retain, subordinate, temp, temporary, toiler, underling, 
wage earn, wage slave, wageworker, worker, workingman, workingwoman, workman, workwoman, 
yes-man 
Profitability Compete advantage, bankable, beneficial, economy, fat, favor, gain, juicy, lucrative, money-maker, money-spin, 
pay, remuneration, reward, use, worthwhile 
Turnover Control abandon, abnegate, cede, commit, consign, cough up, deliver, desert, discard, entrust, forfeit, forsake, 
give up, hand over, intrust, lay down, part, release, relinquish, render, renounce, resign, shed, surrender, 
transfer, turn in, waive, yield 
This table presents the lexical fields, developed using Merriam-Webster and WordNet thesauruses, that associate with observable accounting 
measures. The first column lists the accounting measures, while the second column lists the cultural values associated with each observable 
accounting measure. The last column presents the lexical fields associated with each accounting measure. Words in bold are also part of the lexical 
field for the associated cultural value. 
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Appendix A7. Sample Selection 
N Selection Criteria 
3,249 Domestic U.S. mergers and acquisitions announced between 1994 and 2014, between 
public firms, worth at least fifty million dollars and 1% of the acquirer’s pre-
announcement market capitalization and that resulted in a change in control.  
1,817 CD can be estimated: valid 10-K forms (filed before the announcement and parsed 
10-K forms have at least 1,000 words) are available for both the acquirer and the 
target. 
1,427 Accounting information is available for both the acquirer and the target. 
1,133 Market-to-Book ratios of equity are available and positive for both the acquirer and 
the target; Cumulative announcement returns can be estimated for both the acquirer 
and the target. 
1,133 Final sample for which the full model can be estimate 
This table describes the sample construction and the various filters imposed successively in order to 
construct the final sample. 
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Appendix A8. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
CAR(-t, t) Acquirer’s cumulative three- or seven-day abnormal returns, centered around the 
announcement date. 
COMBINED(-t, t) Combined acquirer’s and target’s cumulative three- or seven-day abnormal returns 
centered around the announcement date. The combined returns are an average of the 
acquirer’s and target’s abnormal returns, weighted by their respective market 
capitalization, four weeks before the announcement. 
CD Cultural distance between the acquirer and the target, calculated as the Euclidean 
distance along Cameron et al’s (2006) four dimensions of corporate culture (create, 
compete, control, collaborate).  
COMPLETED Indicator variable that equals one if the acquisition is completed, and zero 
otherwise. 
DAYS_TO_COMPLETE Number of days between the announcement date and the date the acquisition deal 
becomes effective. 
DEAL_VALUE Acquisition value, in million dollars.  
DIFF_TAX Natural logarithm of 1 plus the absolute difference in corporate tax rates between the 
acquirer’s and the target’s states. 
DIFF_WB Natural logarithm of the difference between Gallup-Healthways well-being scores. 
Yearly, Gallup-Healthways ranks states according to a well-being index; the 
difference is the difference in ranks between the states where the acquirer and the 
targets are headquartered. 
DIV_DEAL Indicator variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and the target do not share the same 2-
digit SIC code. 
FRIENDLY Indicator variable that equals 1 if the deal’s attitude is friendly, and zero otherwise. 
Deal attitude comes from Thompson SDC Platinum.  
GEO_DISTANCE Natural logarithm of the straight line distance, in miles, between the capital cities 
of the states where the acquirer and the target are headquartered. 
MB Acquirer’s Market-to-Book equity ratio, calculated using month-end values of the 
month immediately prior to the acquisition announcement. 
MB_TARGET Target’s Market-to-Book equity ratio, calculated using month-end values of the month 
immediately prior to the acquisition announcement. 
MERGER_FORM Indicator variable that equals 1 if the transaction form is a merger, and zero otherwise.  
MERGER OF EQUALS Indicator variable that equals 1 if the transaction is classified as a merger of equals in 
SDC database, and zero otherwise. 
MKT_CAP Natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market capitalization, measured at the end of the 
month preceding the acquisition announcement. 
MKTCAP Acquirer’s market capitalization, in billions, measured at the end of the month 
preceding the acquisition announcement. 
PURE_CASH Indicator variable that equals 1 the acquisition was entirely paid in cash. 
PURE_STOCK Indicator variable that equals 1 the acquisition was entirely paid in stock. 
REL_SIZE Deal value, relative to the acquirer’s pre-announcement market capitalization. 
SAME_POLITIC Indicator variable that equals 1 if the acquirer’s state governor is of the same 
political allegiance as the state governor of the target’s state. 
SAME_REL Indicator variable that equals 1 if the proportion of Catholics is above the national 
median in both the acquirer’s and the target’s states. 
SCORE_HP Hoberg and Phillips’s (2010 and 2015) measure of product similarity. 
TOEHOLD Percentage of target shares held by the acquirer at the announcement. 
UNSOLICITED Indicator variable that equals 1 if the transaction is described as a merger of equals in 
SDC, and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix A9. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
  24-month BHAR 36-month BHAR 
 
All Strong Acq. Weak Acq.  All Strong Acq. Weak Acq. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CD 1.6643 2.0758 1.7091 3.5563 4.0754 3.2654 
 
(0.0036) (0.0000) (0.0548) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0196) 
 
[0.1795] [0.2135] [0.1914] [0.2215] [0.2347] [0.2175] 
REL_SIZE 0.0548 0.0153 0.1053 0.1427 0.1697 0.1313 
  (0.1878) (0.6376) (0.2234) (0.1277) (0.0743) (0.3753) 
MKT_CAP -0.0296 -0.0404 -0.0133 -0.0573 -0.0783 -0.0364 
  (0.1536) (0.1858) (0.7412) (0.0532) (0.1763) (0.3950) 
PURE_STOCK -0.1398 -0.2662 0.0155 -0.2792 -0.481 -0.0323 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8246) (0.0000) (0.0064) (0.8148) 
PURE_CASH 0.1827 0.2103 0.0802 0.1941 0.1834 0.0575 
  (0.0071) (0.0469) (0.2917) (0.0110) (0.2857) (0.7351) 
DIV_DEAL -0.0477 -0.014 -0.1265 0.0247 0.0703 -0.062 
  (0.5937) (0.9001) (0.2638) (0.6244) (0.1365) (0.6842) 
FRIENDLY -0.0529 -0.0547 -0.0635 -0.0301 -0.1507 -0.0115 
  (0.5854) (0.5526) (0.5749) (0.8631) (0.5854) (0.9508) 
MB -0.0362 -0.0396 -0.0305 -0.0554 -0.0507 -0.0569 
  (0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0070) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0001) 
MB_TARGET -0.0072 -0.0002 -0.0191 -0.0165 -0.0107 -0.0255 
  (0.2004) (0.9784) (0.0015) (0.1327) (0.2641) (0.0939) 
DIFF_WB -0.0078 -0.0683 0.0329 0.0313 0.0345 0.0481 
  (0.8366) (0.4747) (0.6016) (0.5361) (0.7419) (0.5682) 
DIFF_TAX -0.1182 -0.1083 -0.1697 -0.0434 -0.0025 -0.121 
  (0.1836) (0.2954) (0.1504) (0.7517) (0.9894) (0.4827) 
SAME_POLITIC 0.0598 0.0359 0.1186 0.0588 0.1163 0.0374 
  (0.0168) (0.5454) (0.0003) (0.4075) (0.3129) (0.6074) 
SAME_REL -0.048 -0.0388 -0.1377 -0.1235 -0.3235 -0.0233 
  (0.2694) (0.5531) (0.2579) (0.1403) (0.0663) (0.8510) 
GEO_DISTANCE 0.0192 0.0356 0.0099 0.0106 -0.0148 0.0311 
  (0.1609) (0.1858) (0.6374) (0.7227) (0.7126) (0.5199) 
INTERCEPT -0.1194 0.319 -0.5616 -0.2518 0.4292 -0.7236 
  (0.4108) (0.4279) (0.0111) (0.3764) (0.5852) (0.0138) 
              
R-square (0.1994) (0.2673) (0.2106) (0.2231) (0.2602) (0.2667) 
N 903 477 421 903 477 421 
State Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Appendix A9. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the OLS estimation of the model:  Post-Bid Abnormal Returnit = β1(CDijt) + β2(Xijt) + εit  
The dependent variable is the acquirer’s 24-month or 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns, calculate as 
the difference between acquirers’ buy-and-hold (24) 36-month returns and the compound return of an equally 
weighted portfolio matched on size and book-to-market. Xijt is a vector of acquirer and target deal control 
variables and includes: relative size of the acquisition, acquirers’ pre-announcement market capitalization, 
pure stock offer indicator, pure cash offer indicator, diversifying deal indicator, friendly deal indicator, 
acquirer’s pre-announcement market-to-book ratio of equity, target’s pre-announcement equity market-to-
book ratio, state-level differences in well-being index, state-level differences in marginal corporate tax rate, 
state-level difference in state GDP, differences in the state-wide proportion of Catholics, state-level , indicator 
variable, logarithm of the distance in miles between state capitals. All variables are defined in Appendix A8.  
 
Columns 1 to 3 present the results where the dependent variable are the 24-month BHAR, whereas Columns 
4 to 6 repeat the analysis using the 36-month BHAR as the dependent variable. Results are shown for the full 
sample (Columns 1 and 4), as well as for the strong-culture subsample (Columns 2 and 5) and weak-culture 
subsample (Columns 3 and 6).. Strong (weak) culture acquirers are those where the highest of their four, 
normalized, cultural values is larger (smaller) than the highest of their target’s four, normalized, cultural 
values. 
 
The number of observations and R-squared of each regression are also reported. P-values (in parentheses) are 
calculated using standard errors clustered by both industry and year. Economic significance [in brackets] is 
calculated as the change in the dependent variable that results from a one-standard deviation change in cultural 
distance, while maintaining the other independent variables at their sample means. Acquirers’ industry and 
state indicator variables are included in the regressions. Boldfaced coefficients and associated p-values 
indicate statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
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Appendix B1. Estimation Procedure of VP 
 
We follow Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) and estimate VP ratios, for each month t, 
as the ratio of V(t) and P(t), where V(t) is the residual income model price in month t and P(t) is 
the market price at the end of month t. We use a three-period forecast horizon to estimate V(t):  
𝑉(𝑡) = 𝐵(𝑡) +
[𝑓𝑅𝑂𝐸(𝑡+1)−𝑟𝑒(𝑡)]𝐵(𝑡)
1+𝑟𝑒(𝑡)
+
[𝑓𝑅𝑂𝐸(𝑡+2)−𝑟𝑒(𝑡)]𝐵(𝑡+1)
[1+𝑟𝑒(𝑡)]2
+
[𝑓𝑅𝑂𝐸(𝑡+3)−𝑟𝑒(𝑡)]𝐵(𝑡+2)
[1+𝑟𝑒(𝑡)]2𝑟𝑒(𝑡)
, 
where fROE(t+1) is the forecasted return on equity for period t+1 and the length of a period is 1 
year. The last term discounts the residual income of period t+3 as a perpetuity.  
 We compute forecasted returns on equity as  
𝑓𝑅𝑂𝐸(𝑡 + 𝑖) =
𝑓𝐸𝑃𝑆(𝑡+𝑖)
[𝐵(𝑡+𝑖−1)+𝐵(𝑡+1−2)]/2
, 
where fEPS(t+i) is the forecasted earnings per share (EPS) for period t+i. We delete observations 
where the forecasted ROE is greater than one. We compute future book values of equity as 
𝐵(𝑡 + 𝑖) = 𝐵(𝑡 + 𝑖 − 1) + (1 −
𝐷(𝑡)
𝐸𝑃𝑆(𝑡)
) 𝑓𝐸𝑃𝑆(𝑡 + 𝑖), 
where D(t) is the dividend for period t and EPS(t) is the earnings per share for the same period. 
When EPS(t) is negative, we follow Lee et al. (1999) and divide dividends by (0.06 × total assets), 
which implicitly assumes that earnings are on average 6% of total assets. We delete observations 
with a dividend payout ratio D(t)/EPS(t) greater than one.  
 We estimate the annualized cost of equity, re(t), using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), where the time-t beta is estimated using the trailing five years (or, if there is not enough 
data, at least two years) of monthly return data. The market risk premium is the average annual 
premium over the risk-free rate of the CRSP value-weighted index and is estimated using the 
preceding 30 years. We winsorize CAPM costs of capital that lie outside the range of 5-20%, so 
that outliers take the border values of that range. 
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Appendix B2. Book-Price Ratio of Acquirers across Different Phases of Merger Waves, by Type of Acquisition 
Panel A: 1981-2010, stock waves  
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions (4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N BP  N BP  N BP  N BP  N BP  N BP 
1) All (including 
non-wave industries) 
6770 0.4302  2612 0.4373  2156 0.3769  1741 0.3319  1806 0.4384  1135 0.3720 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 704 0.4178  307 0.4579  220 0.3164  254 0.3639  135 0.3979  163 0.4270 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
3) In-wave 1165 0.3298  542 0.3496  366 0.2658  596 0.2576  161 0.3815  378 0.2852 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 689 0.3995  317 0.4303  208 0.3028  248 0.2892  126 0.5086  156 0.3403 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
786 0.4595  324 0.4823  209 0.4204  297 0.3798  165 0.4666  188 0.4258 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
4323 0.4643  1481 0.4682  1391 0.4272  676 0.4044  1403 0.4411  458 0.4402 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-wave 
(5 - 3) 
 0.1297   0.1328   0.1546   0.1222   0.0851   0.1406 
p-value of difference  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0046)   (0.0000) 
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Appendix B2 (Continued). Book-Price Ratio of Acquirers across Different Phases of Merger Waves, by Type of Acquisition 
Panel B: 1981-2010, cash waves  
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N BP  N BP  N BP  N BP  N BP  N BP 
1) All (including 
non-wave 
industries) 
6770 0.4302  2612 0.4373  2156 0.3769  1741 0.3319  1806 0.4384  1135 0.3720 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 1268 0.4278  501 0.4507  434 0.3885  339 0.3556  277 0.4337  222 0.3977 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
3) In-wave 1750 0.3945  688 0.4239  547 0.3376  412 0.3306  596 0.4181  264 0.3853 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 1151 0.4387  472 0.4658  389 0.3507  345 0.3626  292 0.4640  233 0.4235 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
1494 0.4567  614 0.4310  420 0.4468  469 0.3258  309 0.4220  317 0.3433 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
2712 0.4509  986 0.4286  815 0.4104  678 0.3086  660 0.4444  436 0.3290 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-
wave (5 - 3) 
 0.0622   0.0071   0.1091   -0.0048   0.0040   -0.0420 
p-value of difference  (0.0000)   (0.6783)   (0.0000)   (0.8038)   (0.8421)   (0.0995) 
This table reports the acquirers' mean Book-Price (BP) ratios. We sort the bidders according to the timing of the announcement date relative to the industry-
specific waves. The pre-wave period includes the year before the beginning of the wave, the in-wave period includes the two years of the wave, and the post-
wave period spans the three years following the end of the wave. Non-wave periods cover the rest of the time period. Panel A reports the results using the stock 
waves (industry merger waves defined using only pure stock offers), whereas Panel B reports the results using the cash waves (industry merger waves defined 
using only pure cash offers). We report the mean market-book ratios for each category, along with the number of observations and p-value associated with the 
t-test for statistical difference from zero. We winsorize the BP at the 95th level. The bottom part of each panel shows the results of a t-test for difference in 
mean BP ratios of non-wave acquirers (line 5) and in-wave acquirers (line 3).  
 
We report the mean acquirer BP ratios for: all types of acquisitions (column 1), the acquisitions of public and private targets (columns 2 and 3), the pure stock 
and pure cash acquisitions (columns 4 and 5), and public acquirers that made a pure stock offer for a public target (column 6). P-values measuring whether 
mean values are significantly different from zero are presented in parentheses. Boldfaced differences in mean BP ratios are significant at the 5% level or higher. 
For ease of reading, we do not use boldface for simple mean BP ratios, even when they are significantly different from zero.   
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Appendix B3. RKRV Valuation Measure of Acquirers, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of Acquisition 
Panel A: 1981-2010, stock waves 
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N RKRV  N RKRV  N RKRV  N RKRV  N RKRV  N RKRV 
1) All (including 
non-wave industries) 
8920 2.9074  3132 2.9866  2822 3.0326  1915 3.4050  2321 2.9086  1235 3.3460 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 2355 2.9598  949 3.1737  773 2.9699  879 3.5381  375 2.7570  551 3.4981 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
3) In-wave 2355 2.9598  949 3.1737  773 2.9699  879 3.5381  375 2.7570  551 3.4981 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 798 3.2938  344 3.4025  235 3.3518  271 3.7744  146 3.0324  167 3.6105 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
904 2.2937  370 1.8013  247 2.6349  318 3.1141  169 3.0631  207 3.0649 
 (0.0000)   (0.0781)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
5767 2.8325  1839 2.8122  1814 3.0179  765 3.1212  1800 2.9301  517 3.0984 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-wave 
(5 - 3) 
 -0.8837   -1.5224   -0.5549   -0.5702   0.1188   -0.5762 
p-value of difference  (0.0409)   (0.1384)   (0.0084)   (0.0000)   (0.6365)   (0.0000) 
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Appendix B3 (Continued). RKRV Valuation Measure of Acquirers, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of Acquisition 
Panel B: 1981-2010, cash waves 
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N RKRV  N RKRV  N RKRV  N RKRV  N RKRV  N RKRV 
1) All (including 
non-wave 
industries) 
8920 2.9074  3132 2.9866  2822 3.0326  1915 3.4050  2321 2.9086  1235 3.3460 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 3927 3.0675  1402 2.9673  1281 3.1496  805 3.3617  1063 3.2946  510 3.2599 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
3) In-wave 3927 3.0675  1402 2.9673  1281 3.1496  805 3.3617  1063 3.2946  510 3.2599 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
4) Post-wave 1481 2.9082  548 2.6637  492 3.2098  372 3.4584  397 2.4679  245 3.2232 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
1898 2.7287  708 3.0695  557 2.6879  491 3.3337  407 3.2565  335 3.3628 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
3512 2.7281  1182 3.1592  1049 2.8065  738 3.4253  861 2.6352  480 3.5001 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-
wave (5 - 3) 
 -0.3107   0.2107   -0.5491   -0.1606   0.0116   -0.0492 
p-value of difference  (0.1340)   (0.6639)   (0.0062)   (0.1299)   (0.9499)   (0.7383) 
This table reports the acquirers' mean Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (RKRV) (2005) misvaluation measures. We sort the bidders according to the 
timing of the announcement date relative to the industry-specific waves. The pre-wave period includes the year before the beginning of the wave, the in-wave 
period includes the two years of the wave, and the post-wave period spans the three years following the end of the wave. Non-wave periods cover the rest of 
the time period. Panel A reports the results using the stock waves (industry merger waves defined using only pure stock offers), whereas Panel B reports the 
results using the cash waves (industry merger waves defined using only pure cash offers). We report the mean market-book ratios for each category, along 
with the p-value associated with the t-test for statistical difference from zero. The bottom part of each panel shows the results of a t-test for difference in mean 
RKRV measures of non-wave acquirers (line 5) and in-wave acquirers (line 3).  
We report the acquirer’s mean RKRV measures for: all types of acquisitions (column 1), the acquisitions of public and private targets (columns 2 and 3), the 
pure stock and pure cash acquisitions (columns 4 and 5), and public acquirers that made a pure stock offer for a public target (column 6). P-values are presented 
in parentheses. Boldfaced differences in mean market-book ratios and associated p-values are significant at the 5% level or higher. For ease of reading, we do 
not use boldface characters for simple mean RKRV measures, even when they are significantly different from zero.   
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Appendix B4. Post-Announcement Acquirer 5-Year Raw Return, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of Acquisition 
Panel A: 1981-2009, stock waves  
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N Return  N Return  N Return  N Return  N Return  N Return 
1) All (including non-
wave industries) 
3182 0.3011  1368 0.2686  915 0.2505  774 0.1467  828 0.3180  544 0.2051 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0001)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 276 0.3162  134 0.3474  80 0.1502  105 0.3410  42 0.4976  67 0.3265 
  (0.0000)   (0.0004)   (0.2377)   (0.0117)   (0.0048)   (0.0475) 
3) In-wave 522 0.0389  268 0.0316  125 -0.0724  252 -0.0762  66 0.1339  177 0.0261 
  (0.3184)   (0.4977)   (0.3379)   (0.1085)   (0.3870)   (0.6482) 
4) Post-wave 306 0.3716  155 0.3800  92 0.0308  105 0.0383  50 0.9411  70 0.2158 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.7953)   (0.6481)   (0.0002)   (0.0452) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
283 0.8039  129 0.7922  69 0.8013  101 0.7964  59 0.7590  68 0.8084 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
2079 0.3546  811 0.3126  618 0.3615  312 0.2978  670 0.2784  230 0.3042 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
                  
Non-wave – In-wave 
(5 - 3) 
 0.7650   0.7606   0.8737   0.8726   0.6251   0.7824 
p-value of difference  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0048)   (0.0000) 
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Appendix B4 (Continued). Post-Announcement Acquirer 5-Year Raw Return, by Merger Wave Phase and Type of 
Acquisition 
Panel B: 1981-2009, cash waves  
 All acquisitions 
(1) 
 Public targets, 
all acquirers 
(2) 
 Private targets, 
all acquirers 
(3) 
 Stock 
acquisitions  
(4) 
 Cash acquisitions 
(5) 
 “Pubpubstock” 
deals 
(6) 
 N Returns  N Returns  N Returns  N Returns  N Returns  N Returns 
1) All (including 
non-wave industries) 
3182 0.3011  1368 0.2686  915 0.2505  774 0.1467  828 0.3180  544 0.2051 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0001)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
2) Pre-wave 554 0.2639  245 0.2198  175 0.3193  150 0.2072  97 0.2747  100 0.1894 
  (0.0000)   (0.0006)   (0.0000)   (0.0344)   (0.0027)   (0.0961) 
3) In-wave 797 0.1583  368 0.1003  206 0.0802  175 -0.0303  262 0.2789  132 0.0595 
  (0.0000)   (0.0350)   (0.2473)   (0.6417)   (0.0001)   (0.4433) 
4) Post-wave 578 0.3311  251 0.3546  185 0.1894  144 0.1517  154 0.3857  98 0.2913 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0089)   (0.0308)   (0.0000)   (0.0005) 
5) Non-wave (only 
wave industries) 
628 0.6049  284 0.4994  161 0.6365  194 0.3904  137 0.5736  148 0.3761 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
6) Non-wave (all 
industries) 
1254 0.3946  504 0.3723  349 0.3488  305 0.2161  315 0.3307  214 0.2628 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0004)   (0.0000)   (0.0001) 
                  
Non-wave – In-wave 
(5 - 3) 
 0.4466   0.3992   0.5563   0.4206   0.2947   0.3166 
p-value of difference  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0001)   (0.0096)   (0.0051) 
This table reports the mean acquirers' 5-year post-acquisition raw returns. Post-acquisition 5-year raw returns are the compound returns, calculated for months 
t+1 through t+60, where month t is the month of the merger announcement, or until a firm is delisted, whichever is earlier. We sort the bidders according to 
the timing of the announcement date relative to the industry-specific waves. The pre-wave period includes the year before the beginning of the wave, the in-
wave period includes the two years of the wave, and the post-wave period spans the three years following the end of the wave. Non-wave periods cover the 
rest of the time period. Panel A reports the results using the stock waves (industry merger waves defined using only pure stock offers), whereas Panel B reports 
the results using the cash waves (industry merger waves defined using only pure cash offers).  We report the mean return for each category, along with the p-
value associated with the t-test for statistical difference from zero. The bottom part of each panel shows the results of a t-test for difference in mean return of 
non-wave acquirers (line 5) and in-wave acquirers (line 3).  
We report the mean acquirers’ 5-year post-acquisition raw returns for: all types of acquisitions (column 1), the acquisitions of public and private targets 
(columns 2 and 3), the pure stock and pure cash acquisitions (columns 4 and 5), and public acquirers that made a pure stock offer for a public target (column 
6). P-values are presented in parentheses. Boldfaced differences in mean post-acquisition returns and associated p-values are significant at the 5% level or 
higher. For ease of reading, we do not use boldface characters for simple mean returns, even when they are significantly different from zero.   
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Appendix C1. Summary of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Logit Regression Results 
 
This table summarizes the main findings of the OLS regressions of Table 4.3 and logit regressions of Table 4.4, where the 2.5% filter rule is applied. 
The first (second) row of each weather variable contains results for the OLS (logit) regressions. Only the signs of regression coefficients significant at 
the 20% level or higher are reported. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, two-tailed tests, respectively. The 
superscript a indicates significance at the 20% level. The dependent variables of the OLS regression is daily index return, and that of the logit regression 
is the probability of a positive daily return. All weather variables are based on the average of hourly readings between 6:00 AM and 4:00 PM local time 
on the day of the measurement. SKC is the average sky cover. SPD is the average wind speed. RAIN is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the 
average of the hourly records of liquid precipitations registered in the 6 hours prior to any hourly readings is positive; and zero otherwise. SD is the 
depth of the snow cover on the ground; it is set to zero in summer months and in hot and mild countries. TEMP is the daily average temperature. Panel 
A, B, and C summarize results for the cold, mild, and hot countries, respectively. We define cold, mild, and hot regions based on the 33rd and 67th 
percentiles of the full sample's distribution of annual temperatures. Blue, red, and black colors of the signs indicate results consistent with, inconsistent 
with, or neutral to the interpretation that comfortable weather leads to higher returns, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Cold countries 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC  −* −a −a    −a     −*** 
   −*    −** −*      −*** 
              
SPD   −***   −** −* −*     −* 
   −a           
              
RAIN    −a   −**      −* 
  +a    −a  −a       
               
SD   −a           
 −*** −a −***          −** 
              
TEMP −*** −**    −**   +*** −***   −*** 
  −** −***   +a −* −a  +*** −**  −** −*** 
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Appendix C1 (Continued). Summary of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Logit Regression Results 
 
Panel B: Mild countries 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC   −**   −*       −* 
   +** −a   −***      +***  
               
SPD    −*   −a     −** −a 
     −a −a  −**     −** −* 
               
RAIN      +**        
  −a  −* −**  +a   −a   −* −*** 
               
TEMP −* −***    −**      −a −*** 
  −* −***  −*  −***   +a   −*** −*** 
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Appendix C1 (Continued). Summary of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Logit Regression Results 
 
Panel C:  Hot countries 
 
Jan 
(1) 
Feb 
(2) 
March 
(3) 
April 
(4) 
May 
(5) 
June 
(6) 
July 
(7) 
Aug 
(8) 
Sept 
(9) 
Oct 
(10) 
Nov 
(11) 
Dec 
(12) 
All 
(13) 
SKC −* −**   −**   −
a −a   −*** −*** 
      −a   −a  +a  −**  
               
SPD    +**    −
a −a  −**   
       +**        
               
RAIN       +*** +*     +** 
  +a     +**       +** 
               
TEMP    +*  −
a  −***    +
a  
  +a   +* +* −**  −**    +***  
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Appendix C2. Daily Time Spent Outdoors for Each Month, by Temperature Region 
 
This table reports the averages of daily maximum temperature and daily time spent outdoors for the months, in descending order of time spent outdoors, 
for each temperature region. We estimate the outdoor leisure time using the relationship between time spent outdoors and maximum daily temperature 
retrieved from Graff Zivin and Neidell (2014). 
 
Cold Countries  Mild Countries  Hot Countries 
Month   Maximum 
Daily 
Temperature 
(°F) 
Time Spent 
Outdoors 
(Minutes) 
Month   Maximum 
Daily 
Temperature 
(°F) 
Time Spent 
Outdoors 
(Minutes) 
 
Month Maximum 
Daily 
Temperature 
(°F) 
Time Spent 
Outdoors 
(Minutes) 
July 75.3 40.8  July 79.3 41.4  August 85.5 45.9 
August 72.5 39.4  August 76.4 40.5  June 85.6 45.2 
June 70.5 37.7  June 79.5 40.2  July 85.3 45.1 
September 67.1 34.8  September 73.9 38.9  September 84.4 44.8 
May 62.9 29.2  May 70.0 37.0  May 84.4 44.3 
October 55.6 22.8  April 65.3 32.6  October 82.9 44.0 
April 54.5 21.7  October 63.1 30.3  April 83.1 43.3 
November 45.9 16.0  November 56.5 23.3  November 79.8 42.6 
March 43.7 14.7  March 55.3 21.9  March 79.8 40.9 
December 39.2 12.1  December 49.2 18.5  December 76.3 39.3 
February 35.6 10.6  February 48.4 16.9  February 77.1 39.1 
January 34.4 10.1  January 46.6 16.2  January 75.2 38.4 
 
